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Introduction
An introductory summary
Over the last decade, the total amount of assets under management of U.S.
mutual funds has dramatically grown from $9 trillion in 2005 to over $15 trillion
in 2015.1 The increasingly important role of mutual funds within the financial
system has led to a surge of research examining mutual fund behavior and its
impact on the broader financial economy. This thesis adds to this research area
(i) by studying how fire-sales by mutual funds can result in financial contagion,
(ii) by examining the relationship between securities lending and fund risk, and
(iii) by analyzing the trading activity of mutual funds in the last three days
preceding their disclosure date.
In the first paper “Financial Contagion in the Mutual Fund Industry”
(co-authored with Tim R. Adam), we explore fire-sales as a mechanism for
the transmission of liquidity shocks across the mutual fund industry. Fire-
sales emerge if institutions are forced to sell assets due to liquidity needs,
which can result in temporary asset price declines (Scholes, 1972; Shleifer and
Vishny, 1997; Coval and Stafford, 2007; Jotikasthira, Lundblad, and Ramado-
rai, 2012). By exploiting an exogenous shock to the closed-end fund industry,
we document that some levered closed-end funds were forced to fire-sell por-
tions of their assets in February 2008. Assets that were sold in response to
this shock temporarily declined by up to -10% and infected initially unaffected
open-end funds that were significantly invested in these fire-sale stocks. We
find that the performance deterioration that resulted from these investments
led to fund outflows, which triggered additional fire-sales by open-end funds.
Hence, our paper provides evidence that a liquidity shock can spread through
1 See Investment Company Institute (2016).
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fire-sales from one financial sector to another. This emphasizes the potential
risk of financial contagion inherent in the mutual fund industry.
The second paper “Securities Lending and Fund Risk: Evidence from
Mutual Bond Funds” examines whether mutual bond funds increase their port-
folio risk by reinvesting the cash collateral received in securities lending trans-
actions in risky securities. The reinvestment of collateral is essentially a form
of leverage because lenders remain exposed to price fluctuations of the lent
securities. Due to the opacity of securities lending programs, many regula-
tors have recently noted that the risks embedded in these programs are not
well understood (e.g., International Monetary Fund 2015, Financial Stability
Board 2012). This paper sheds light on these risks by examining the relation
between fund risk and lending. Studying this relation is challenging as lend-
ing and fund risk are endogenous variables that depend on other unobserved
factors. I address this concern by differentiating between funds using their
lending agents. Fund risk should not be associated with lending if the agent
of a fund runs a lending program, in which lending transactions are collateral-
ized by non-cash securities. Moreover, I identify lending agents that are more
likely to follow risky collateral reinvestment strategies by collecting informa-
tion about the agents’ lending losses over the sample period. These losses must
have resulted from risky collateral reinvestments.
Consistent with the hypothesis that lending increases fund risk, I find
that the risk of government bond funds is positively related to their lending
activity. This relationship disappears if the lending agent relies on non-cash
securities as collateral. In contrast, the risk-lending correlation is more pro-
nounced for funds whose lending agent is more likely to reinvest the lending
collateral riskily. These results suggest that securities lending programs should
not be viewed as a risk-free way to generate income and, instead, should be
carefully monitored by investors.
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In the third paper “End-of-Period Trading by Mutual Funds” (co-authored
with Hermann Elendner), we propose a novel way to measure the trading ac-
tivity of mutual funds over the last three days of their reporting period. We use
this measure to systematically analyze the motives for end-of-period trading
and how these trades impact stock prices. Our results indicate that end-of-
period trades are related to window dressing. Window dressing describes the
activity of mutual funds to manipulate holdings shortly before the disclosure
date in an attempt to mislead investors (Agarwal, Gay, and Ling, 2014; Lakon-
ishok, Shleifer, Thaler, and Vishny, 1991). Consistent with this activity, heavy
end-of-period traders tend to disclose a (lower) higher proportion of stocks with
strong (poor) past performance. They further show higher backward holding
return and rank gaps, which are the standard measures for window dressing in
the literature. Some end-of-period trades also appear to be driven by the need
to respond to sudden inflows and outflows (Coval and Stafford, 2007). We do
not find evidence for portfolio pumping, which describes the behavior of ar-
tificially inflating stock prices through aggressive trading immediately before
disclosure (Carhart, 1997). Moreover, funds with large end-of-period trades
do not show superior performance, indicating that most trades at the end of
the period are not related to funds possessing proprietary information.
When examining the relation between stock prices and end-of-period
trading, we find that stocks with a large demand overhang experience price
increases of about 20 bps over the last three days before the end of a reporting
period. In June and December, this price appreciation reverts over the fol-
lowing month. These results are consistent with end-of-period trades causing
temporary price pressure.
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Financial Contagion in the Mutual Fund
Industry
Tim R. Adam Laurenz Klipper
Abstract:
We show that a liquidity shock to closed-end funds can lead to liquidity with-
drawals from open-end funds, thus causing a cascade of fire-sales. The failure
of the market for auction rate securities in 2008 triggered asset sales at some
highly levered closed-end funds. These asset sales led to temporary price de-
clines of up to -10%. Open-end funds that held significant numbers of these
fire-sale stocks experienced outflows, forcing them to sell assets. These forced
sales induced additional price pressure. Our results show that financial conta-
gion can originate in a relatively small sector of the mutual fund industry and
spread to a much larger one.
Keywords: Mutual funds, closed-end funds, financial contagion, fire-sales,
flow-performance relationship, auction rate securities
JEL-Classification: G01, G11, G14, G23, G28
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1 Introduction
“The first sale can set off a cascade of fire-sales that inflicts losses on many
institutions [...] reducing the financial system’s capacity to bear risk.”
— French, Baily, and Campbell (2010), Princeton University Press
Due to the strong interdependencies of our financial system, liquidity shocks
can become contagious by spreading from one market to another. While much
analysis has focused on explaining and understanding financial contagion in
the banking industry, less attention has been paid to the question whether
and how shocks can transmit across non-bank financial institutions, such as
mutual funds. In this paper, we address this question empirically by examining
whether ‘fire-sale cascades’ can explain the spillover of a liquidity shock from
the closed-end to the open-end fund industry.
Fire-sales are forced asset sales triggered by liquidity needs, which can
cause temporary asset price declines (Scholes, 1972; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).
Given that fire-sale assets are not only held by the selling institutions, they
simultaneously cause temporary losses to the portfolios of others. If fund
investors react to these losses by withdrawing liquidity, as predicted by the
well-known flow-performance relationship (Sirri and Tufano, 1998; Chevalier
and Ellison, 1997), they can spur a cascade of additional forced fire-sales at
those funds.1 For that reason, a liquidity shock at some funds can transmit
through fire-sales to other, initially unaffected, institutions.2
To study fire-sale cascades as a channel of financial contagion, we pro-
ceed along the following line of inquiry. First, we use an exogenous liquidity
shock in the closed-end fund industry to overcome the primary challenge of
1 Coval and Stafford (2007) document that outflows can force mutual funds to sell at fire-sale
prices.
2 This argument has been made by Shleifer and Vishny (2011), but is not empirically
examined by them.
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distinguishing between unforced and forced sales. This shock only affected
some levered closed-end funds and, hence, allows for a clear identification of
initial fire-sales. In the second step, we examine whether these fire-sales re-
sult in outflows at open-end funds that were not directly affected by the initial
shock. Such outflows can emerge if investors of open-end funds do not differen-
tiate between a performance deterioration caused by fire-sales and performance
losses that are caused by other factors, such as poor managerial investment
decisions. The examination of the flow-performance relationship and whether
this relationship is affected by the reason for poor performance is, therefore, a
critical part of this paper. Finally, we test whether open-end funds that were
exposed to initial fire-sales sell assets at fire-sale prices themselves.
To identify initial fire-sales, we exploit the failure of the auction rate
security (ARS) market in February 2008, which resulted in a sudden increase in
borrowing costs for some levered closed-end funds. As the shock only affected
levered funds, it is an ideal setting to examine spillover effects to open-end
funds, which typically do not rely on leveraged investment strategies. ARS
are preferred equity instruments, which accounted for almost 70% of total
fund leverage by the end of 2007. The coupon rate of ARS is determined
weekly, bi-weekly, or monthly through an auction mechanism. In February
2008, the auction mechanism for ARS stopped working due to reasons that
were exogenous to the closed-end fund industry. As a result, ARS dividend
rates were set to pre-specified maximum rates, which on average were twice the
rates determined through the regular auction mechanism. In response to this
sudden increase in borrowing costs, closed-end funds redeemed 90% of their
ARS leverage over the following two years. These leverage redemptions were
financed by asset sales as closed-end funds replaced their ARS only partially
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by other debt instruments.3 We use these sales to construct a variable on the
stock level, called ‘selling pressure’. This measure captures the aggregate sales
of all funds that redeem ARS in a given period and proxies for the extent of
price pressure that a stock experiences due to fire-sales in the selling quarter.
Using the asset sales of 53 ARS-levered closed-end funds, we find that
stocks in the two highest selling pressure quintiles experience 4-factor abnor-
mal stock returns of -9.1% to -10.4% in the selling quarter.4 This price drop
is followed by strong price reversals over the next 12 months that almost com-
pletely offset the initial price depreciation. Such a reversal is consistent with a
temporary price drop caused by fire-sales, but inconsistent with a permanent
price drop due to new information.
Some open-end funds that are not directly affected by the failure of the
ARS market are significantly exposed to these fire-sales. We measure this
exposure using a variable called ‘fire-sale exposure’. Funds with the highest
exposure to fire-sales (i.e. funds in the top fire-sale exposure quintile) hold, on
average, 16% of their portfolio in stocks that belong to the highest two selling
pressure quintiles. These investments are costly. On average the 3-month fund
performance deteriorates by 1.1% per one standard deviation increase in fire-
sale exposure. More importantly, these performance losses lead to significant
fund outflows as most investors appear to be insensitive to the reason for poor
performance. We, however, observe differences between investor classes. When
open-end funds are exposed to fire-sales, we show that the flow-performance
relationship is weaker for institutional than for retail investors. This differ-
3 Anecdotal evidence suggests that some funds were unable to replace their ARS by other
debt instruments. For example, the Denali and Calmos Strategic Total Return Fund
writes: ’At this time, the Fund has not found an adequate alternative to replace the
ARPs [a form of ARS]’ (The Denali Fund, N-CSRS, March 2008); ’Our ability to refinance
all preferred shares with debt was constrained by regulations that require total assets in
closed-end funds to be at least three times the amount of debt leverage’ (Calamos Strategic
Total Return Fund, N-CSRS, June 2008).
4 Our results are obtained using the event-study methodology by Kolari and Pynnönen
(2010), which accounts for cross-sectional correlations of returns and inflated volatiles in
the event window.
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ence is not observable in other non-exposure periods and suggests that retail
investors pay less attention to the cause of the performance deterioration.
Finally, we examine whether sales of open-end funds that are exposed to
fire-sales show also return patterns that are consistent with fire-sales. For that
purpose, we define, analog to the selling pressure variable for closed-end funds,
a pressure variable for sales by open-end funds, which we call ‘cascade pressure’.
The cascade pressure variable measures the fraction of shares sold in aggregate
by all open-end funds weighted by each fund’s ‘fire-sale exposure’ during the
previous quarter. Weighting by the fire-sale exposure means that we put more
weight on sales of open-end funds that were strongly exposed to closed-end
fund fire-sales. Consistent with fire-sale cascades, we find that stocks in the
top cascade pressure quintile have on average negative abnormal returns of
-6.4% (as measured by 4-factor alphas) in the selling quarter, even after we
eliminate all stocks held by ARS-levered funds. This return pattern reverses in
the quarter that follows. Our results suggests that fire-sales can spread from
one market segment (stocks held by closed-end funds) to an initially unaffected
market segment (stocks held by open-end funds), posing a potential threat to
financial stability.
One concern that needs to be addressed is the possibility that the ob-
served stock return patterns are driven by unobserved variables or events such
as the financial crisis. We try to mitigate this concern by running placebo
tests using two control groups. To construct the first group we use the sales of
the same ARS-levered funds, but consider only periods in which they do not
redeem their ARS leverage. Hence, we can compare sales of redeeming funds
with non-redeeming funds in the same period. The second control group is
based on sales by funds that were not levered by ARS leverage. Thus, these
funds should not be impacted by the failure of the ARS market. We use the
same method as before to calculate two placebo measures of selling pressure
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based on the sales by both control groups. We do not find evidence for fire-sales
for any of the two measures.
The strong price reaction of stocks sold by ARS-levered funds raises the
question whether the observed price drop is only a result of fire-sales by the
closed-end fund sector, which is relatively small compared to the total mutual
fund industry. While we believe that closed-end fund sales exerted significant
price pressure, the price effect might have been amplified by front-running
speculators such as hedge funds, as described by Brunnermeier and Pedersen
(2005). Consistent with this argument, we observe a strong increase in short
sales for stocks in the top selling quintile during the selling quarter, while we
do not find any increase in short sales for the placebo groups.
Our paper relates to different strands of the existing literature. First, our
study adds to the growing literature on fire-sales, which is pioneered by Shleifer
and Vishny (1992), who describe how forced sales can drive market prices
temporarily away from their fundamental values. The empirical literature
has shown that fire-sales can occur in both financial and product markets. For
example, Campbell, Giglio, and Pathak (2011) show that forced sales can occur
in the housing market. Pulvino (1998) and Benmelech and Bergman (2011)
document that airline companies near or in bankruptcy sell aircrafts below
value. Coval and Stafford (2007) and Jotikasthira, Lundblad, and Ramadorai
(2012) document temporary price declines in stocks that are sold by open-end
funds experiencing severe outflows. Mitchell, Pedersen, and Pulvino (2007)
and Aragon and Strahan (2012) find that forced sales by hedge funds affect
asset prices and liquidity. The work closest to our project is the study by
Tang (2014), who documents price declines of stocks held by levered closed-
end funds that experience an unexpected increase in borrowing costs. We
go beyond Tang’s findings by providing evidence that these initial fire-sales
can cause a cascade of additional fire-sales by open-end funds. We also differ
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from Tang in our identification strategy. In contrast to Tang, we do not only
compare stocks of ARS-levered funds with stocks of non-ARS-levered funds
in the year following the shock, but compare quarterly sales by ARS-levered
funds during redemption periods with sales by ARS-levered funds during non-
redemption periods.
Second, our paper is directly linked to the literature focusing on fire-sale
cascades. Most related to our work are the models by Vayanos and Woolley
(2013) and He and Krishnamurthy (2012, 2013). Vayanos and Woolley (2013)
argue that initial price declines can be amplified by flow-induced fire-sales.
He and Krishnamurthy (2012, 2013) develop two more general models, which
explain how equity withdrawals from financial intermediaries can be reinforcing
in a general equilibrium framework. Lou (2012) argues that fire-sale cascades
can explain mutual fund performance persistence, stock momentum, and the
smart-money-effect. In a summary paper, Shleifer and Vishny (2011) present
anecdotal evidence for such cascades. Other papers focus on fire-sales cascades
that emerge due to de-leveraging cycles. Such de-leveraging cycles can arise
if falling prices cause (i) margin requirements to rise or funding supplies to
decline (Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009; Brunnermeier and Sannikov, 2014;
Dudley and Nimalendran, 2011), (ii) the value of debt collateral to decline
(Gromb and Vayanos, 2002), or (iii) leverage levels to rise above self-imposed
or regulatory limits (Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997; Stein, 2009). We add to this
literature by showing that initial fire-sales in one market can trigger fire-sales
in other, initially unaffected markets.
Third, studying fire-sales also contributes to the stream of literature that
investigates the role of non-banks in financial contagion, excess co-movement
of asset prices, and abnormal asset volatility. Barberis and Shleifer (2003)
show that excess stock co-movement and volatility can be caused by funds
with similar investment styles. Bartram, Griffin, Lim, and Ng (2015) find
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empirical evidence that stock co-movement is related to common mutual fund
ownership. Barberis, Shleifer, and Wurgler (2005) and Greenwood (2005, 2008)
argue that the sentiment and preferences of fund managers affect stock return
correlations. Anton and Polk (2014) show that two unrelated stocks can expe-
rience similar negative returns if they are held by the same funds with strong
outflows. Greenwood and Thesmar (2011) show that non-fundamental stock
volatility can be explained by correlated liquidity withdrawals from mutual
funds. Boyson, Stahel, and Stulz (2010) find that hedge fund returns correlate
more strongly as fundamentals would suggest because of common shocks to
funds’ funding situations. While these studies provide evidence that stock re-
turns are strongly linked and affected by mutual fund behavior and ownership
in general market conditions, Manconi, Massa, and Yasuda (2012), Hau and
Lai (2013) and Adams, Füss, and Gropp (2014) emphasize the importance of
funds in transmitting liquidity shocks. Manconi et al. (2012) argue that funds
that were invested in both secured bonds and corporate bonds were largely
responsible for spreading the crisis from the secured bond market to the cor-
porate bond market. Hau and Lai (2013) find that the shock to bank stocks
in the recent financial crisis spilled-over to non-bank stocks because of out-
flows at funds that were invested in both assets. Adams et al. (2014) quantify
risk spillovers from hedge funds to banks and insurance companies. Our re-
search will be the first to show that a shock to closed-end funds can spread to
open-end funds and the assets they hold.
Finally, our paper is connected to studies that inquire the flow-performance
relationship that was first documented by Sirri and Tufano (1998) and Cheva-
lier and Ellison (1997). Del Guercio and Tkac (2002) show that investors
of pension funds react more strongly to risk-adjusted performance measures,
while mutual fund flows react more strongly to raw returns. James and
Karceski (2006) provide evidence that flows respond less strongly to past per-
formance when the fund is an institutional opposed to a retail fund. Huang,
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Wei, and Yan (2007), Ivković and Weisbenner (2009), and Chen, Goldstein,
and Jiang (2010) find that the flow-performance relationship is affected by
the level of participation costs, expenses, and the funds’ asset compensa-
tion, respectively. We add to this literature by examining whether the flow-
performance relationship is sensitive to the reason for poor performance.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we
describe the experimental design and our main variables, Section 3 covers the
data and data sources. Section 4 reports our empirical results. In Section 5,
we present robustness and additional tests. Section 6 concludes.
2 Experimental design and variables
2.1 Fire-sales by ARS-levered funds
In the first part of our analysis, we study fire-sales by levered closed-end funds.
We identify these fire-sales by exploiting an unexpected shock to the borrow-
ing costs of some levered funds, which resulted in de-leveraging and portfolio
liquidations. Relying on an exogenous shock for the identification of fire-sales
is advantageous as it allows us to refrain from fund flows, which are potentially
endogenous.
2.1.1 The failure of the auction rate security market
In early 2008, some levered closed-end funds were exposed to a funding shock,
when the auction rate security (ARS) market collapsed. ARS are preferred
equity securities, which were used by 21% of our sample funds and accounted
for 70% of total fund leverage by the end of 2007. The feature that distinguishes
ARS from other sources of leverage is that the dividend yield is reset weekly,
bi-weekly, or in rare cases monthly through an auction mechanism. In such an
auction, all existing bids are ranked and the lowest rate at which all ARS can
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be (re-)allocated at par value establishes the clearing rate, which is valid up to
the next auction date. Should the auction mechanism fail, the fund must pay
a pre-specified maximum dividend rate on its outstanding ARS. An auction
failure is usually caused by a demand-supply imbalance, which prevents the
market from clearing.
Before 2008, auction failures of ARS were extremely rare. A special re-
port of Moody’s (2008), for example, recorded only 44 failures in over 100,000
auctions. Starting in mid February 2008, however, the market for ARS secu-
rities suddenly collapsed and almost all auctions began to fail. The auctions
in our sample showed similar failures.5 The main reason for the ARS market
collapse was an unexpected liquidity withdrawal by brokers-dealers (Han and
Li, 2009; Tang, 2014). Brokers-dealers regularly supported auctions by buy-
ing ARS on their own accounts and acting as a market maker. When they
withdrew collectively from the market, there was no buffer for demand and
supply imbalances, which caused the liquidity in the ARS market to quickly
dry up. Consequently, auction failure became a permanent symptom of the
ARS market.
When the ARS market collapsed, the dividend rate of ARS jumped to
their pre-specified maximum rates. Figure 1 captures the development of these
rates around the failure of the ARS market in February 2008. Since our data
set does not contain dividend rates of the sample funds before the ARS mar-
ket failure, we complement our data with the SIFMA Auction Rate Preferred
7-Day Index. This index contains self-reported data from actual ARS issues
(including issues by other institutions than closed-end funds). As shown, the
average dividend rate of the SIFMA index was relatively stable and fluctuated
at about 0.75 of the 1-week US LIBOR rate before the ARS market failure.
Beginning in February, however, the index suddenly increased to a maximum
5 One ARS issue was not subject to auction failure because the whole issue was bought by
an affiliated investor.
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of about 1.4 of LIBOR.6 This corresponds well to the average maximum divi-
dend yield observed among our sample funds, which amounts to about 1.5 of
LIBOR in the periods subsequent to the ARS market failure. This suggests
that our sample funds experienced on average almost a doubling of their bor-
rowing costs. Since the failure of the ARS market was predominantly driven by
liquidity needs of brokers-dealers and since other non-funds institutions were
similarly affected, this increase in funding costs was plausibly exogenous to the
mutual fund industry.
*** Insert Figure 1 about here ***
In response to the sudden increase in borrowing costs, many funds re-
deemed their outstanding ARS, as illustrated in Figure 2.7 Between February
2008 and February 2010, the total volume of outstanding ARS (solid blue
line) declined by about 12 billion, which represents a reduction of almost 90%.
The number of funds that used ARS as a source of leverage (green dashed
line) shrunk in a similar manner. The dotted-dashed red line, which shows
the volume of non-ARS liabilities, indicates that funds partially replaced their
ARS by other liability types. In fact, about 12% of our sample funds replaced
their ARS completely by other debt instruments. In contrast, 14% did not
raise any (non-ARS) debt. Most funds substituted only partially. One reason
for this incomplete substitution is that the SEC imposes lower restrictions on
ARS-leverage (100% of TNA) when compared to debt-leverage (50% of TNA).8
Incomplete substitutions, however, may also have resulted from capital supply
6 Note that the fluctuation in the ARS index after the failure of the ARS market are caused
by a weekly changing composition of issues. Hence, the index strongly depends on the
fraction of failed auctions used to calculate the index at a given date.
7 Most ARS issues are perpetual, but redeemable at the fund’s option.
8 In unreported tests we, however, do not find evidence that sales by funds with more than
50% leverage result in larger price effects.
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frictions.9 Since closed-end funds did not completely substitute their ARS-
leverage, they had to sell assets to finance their ARS redemptions.10 We will
use these sales to identify stocks that were fire-sold.
*** Insert Figure 2 about here ***
2.1.2 Treatment and control groups
One advantage of our setting is that we observe sales of ARS-levered funds
during periods in which they reduced their ARS and during periods in which
they did not alter their ARS positions. While funds needed to sell assets to
finance ARS reductions in redemption periods, they faced no selling pressure in
non-redemption periods. We use this information to differentiate between sales
by ARS-levered funds in redemption (treatment group) and non-redemption
periods (control group I). Moreover, as an additional control group, we also
examine the sales by closed-end funds that did not rely on ARS-leverage and,
hence, faced no direct increase in borrowing costs. Thus, we can examine the
sales of three different groups:
(i) Treatment: Sales of ARS-levered funds in ARS redemption periods
(ii) Control I: Sales of ARS-levered funds in non-ARS redemption periods
(iii) Control II: Sales of non-ARS-levered funds
We expect fire-sales only to be present when studying stock sales of ARS-
levered funds in ARS redemption periods (treatment group), while we should
9 Since the failure of the ARS market was triggered by broker-dealers that were impacted by
tightening credit markets themselves, it is not surprising that closed-end funds could not
easily replace their ARS by bank leverage. We also found anecdotal evidence for credit
supply frictions in fund reports. For example: ’At this time, the Fund has not found an
adequate alternative to replace the ARPs [A form of ARS]’ (The Denali Fund, N-CSRS,
March 2008); ’Our ability to refinance all preferred shares with debt was constrained by
regulations that require total assets in closed-end funds to be at least three times the
amount of debt leverage’ (Calamos Strategic Total Return Fund, N-CSRS, June 2008).
10The average cash position of our ARS-levered funds is less than 1% of total assets and,
hence, plays no significant role in the financing of ARS redemptions.
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not find similar evidence in both control groups. Since funds redeemed their
ARS redemptions in different time periods, we can examine the return patterns
of (forced) asset sales throughout the sample period from 2008 to 2010. This
mitigates concerns that price movements of stocks in the treatment group are
driven by reasons unrelated to fire-sales.
2.1.3 Identification of fire-sales
We identify fire-sale stocks by constructing a time-varying pressure measure
for each stock j, similar to the pressure measure used by Coval and Stafford
(2007). This measure is based on the selling behavior of ARS-levered closed-
end funds during redemption periods (treatment group).
Selling pressure(TG)j,t=
i∈ARS∑
i
(
max(−∆Sharesi,j,t, 0)
NOSHj,t
∣∣∣∣∣Redemptioni,t=1
)
(1)
∆Sharesi,j,t is fund i’s sales of stock j between quarter t−1 and quarter t.
NOSHj,t is stock j’s total shares outstanding at quarter t. Redemptioni,t is a
dummy variable that equals one if fund i reduces its outstanding ARS between
quarter t−1 and quarter t. Intuitively, the selling pressure measure captures
the aggregate sales of stock j by all ARS-levered funds, which redeemed ARS
in a given quarter (treatment group). If the selling pressure measure is high,
the stock is a potential fire-sale stock in the respective quarter. As noted
earlier, closed-end funds redeemed their ARS in different time periods. Hence,
the selling pressure measure has substantial cross-sectional and time-series
variation.
We use an analogous procedure to calculate two placebo selling pressure
measures using the stock sales of ARS-levered funds during non-redemption
periods (control group I) and using the sales of non-ARS levered funds during
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the entire sample period (control group II). As those sales were not triggered by
the need to finance ARS redemptions, there should be no evidence for fire-sales
for these transactions.
Selling pressure(CGI)j,t=
i∈ARS∑
i
(
max(−∆Sharesi,j,t, 0)
NOSHj,t
∣∣∣∣∣Redemptioni,t=0
)
(2)
Selling pressure(CGII)j,t=
i∈non−ARS∑
i
(
max(−∆Sharesi,j,t, 0)
NOSHj,t
)
(3)
2.1.4 Analyzing fire-sale return patterns in event studies
We follow Coval and Stafford (2007) and analyze stock return patterns in event
studies to examine whether our selling pressure measure truly identifies fire-
sale stocks. Fire-sold stocks should experience negative return in the selling
quarter followed by subsequent reversals. Such a reversal is consistent with a
temporary price drop caused by fire-sales, but inconsistent with a permanent
price drop due to a change in investors’ expectations. To analyze stock returns,
we split our stocks into five quintiles according to each stock’s selling pressure.
The probability of detecting fire-sale patterns should increase as we move along
these quintiles. We define for each stock an event quarter, which is the quarter
in which the stock’s selling pressure is the highest during the sample period.
*** Insert Figure 3 about here ***
Figure 3 shows the distribution of these event quarters for the top selling
pressure quintiles of treatment and control groups. While the event quar-
ters of control group II (non-ARS levered funds) are quite equally distributed
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throughout the sample period, most event quarters of the treatment and con-
trol group I are found between the second quarter of 2008 and the first quarter
of 2009. Due to this event clustering, abnormal returns are likely correlated
in the cross-section. Moreover, test statistics might be misspecified due to
event-induced volatility. To account for both, cross-correlation and variance
inflation, we use a recent event study methodology proposed by Kolari and
Pynnönen (2010), which we detail in Appendix A.4.11
For each group and quintile, we conduct separate event studies, in which
we test for abnormal returns in the event quarter and the following 12 months.
Abnormal returns are measured by 4-factor alphas, which account for the
stocks’ risk exposure to the following four factors: (i) the market, (ii) the
size, (iii) the value-to-book, and (iv) the momentum factor. The betas used
to calculate these alphas are estimated using daily returns over the year pre-
ceding the ARS market failure. The test-statistics are computed using the
methodology of Kolari and Pynnönen (2010) and are based on the average
cumulative abnormal return of all stocks in the respective group, quintile, and
event period.
2.2 The impact of fire-sales on open-end funds
To investigate whether fires-sales by ARS-levered closed-end funds can lead to
financial contagion, we study the impact of fire-sales on open-end funds that
were not directly affected by the ARS market failure. If fire-sales negatively
affect asset prices, portfolios of open-end funds with large investments in these
stocks should lose in value. We, therefore, start by investigating whether open-
end funds with high exposure to fire-sale stocks show abnormal performance
losses. Such a performance deterioration can lead to fund outflows if investors
ignore the reason for poor performance and withdraw liquidity from the fund,
11We do not use non-parametric event study tests or a portfolio approach as the test statistic
of Kolari and Pynnönen (2010) is more powerful in long-horizon event studies.
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as predicted by the well-know flow-performance relationship (e.g. Chevalier
and Ellison, 1997; and Sirri and Tufano, 1998). Thus, the main objective of
this section is to examine whether the flow-performance relationship is affected
by the reason for poor performance.
To examine the impact of fire-sales on the performance and flows of
open-end funds, we construct a variable that measures the extent to which an
open-end fund is exposed to fire-sale stocks, which we call ‘fire-sale exposure’.
Monthly selling pressure (TG)j,t =
2∑
m=0
1
3 · Selling pressurej,t+m
FS exposurei,t =
2∑
m=0
∑
j
Monthly selling pressure (TG)j,t−m · wi,j,t−3
(4)
Note that the variable selling pressure (TG) at period t measures stock
j’s price pressure during the last three months. To compute a monthly selling
pressure variable, we take the average of all selling pressure measures that
affect a stock in a given month, i.e. the selling pressure of t, t+ 1, and t+ 2.12
Fund i’s fire-sale (FS) exposure equals the sum of each stock j’s monthly
selling pressure (TG) in quarter t weighted by fund i’s relative investment in
the stock at the beginning of the quarter (wi,j,t−3). Intuitively, an open-end
fund with high fire-sale exposure holds a large proportion of fire-sale stocks.
We hypothesize that the fire-sale exposure measure is negatively related to fund
performance. This relation is not mechanically because open-end funds could
avoid a performance loss by selling a stock before the fire-sales takes place or
make other profitable investments. We then test in our main analysis whether
the flow-performance relationship holds even if the performance deterioration
appears to be driven by price movements due to fire-sales.
12We need to compute the monthly selling pressure variable since funds report to their
shareholders in different calendar months.
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2.3 Fire-sale cascades
Coval and Stafford (2007) show that outflows at open-end funds can result in
fire-sales. Fire-sold stocks depreciate in the selling quarter and show significant
reversals in the subsequent months. If fire-sales by closed-end funds cause
outflows at open-end funds, as predicted in the previous section, assets sold
by open-end funds with high fire-sale exposure should show similar fire-sale
patterns during the outflow quarter. To test this hypothesis, we construct a
pressure measure using our sample of open-end funds, which we call ‘cascade
pressure’.
Cascade pressurej,t=
i∈Open∑
i
max(−∆Sharesi,j,t, 0)·FS exposurei,t−3
NOSHj,t
(5)
Intuitively, the cascade pressure measure captures the proportion of shares
sold in aggregate by all open-end funds weighted by each fund’s fire-sale (FS)
exposure during the previous quarter. We weight by the funds’ fire-sale ex-
posure to give more weight to sales by open-end funds that hold a larger
proportion of ARS fire-sales stocks in their portfolios. Large sales of stocks by
open-end funds that were heavily invested in ARS fire-sale stocks are likely fire-
sale candidates. To isolate the cascade pressure effect from a potential price
impact due to sales of closed-end funds, we will analyze stock returns only
for stocks that were not held by ARS-levered closed-end funds in the previ-
ous quarter. Using the same event study methodology as described in Section
2.1.4, we will examine whether stocks in the highest cascade pressure quin-
tile have abnormal stock returns in the selling quarter and show subsequent
reversals.
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3 Data
Our sample period spans from February 2008 to February 2010 to cover the
period in which the majority of ARS leverage is redeemed in response to the
ARS market failure in February 2008.13 Our data set consists of two sub-
samples: Closed-end and open-end funds.
We use web-crawling techniques to extract information on closed-end
funds from N-SAR forms, which have to be filed by all U.S. investment com-
panies in a semi-annual frequency. N-SAR forms contain a large number of
fund characteristics and detailed balance sheet data.14 Closed-end funds are
identified through question 27 (Q27) on the N-SAR form. We drop all entries
for which the date of filling or the fund name is not extractable as well as
records for which total assets or net assets are zero, negative, or not available.
We only keep funds that primarily invest in equity securities (N-SAR Q66)
since our analyses require detailed holding data that are more extensive for
equity funds.15 Using Q69 on the N-SAR form and the inspection of fund
names, we exclude index and real estate funds. To eliminate funds that only
show up in our sample due to misreporting, we only keep funds for which we
have at least five consecutive observations.
To obtain access to quarterly fund holdings, we carefully merge this
data with the Morningstar Direct and the Thomsaon Reuters S12 Ownership
Database using fund names and tickers. We follow Coval and Stafford (2007)
13 In some descriptive statistics we also present data of before February 2008 to describe the
evolution of leverage over time.
14To ensure the quality of our data, we manually inspect a random sample of 100 N-SAR
fillings, which show no identifiable extraction error.
15Although focusing on relative liquid equity markets, makes it harder to identify mis-
pricing, several studies (e.g. Coval and Stafford 2007, Jotikasthira et al. 2012) document
that stocks sometimes sell at fire-sale prices.
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and require funds to report a minimum of 20 holdings at least once during the
sample period.16
Since data on ARS leverage is not available in any standard database,
we hand-collect quarterly ARS positions as well as quarterly total net assets
for all closed-end funds in our sample from SEC N-CSR(S) and N-Q fillings.
We use the latest available information on ARS leverage before February 2008,
the failure of the ARS market, to differentiate between ARS-levered funds that
were exposed to the funding shock and non-ARS-levered funds. Our closed-
end equity fund sample consists of 53 ARS-levered and 155 non-ARS-levered
funds.
To construct our open-end fund data set, we collect all open-end funds
available in the CRSP Survivor-Bias-Free US Mutual Fund Database. Using
MFLINKS we match this data to quarterly holdings available in the Thomson
Reuters S12 Ownership Database. We eliminate all index funds (as defined
by CRSP) and non-equity funds, which we identify by Thomson’s investment
objective code. We address the incubation bias in the CRSP database identified
by Elton, Gruber, and Blake (2001) and Evans (2004) by removing observations
of funds with less than 5 million assets under management in the previous
month. Similar as with the closed-end fund data, we remove funds that never
report more than 20 holdings throughout the sample period. We are left with
1,469 open-end equity funds.
We match all open-end and closed-end fund holdings to the CRSP Stock
Database using 8-digit CUSIPs to obtain stock prices, returns, and other stock
characteristics. Our sample includes 8,746 different stocks, which represent
70.7% of all common stocks (share code 10 or 11) contained in the CRSP
Stock Database.
16Coval and Stafford (2007) argue that the holdings of funds with less than 20 holdings are
less reliable.
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The paper also relies on several other data sources. Dividend yields of
ARS issues are obtained from the Securities Industry and Financial Markets
Association (SIFMA). 1-week US LIBOR as well as 1-month Treasury Bill
rate are provided by St. Louis Fed. To calculate abnormal returns, we use
the market, size, value-to-book, and momentum factors from the Fama/French
website. The liquidity factor of Pastor and Stambaugh (2003), which is used to
estimate liquidity betas, is downloaded from Lubo Pastor’s research website.
Short sale data on stocks are obtained from the Bats Exchange website.17
The data is used to construct a number of variables that are described
and defined in Appendix A.I. All continuous variables are winsorized at the
1% levels to alleviate the effect of outliers.
4 Results
4.1 Descriptives
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for ARS-levered and non-ARS-levered as
well as open-end funds in the last quarter before the failure of the ARS market
in February 2008. As observed in Panel A, the ARS-levered and non-ARS
levered funds in our sample are considerably large despite their closed-end
structure. While total assets of ARS-levered funds amount to $1,000 million
on average, non-ARS-levered funds manage on average assets worth of $558
million. This difference is partially attributable to different levels of TNA ($679
million compared to $509 million), but is predominantly a result of distinct
leverage policies. ARS-levered funds use considerably more leverage averaging
at 51% of TNA, compared to non-ARS-levered funds (9%). Among the ARS-
levered funds, ARS-leverage accounts for the majority of leverage amounting
to almost 45% of TNA on average. This is important for our identification
17Unreported analyses reveal that the short sale data of the Bats Exchange website has 90%
correlation with the short sale data from NASDAQ.
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strategy as it shows that ARS-levered funds were strongly exposed to the
failure of the ARS market. In contrast, the amount of other leverage accounts
only for 6% of TNA and is comparable to the average amount of other leverage
used by non-ARS-levered funds (9%).
The TNA of open-end funds are on average significantly higher compared
to both closed-end fund groups (1,135 million). However, since open-end funds
usually do not use leverage, the amount of total assets is comparable to the
assets managed by ARS-levered funds.
We observe strong differences in the turnover ratios across all three
groups. The turnover ratio of ARS-levered funds (22%) is on average about
half the turnover ratio of non-ARS-levered funds (42%) and about a quarter of
the turnover ratio of open-end funds (85%). The comparably lower turnover
ratio of closed-end funds is consistent with the findings of Deli and Varma
(2002).
Panel B compares the holding characteristics of the sample funds. Both
closed-end fund groups as well as the open-end funds in our sample invest in
stocks that have similar market capitalization and trading volumes. Stocks
held by open-end funds tend to have slightly lower bid-ask spreads than both
closed-end fund groups. Examining the market beta, we observe that open-end
funds and non-ARS levered funds tend to have a market beta close to one.
In contrast, ARS-levered funds appear to invest in stocks with slightly lower
market betas (0.8). This is consistent with the idea that ARS-levered funds buy
low beta stocks and use leverage to increase their market exposure (Frazzini
and Pedersen, 2014).
*** Insert Table 1 about here ***
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The differences observed in leverage, turnover, and the holdings indi-
cate that ARS-levered and non-ARS-levered funds follow different investment
strategies and, hence, are only imperfect candidates for control and treat-
ment group. For this reason, we use a different identification strategy as Tang
(2014), who compares returns of stocks held by ARS-levered with the stocks
held by non-ARS-levered funds. Instead, we compare stock sales by ARS-
levered funds during redemption periods (treatment group) with stock sales
during non-redemption periods (control group I) and complement this analy-
sis by studying stock sales by non-ARS-levered funds (control group II). Using
this strategy, we search for fire-sales in periods in which ARS-levered funds
sold assets to finance their ARS redemptions.
Consistent with this argument, Panel A of Table 2 shows that the re-
duction of total investments is unusually strong for ARS-levered funds during
redemption periods. On average, total investments shrink by 13.7% in ARS
redemption periods, while total investments fall only by 3.88% if ARS-levered
funds do not redeem. The stronger decrease in total investments stems at
least partly from large reductions in ARS-leverage of about 16.5% on aver-
age. ARS-levered funds in redemption periods seem to be unable to substi-
tute their ARS-leverage by other debt financing. Therefore, total leverage
decreases by 6.3%. For comparison, the leverage ratio decreases only by 1.1%
on average in non-redemption periods. During the same period, the assets of
non-ARS-levered funds only decline by about 5% and leverage remains fairly
stable. This evidence suggests that ARS-levered funds sold assets to finance
their redemptions. Note that our results also indicate that assets are not sold
before the redemption quarter to strategically avoid fire-sale costs.
*** Insert Table 2 about here ***
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For our identification strategy, it is important that our treatment and
control groups sell the same type of stocks. Panel B shows characteristics for
stocks that are sold and not sold by all three groups. Overall, the sales of
ARS-levered funds in ARS redemption periods are comparable to the sales
in non-redemption periods. The stocks are of similar size, experienced in the
past small negative returns of between -1.7% and 2.2%, and differ not sub-
stantially in terms of volatility, dividend yield, and market beta. Sales in ARS
redemption periods tend to have a slightly lower trading volume and a smaller
relative bid ask spread. In contrast, sales of non-ARS levered funds differ
more strongly from the two other groups. Non-ARS-levered funds tend to
sell bigger stocks, stocks with more turnover, higher past stock volatility, and
higher dividend yield. These differences are consistent with our previous ob-
servations that non-ARS-levered funds and ARS-levered funds follow different
investment strategies and justify our approach to compare ARS-levered funds
during redemption with ARS-levered funds during non-redemption periods.
4.2 Fire-sales by ARS-levered funds
4.2.1 Selling pressure and stock returns
In this section, we study whether the failure of the ARS market resulted in
fire-sales. As described in Section 2.1, we identify fire-sales by studying the
sales of ARS-levered funds in periods in which they had to finance their ARS
redemptions and, hence, were likely forced to liquidate assets.
In Panel A of Table 3, stocks are split into five quintiles according to
the selling pressure measure, which captures the extent to which a stock is
sold by ARS-levered funds during their ARS redemption periods. The highest
quintile contains stocks that experience the highest selling pressure during the
sample period and, hence, are the most likely fire-sale candidates. The lowest
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quintile, in contrary, contains stocks with the lowest selling pressure.18 We
define the ’event quarter’ of a stock as the quarter in which its selling pressure
was the highest during the sample period and document (cumulative) 4-factor
adjusted stock returns for the event quarter and the following 12 months.19
For statistical inference, we rely on the event study methodology of Kolari and
Pynnönen (2010), which accounts for cross-sectional return correlations across
stocks and inflated return volatility in the event period.
*** Insert Figure 4 about here ***
Consistent with fire-sales, we find that stocks with high selling pressure
show negative and statistically significant abnormal returns in the event quar-
ter, i.e. the quarter, in which they are sold by ARS-redeeming funds. These
abnormal returns are economically large. Stocks that are sorted into the fourth
and fifth quintile experience on average abnormal stock returns of -9.1% and
10.4%, respectively (see Figure 4 for a graphical representation of the fifth
quintile). Importantly, the price decline observed in the upper two quintiles is
followed by substantial price reversals. In the 3 to 12 months that follow the
fire-sale quarter, stock returns reverse by an average abnormal stock return
of 14.3% for the fifth and an average abnormal stock return of 19.1% for the
fourth quintile.20 Such a reversal is consistent with a temporary price drop
caused by fire-sales, but inconsistent with a permanent price drop due to a
change in investors’ expectations.
Note that in the fifth quintile both, the price decrease as well as the
price reversal, are only significant at the 10% level despite their high economic
18 Stocks that were not sold by ARS-levered funds during ARS redemption periods are not
included.
19Results are robust if we study 1-factor or 5-factor abnormal returns.
20Note that stock prices in the fifth quintile continue to fall in the subsequent three months
after the fire-sale quarter. Two possible reasons for this price decline include fire-sale
cascades, which we examine in Section 4.4, and predatory trading, for which we present
evidence in Section 4.2.2.
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significance. This comparably low level of significance is caused by the choice of
our event study methodology, which accounts for potential correlations across
returns. Given that event dates in the fifth quintile are more clustered when
compared to the other quintiles, t-statistics in this quintile need to be adjusted
more strongly for potential cross-correlations.21 We believe this conservative
approach is important to make sure that t-statistics are not biased upwards.
We find similar downward patterns for the third quintile (-9.3%), but no
subsequent reversals. Hence, the price drop in this quintile is not explainable
by price pressure.22 Among the stocks with low selling pressure (lowest two
quintiles), we do not observe any statistically significant price change. Hence,
stock prices appear to be only affected if they are heavily sold during redemp-
tion periods.
Overall, our results indicate that the sudden need to repay leverage can
result in significant downward price pressure on individual stocks that is not
explainable by information based theories.
*** Insert Table 3 about here ***
A valid concern is that the observed price patterns are spurious or driven
by other contaminating events such as the financial crisis. One feature of our
identification strategy that mitigates this concern is the fact that our sample
funds redeem their ARS in different time periods. Hence, the individual event
quarters differ across stocks.
We further address this issue by conducting two placebo tests. For that
purpose, we repeat the analysis of Panel A, but construct quintiles according to
21 For example, the estimated cross-correaltion in the fifth quintile is 0.02, while it is below
0.004 for the other quintiles. If we do not adjust for this correlation across returns, the
price effect documented in the fifth quintile is significant to the 1% level.
22Coval and Stafford (2007) report similar price effects resulting from voluntary trades.
They believe this effect to be driven by funds bringing information into prices or by
unloading poor performing stocks.
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two placebo selling pressures (defined in Section 2.1). These placebo measures
are based on the sales of ARS-levered funds during non-redemption periods
(control group I) and the sales of non-ARS-levered funds (control group II). As
both groups had no need to finance ARS redemptions during the event quarter,
we can interpret the stocks in the highest quintiles as those stocks that were
heavily, but voluntarily sold within the sample period. Panel B and C reveal
that there is no evidence for fire-sales in both placebo tests. For control group
I, we find no price effect in the event quarter for all quintiles except the third
(Panel B). For control group II, we observe a weak but significant price drop
in the event quarter for the top quintile (Panel C). However, reversals do not
follow on any of these price decreases. This suggests that the price drop is not
caused by fire-sales, but rather the result of funds selling due to information
or in an attempt to eliminate underperforming stocks. Therefore, in contrast
to our treatment stocks, sales of our control groups show no price movements
consistent with fire-sales.
4.2.2 Predatory trading and characteristics of fire-sale stocks
Although about $190 billions of assets were managed by U.S. closed-end funds
by 2008 alone, the industry is relatively small compared to the open-end fund
industry with total net assets of about $9,600 billions.23 This difference might
raise the question whether closed-end funds can create sufficient price pressure
to cause the observed price drop.
We present two arguments to address this question. First, we want to
draw attention to the magnitude of sales by ARS-levered funds during re-
demption periods. During ARS-redemptions total investments by ARS-levered
funds shrink by about 13.7% or $155 million on average (see Table 2). When
multiple funds need to liquidate such a significant proportion of their assets
during adverse market conditions and low market liquidity, which predomi-
23 Investment Company Fact Book, 2009.
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nated during the sample period, it seems reasonable that stock prices are not
immune to these transactions.
Second, and even more importantly, we believe that the price pressure
effect created by ARS-levered funds was amplified by front-running specu-
lators, such as hedge funds. Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2005) show that
front-running or - as they label it - predatory trading can lead to additional
price overshooting and reduced market liquidity.
*** Insert Figure 5 about here ***
The first graph of Figure 5 provides descriptive evidence for front-running
by displaying the short sale volume around the event quarter for stocks in the
highest selling pressure quintile, i.e. for those stocks that showed strong price
declines. The red dashed line indicates that the short-sale volume amounts to
about 0.05% of shares outstanding six months before the event quarter. About
three months before the event quarter short sales start to increase continuously
and the volume reaches a level of about 0.4% one month after the fire-sale
quarter. In the months thereafter, short sales decrease again to a volume
similar to the level before the event quarter. The increase before the event
quarter is consistent with predatory speculators trying to exploit the funds’
selling needs in advance of the transaction.
To ensure that the increase of short sales is not only a byproduct of
the financial crisis or some other phenomena in the sample period, Figure 5
also contains the short sale volume for the top quintile of our two placebo
selling pressures, which we calculate using sales of ARS-levered funds during
non-redemption periods (control group I) and using sales of non-ARS-levered
funds (control group II). For control group I, the fluctuations of the short sale
volume seem to be unrelated to the stocks’ selling pressure. For example, there
is virtually no increase in short sales during the event quarter. The short sale
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volume of control group II is stable throughout the considered time period.
Hence, there is no evident link between short-sales and selling pressure in the
two control groups.
While this evidence is indicative for front-running, it is only feasible if
speculators had access to two pieces of information: (i) The period in which
the fund was forced to sell and (ii) the position that was sold by the pressurized
fund. The first piece of information is publicly known as funds announced their
planned ARS-redemptions in advance. We argue that the speculator could
infer the second piece of information from the funds’ past holdings, which are
known to be sticky.
*** Insert Table 4 about here ***
Table 4 presents evidence that supports our argument. Stocks that were
held in large proportions by ARS-levered funds one quarter before the ARS
market failure turn out to experience higher selling pressure and end up in
the top selling pressure quintile with higher probability. Hence, a speculator
could easily profit from the funds’ selling needs by short-selling stocks in which
ARS-levered funds had the highest ownership. While the ownership by ARS-
levered funds is by far the most predictive variable, fire-sale stocks also tend
to have a smaller market capitalization, higher dividend yields, higher trading
volumes, and a lower sensitivity to the aggregated market liquidity. The latter
two findings support the idea that funds tried to mitigate fire-sale costs by
selling more liquid assets.
4.3 The impact of fire-sales on open-end funds
4.3.1 Univariate results
Although open-end funds are not directly affected by the collapse of the ARS
market, open-end funds are indirectly affected by the shock if they are invested
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in stocks that experience price pressure due to fire-sales by ARS-levered funds.
We measure the exposure to fire-sales using a variable called ‘fire-sale expo-
sure’, as defined in Section 2.2. Our main objective in this section is to ex-
amine whether this exposure leads to fund outflows at open-end funds. These
outflows may emerge if fund investors withdraw liquidity from funds whose
performance suffered from investments in fire-sale stocks. The empirical fact
that fund investors respond to fund performance has been well documented
by several studies in the literature (see e.g. Chevalier and Ellison, 1997 and
Sirri and Tufano, 1998). The main question, therefore, is whether investors
react to poor performance even if the performance deterioration results from
an exposure to fire-sale stocks. This question is important as outflows can
trigger additional fire-sales (Coval and Stafford, 2007).
*** Insert Table 5 about here ***
We start by analyzing this question descriptively. For that purpose, we
sort the open-end funds in our sample into five quintiles according to each
fund’s level of fire-sale (FS) exposure. We then document (i) the average fire-
sale exposure, (ii) the average proportion of the portfolio invested in stocks
that were fire-sold by closed-end funds, (iii) the average 3-month abnormal
fund performance, and (iv) the average netflows in the subsequent quarter.
3-month abnormal fund returns are calculated by adjusting fund returns by
the weighted return of all sample funds.24 All other variables are defined in
Appendix A.I.
As shown in in Table 5 and confirming the validity of our measure, open-
end funds with the lowest fire-sale exposure (quintile 1) have less than 1% of
their assets invested in stocks whose selling pressure is in the top three quintiles.
Hence, their portfolios are essentially not affected by any price pressure induced
24We do not measure performance using factor models as the existing literature shows that
investors react predominantly on raw returns relative to the market.
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by closed-end fund fire-sales. In contrast, open-end funds with the highest
fire-sale exposure (5. quintile) have about 8% of their holdings invested in
stocks belonging to the fifth selling pressure quintile and about 9% of the
assets invested in stocks belonging to the fourth quintile. Since these stocks
experience significant price declines of up to 10%, these investments should be
costly. Consistent with this argument, funds with the highest fire-sale exposure
have abnormal 3-month fund returns that are on average 1% lower than funds
in the lowest exposure quintile. Funds in the fifth exposure quintile also have
on average 1.6% lower netflows than funds in the first exposure quintile. This
suggests that fund investors reacted to the poor performance by withdrawing
liquidity.
4.3.2 Multivariate results
To test whether our descriptive results hold in a multivariate framework, we
estimate the relationship between fire-sale exposure, fund performance, and
fund flows in several regressions. In all of these regressions, we control for
common time trends by including time fixed effects and for unobserved het-
erogeneity across styles using style fixed effects. Similar to Coval and Stafford
(2007), we also control for lagged performance and flow variables to ensure that
our results are not driven by delayed investor reactions. We cluster standard
errors at the fund level to account for non-independent observations within
funds (Petersen, 2009) and report all regression results in Table 6.
*** Insert Table 6 about here ***
We first examine the link between fund performance and fire-sale expo-
sure by regressing 3-month abnormal fund returns on the fire-sale (FS) expo-
sure variable. As evident in column (1), there exists a negative relationship
between exposure and fund performance. A one standard derivation increase
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in fire-sale exposure is associated with a decrease in fund performance of about
1.1% (in absolute terms).
In column (2), we examine how fund flows respond to fund performance
in general by regressing the funds’ quarterly performance on their netflows in
the next quarter. Consistent with the literature, we find that future netflows
tend to be low when fund performance is poor.
In columns (3) to (5), we investigate whether this flow-performance re-
lationship still holds if the performance drop is a result of holding fire-sale
stocks. Column (3) shows that fire-sale pressure is negatively correlated with
future fund flows if we do not adequately control for fund performance in the
current quarter. An increase in fire-sale exposure by one standard deviation,
is associated with 0.6% higher outflows in the next quarter.
In column (4), we run the same regression, but control for fund perfor-
mance in the fire-sale quarter. If the correlation between fire-sale exposure and
flows is, as argued, driven by the flow-performance relationship and investors
do not differentiate between the reasons for poor performance, the exposure
coefficient should now become insignificant. As expected, we do not find any
significant relationship between flows and the exposure variable once we ade-
quately control for fund performance.
In column (5) we additionally interact fund performance with our fire-sale
exposure variable. The interaction term turns out to be insignificant, while
the flow-performance relationship continues to hold. Our results indicate that
investors withdraw liquidity even if the poor performance results from price
pressure induced by fire-sales.
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4.3.3 Institutional vs. retail investors
Our finding that investors do not differentiate between the reasons for poor per-
formance is perhaps somewhat surprising as the performance of funds with high
fire-sale exposure should revert once fire-sale stocks start to recover. Hence,
some sophisticated investors, such as institutional investors, might come to the
conclusion not to withdraw liquidity. We analyze, therefore, whether retail and
institutional investors react differently to performance losses that are linked
to closed-end fund fire-sales. For that purpose, we calculate for each fund the
aggregate flows to all of its institutional and, separately, all of its retail share
classes. Hence, we end up with two share class observations for each fund. We
then analyze whether institutional and retail fund flows of the same fund differ,
when funds are exposed to fire-sales. To conduct this analysis, we estimate
the following regression framework:
SC Flowsc,i,q+1 = β1 · FS Exposurei,q ·Retailc,q · Performancei,q
+ β2 ·Retailc,q · Performancei,q
+ β3 · FS Exposurei,q ·Retailc,q
+ β4 ·Retailc,q + γ ·Xcq + αi,q + c,i,q
(6)
The variable SC Flowsc,i,q+1 denotes the flows to share class c of fund i
at quarter q+ 1. FS Exposurei,q measures each fund’s exposure to closed-end
fund fire-sales. Performancei,q captures the 3-month abnormal performance
of each fund. Retailc,q is a dummy variable that equals one if the share class
is a retail class and zero if the share class is catered to institutional investors.
Similar to the regressions above, we control for lagged netflows of each share
class to account for potential long-term trends (Xcq). We include ‘fund x time’
fixed effects to only consider the variation between institutional and retail
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investors of the same fund at the same time. Note that all variables that
do not vary at the share class level are absorbed by these fixed effects (e.g.
FS Exposurei,q ·Performancei,q). We expect the β1 coefficient to be positive,
which would indicate that institutional investors withdraw less liquidity from
a fund with poor performance and high exposure to fire-sales. If institutional
investors, however, react differently to performance regardless of the level of
exposure, we should only observe a significant β2 coefficient.
*** Insert Table 7 about here ***
As evident in Table 7, we do not find evidence that institutional investors
respond differently than retail investors to fund performance in general. The
β2 coefficient is insignificant in both columns regardless whether the triple in-
teraction term is included or not. However, we find evidence that institutional
investors react less strongly to past performance if the fire-sale exposure is
high, supporting our hypothesis.
4.4 Fire-sale cascades
As shown in the previous section, open-end funds that are strongly invested in
fire-sold stocks suffer from subsequent performance losses. This performance
drop results in fund outflows. Coval and Stafford (2007) document that out-
flows can cause fire-sales. Therefore, we examine in this section whether the
exposure to fire-sales results in sufficiently high outflows to induce a cascade
of additional fire-sales by open-end funds.
We examine this question following a similar procedure as in Section
4.2.1, in which we studied the fire-sales of ARS-levered funds. Instead of using
the selling pressure measure based on ARS-levered funds, however, we sort all
stocks in five quintiles according to our cascade pressure measure, which we
defined in Section 4.4. Cascade pressure measures the extent to which a stock
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is sold by all open-end funds, weighting the sale of each fund by its exposure
to fire-sale stocks in the previous quarter. We exclude all stocks that are held
by ARS-levered funds at the beginning of each quarter to isolate the price
pressure induced by open-end funds from the price pressure created by ARS-
levered funds.25 Similar as before, we define each stock’s event quarter as the
quarter in which the cascade pressure is highest within the sample period and
use the event study methodology of Kolari and Pynnönen (2010) to analyze
abnormal stock returns.
*** Insert Figure 6 about here ***
Table 8 and Figure 6 show that stocks in the highest quintile have on
average strong 4-factor abnormal returns of -6.4% in the event quarter. These
stock returns are not only economically large, but also significant at the 1%
level. Moreover, they are followed by a strong reversal over the following four
months, which amounts to 7.4%.26 This reversal is consistent with a temporary
price drop due to fire-sales and rebuts other explanations such as a change in
investors’ expectations, which would require permanent price changes. Note
that the event quarter in this table is not the quarter in which stocks by ARS-
levered funds are fire-sold, but the quarter thereafter. This timing difference
mitigates the concern that the observed price patterns are related to macro
effects, general co-movements of portfolios, or general market trends. Overall,
our findings suggest that a shock in the closed-end fund sector can transmit to
stocks in the open-end fund industry. This highlights that markets are strongly
interconnected and emphasizes the risk of financial contagion.
*** Insert Table 8 about here ***
25Our results are stronger if stocks held by ARS-levered funds are included.
26Note that we changed the table labels in comparison to the previous section slightly to
document this effect.
38
While we do not find evidence for fire-sales in the lower quintiles consis-
tent with our story, it should be noted that stocks in the second quintile experi-
ence on average a weaker but statistically significant price decrease. This price
decreases is followed by significant reversals. We do not have an explanation
at hand to explain these findings.
5 Robustness and further tests
5.1 Pseudo cascade pressure
To verify that the channel of contagion is linked to investors flows, we conduct a
placebo test based on all non-ARS levered closed-end funds. For that propose,
we construct a placebo cascade pressure for these funds. This measure is
constructed similarly to the cascade pressure in the previous section, but relies
on the aggregate sales by non-ARS levered funds.
FS exposurenon−ARSi,t =
2∑
m=0
∑
j
Monthly selling pressure (TG)j,t−m·wi,j,t−3
(7)
Cascade pressurenon−ARSj,t =
non−ARS∑
i
max(−∆Sharesi,j,t, 0)·FS exposurenon−ARSi,t−3
NOSHj,t
(8)
Due to their closed structure, closed-end funds are not subject to inflows
or outflows. Consequently, non-ARS levered closed-end funds should not feel
any pressure to fire-sale assets due to being exposed to initial fire-sales by
ARS-levered funds. We, therefore, expect no price fluctuation in response to
their asset sales.
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As in the previous section, we use event studies to test whether stocks
with high pseudo cascade pressure show abnormal fund returns. We exclude
all stocks that were held by ARS-levered funds at the beginning of the quarter.
We also exclude all stocks whose (true) cascade pressure belongs to the top
quintile. This way we make sure that we do not pick up any price effect that
arises due to fire-sales by other institutions.
As evident in Table 9, we do not find evidence for fire-sales using our
pseudo cascade pressure measure. The abnormal returns of the considered
stocks are statistically not differentiable from zero except for stocks whose
pseudo cascade pressure belongs to the fourth quarter. Within this fourth
quintile, however, the average abnormal return is positive. Thus, the sales
by non-ARS levered funds, which are not subject to the flow-performance
relationship, do not appear to have caused price pressure.
5.2 Robustness tests
We examine the robustness of our results by making several changes to our
experimental design.27 First, we follow Coval and Stafford (2007) and repeat
our analysis using the following alternative measure for selling pressure:
Selling pressure(TG)altj,t=
i∈ARS∑
i
(
max(−∆Sharesi,j,t, 0)
Avg. trading volj,t−6;t−12
∣∣∣∣∣Redemptioni,t=1
)
(9)
We use this alternative measure to make sure that our results are not
driven by the denominator (i.e. shares outstanding). Our results remain very
similar with negative stock returns of about -8.2% in the selling quarter for
the top selling pressure quintile, followed by significant reversals.
27All results are available upon request.
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Second, we use alternative event study methodologies. While magnitudes
are not affected by this robustness test, the statistical significance increases to
the 1% level if we use the methodology proposed by MacKinlay (1997) or by
Boehmer, Masumeci, and Poulsen (1991), which do not account for correlations
across returns.
Third, instead of using 4-factor abnormal returns we analyze stock re-
turns that are adjusted for only one (market factor) or five factors (Fama and
French, momentum and the liquidity factor of Pastor and Stambaugh, 2003).28
The fire-sale patterns are visible in all specifications, while magnitudes vary
from -8.5% to -14% for the top selling pressure quintile.
Finally, as control group II differs in several dimension from the treatment
group, we use propensity score matching techniques to select those non-ARS
levered funds that compare best to the ARS-levered funds in our sample based
on observables such as leverage and size. We do not find any evidence for
fire-sales in this redefined control group II.
6 Conclusion
In this study, we use the failure of the auction rate security (ARS) market
in February 2008 as a natural experiment to provide evidence for fire-sale
cascades. We find that funds that redeem ARS finance these redemptions by
selling assets. These sales are associated with negative 4-factor stock returns
of up to -10%. Consistent with fire-sales and inconsistent with permanent
price declines due to changes in the stocks’ fundamentals, this price drop is
followed by reversals in the following 12 months. We show that the price
pressure effect induced by ARS-levered funds transmits to initially unaffected
open-end funds that are invested in fire-sale stocks. When open-end fund
28We do not use the 5-factor model as our base specification since the liqudity factor is only
available in a monthly frequency. Hence, we would need to estimate betas over a five year
window.
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investors observe the performance deterioration resulting from this investment
in fire-sale stocks, they update negatively about the fund manager’s ability and
withdraw liquidity. This investor behavior is well known in the literature and it
is also observable if the poor performance is a result of fire-sales. In response to
these fund outflows, open-end funds are forced to liquidate assets themselves.
We find that those sales show similar, but weaker fire-sale patterns. In the
selling quarter stocks sold by pressurized open-end funds fall by up to -6.4%,
even if we exclude all stocks held by ARS-levered funds at the beginning of
the quarter. This price decline is only from temporary nature and reverses in
the subsequent months. Our findings suggest that initial fire-sales can create
sufficient price pressure to set off a cascade of additional fire-sale cascades
posing a threat to financial stability.
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Appendix
A.1 Figures
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Figure 1: Dividend yields around the failure of the ARS market
This figure shows the SIFMA Auction Rate 7-Day index, the 1-month treasury
rate and the average (maximum) dividend yield of ARS issues in our sample
around the ARS market failure in February 2008. The SIFMA Auction Rate
7-day index is based on self-reported (weekly changing) data from actual ARS
issues provided by broker dealers and auction agents. The average maximum
dividend yield is based on 38 ARS issues in our sample, for which data is
available. All rates are scaled by the 1-week US LIBOR interest yield.
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Figure 2: The volume of ARS and other liabilities
This figure shows the number of auction rate security (ARS) users as well as
the total volume of outstanding ARS and other liabilities around the ARS
market failure in February 2008. A fund is defined to be an ARS user if the
fund reports ARS on its balance sheet in a given period. The figure is based
on 53 funds that use ARS as part of their leverage strategy.
Figure 3: The distribution of fire-sales
This figure shows the distribution of stocks in the top selling pressure
quintile of the treatment group (TG), control group I (CGI) and control
group II (CGII). The TG (CGI) is based on sales by ARS-levered funds in
(non-) redemption periods. CGII is based on sales by non-ARS levered funds.
Selling pressure (TG), (CGI) and (CGII) measures the extent to which a stock
is sold by the respective group. Each stock is counted at most once by only con-
sidering the quarter in which the stock has its highest selling pressure within
the sample period from 2008 to 2010. The figure is based 169, 253 and 630
stocks in the top selling pressure quintile of the treatment, control group I and
control group II, respectively.
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Figure 4: Selling pressure & stock returns
These figures show 4-factor cumulative abnormal returns for stocks in the top
selling pressure quintile of the treatment group (TG), control group I (CGI)
and control group II (CGII). The TG (CGI) is based on sales by ARS-levered
funds in (non-) redemption periods. CG II is based on sales by non-ARS
levered funds. Selling pressure (TG), (CGI) and (CGII) measures the extent
to which a stock is sold by the respective group. The event quarter of a stock
(E1, E2, E3) is the quarter in which its selling pressure is the highest within
the sample period from 2008 to 2010. The cumulative returns are based on
monthly returns around this quarter. All variables are defined in Appendix
A.I.
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Figure 5: Selling pressure & short sales
These figures show 4-factor cumulative abnormal returns and the short sale vol-
ume for stocks in the top selling pressure quintile of the treatment group (TG),
control group I (CGI) and control group II (CGII). The TG (CGI) is based
on sales by ARS-levered funds in (non-) redemption periods. CGII is based
on sales by non-ARS levered funds. Selling pressure (TG), (CGI) and (CGII)
measures the extent to which a stock is sold by the respective group. The event
quarter of a stock (E1, E2, E3) is the quarter in which its selling pressure is the
highest within the sample period from 2008 to 2010. The cumulative returns
are based on monthly returns around this quarter. All variables are defined in
Appendix A.I.
53
Figure 6: Cascade pressure & stock returns
This figure shows 4-factor cumulative abnormal returns for stocks in the top
cascade pressure quintile. Cascade pressure is defined in Section 4.4 and cap-
tures the extent to which a stock is sold by all open-end funds weighted by
each fund’s exposure to fire-sales by ARS-levered funds in the previous quar-
ter. The event quarter of a stock (E1, E2, E3) is the quarter in which its
cascade pressure is the highest within the sample period from 2008 to 2010.
The cumulative returns are based on monthly returns around this quarter. All
variables are defined in Appendix A.I.
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Table 4: Predictability and stock characteristics of fire-sale stocks
This table report OLS and logit regressions to evaluate which factors determine high selling
pressure. Selling pressure is defined in Section 2.1.3 and measures the extent to which a
stock is sold by ARS-levered funds during redemption periods. The dependent variable is
each stock’s highest value of selling pressure during the sample period from 2008 to 2010,
and expressed either as a continuous variable or as a dummy variable. The dummy variable
equals one if a stock’s maximum selling pressure belongs to the top quintile. The variable
’Total shares held by ARS-levered funds2007’ is defined for each stock as the aggregated sum
of shares held by ARS-levered funds at the end of 2007, scaled by shares outstanding. All
other variables are defined in Appendix A.I. Marginal effects are shown for regression (2)
and are computed at mean values. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust. T-Values
are reported in parentheses. *,**,*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels
respectively.
Dependent variable
Selling pressure (TG)
Selling pressure (%) 5. Quintile (highest)
(1) (2)
Predictability
Shares held by ARS-levered funds2007 (%) 0.024∗∗∗ 0.695∗∗∗
(6.50) (5.61)
Stock characteristics
Log(Market cap) -0.018∗∗∗ -0.857∗∗∗
(-4.68) (-4.72)
Market beta -0.010 -0.229
(-1.56) (-0.93)
Liquidity beta -0.036∗∗∗ -1.376∗∗∗
(-3.13) (-2.61)
Log(Trading Volume) 0.012∗∗∗ 0.595∗∗∗
(3.11) (3.65)
Dividend yield (%) 0.004∗∗∗ 0.152∗∗∗
(4.21) (4.05)
N 530 530
R2 0.387
Pseudo R2 0.274
Marginal Effects No Yes
Positive predictive value (%) - 68.63
Negative predictive value (%) - 84.97
Correctly classified (%) - 83.40
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Table 6: Fire-sale exposure, fund performance and fund flows
In Column (1) we report a OLS regression relating the fire-sale exposure of open-end funds
to 3-month abnormal fund returns. Columns (2) to (5) show regression estimations relating
the fire-sale exposure to the funds’ 3-month netflows experienced in the next quarter. Fire-
sale (FS) exposure is defined in Section 2.2 and measures the extend to which an open-end
fund is exposed to fire-sales by ARS-levered funds. The 3m abnormal return is the 3-month
fund return in excess of the value weighted return of all open-end sample funds. All other
variables are defined in Appendix A.I. The regressions are based on all open-end funds
during the sample period from February 2008 to February 2010. T-Values are reported in
parentheses. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust and clustered at the fund level.
*,**,*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.
3m abn retq 3m fund net flowsq+1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Main variables
FS exposure (%) -1.91∗∗∗ -0.87∗∗∗ -0.38 -0.62
(-14.28) (-2.68) (-1.14) (-1.16)
3m abn retq 0.35∗∗∗ 0.25∗∗∗ 0.27∗∗∗
(10.01) (4.68) (4.62)
FS exposure * 3m abn retq -3.89
(-0.53)
Lagged variables
3m abn retq-1 0.13∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗
(4.13) (3.28) (3.38) (3.39)
3m abn retq-2 0.15∗∗∗ 0.18∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗
(3.48) (2.96) (3.22) (3.16)
3m abn retq-3 0.08∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗ 0.12∗∗ 0.12∗∗
(2.61) (2.42) (2.56) (2.56)
3m abn retq-4 -0.03 -0.04 -0.01 -0.02
(-0.90) (-0.72) (-0.27) (-0.30)
3m abn retq-5 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.05
(1.14) (0.78) (1.20) (1.19)
3m abn retq-6 0.01 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03
(0.42) (-0.49) (-0.49) (-0.47)
3m fund flowsq 0.13∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗ 0.08∗∗ 0.08∗∗
(5.24) (2.37) (2.18) (2.18)
3m fund flowsq-1 0.10∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗
(5.40) (4.19) (4.19) (4.18)
3m fund flowsq-2 0.05∗∗∗ 0.02 0.02 0.02
(4.51) (1.02) (0.97) (0.98)
3m fund flowsq-3 0.05∗∗∗ 0.06∗ 0.06∗ 0.06∗
(3.84) (1.93) (1.91) (1.91)
3m fund flowsq-4 0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
(1.61) (-0.20) (-0.23) (-0.24)
3m fund flowsq-5 0.03∗ 0.02 0.02 0.02
(1.93) (0.76) (0.77) (0.78)
3m fund flowsq-6 0.03∗∗ 0.04 0.04 0.04
(2.06) (1.59) (1.63) (1.63)
N 7,106 19,301 6,285 6,285 6,285
Adjusted R2 0.0798 0.100 0.0760 0.0811 0.0810
Style fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quarter-time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 7: Retail vs. Institutional fund flows
This table reports OLS regression results examining the relationship between fund perfor-
mance, fire-sale exposure and netflows to institutional and retail share classes of open-end
funds. For each fund, the 3-month netflows to all institutional and retail share classes are
separately aggregated, such that for each fund only two share class observations remain.
3-month netflows for share class c (retail or institutional) and fund i are the sum of monthly
net flows which are calculated using the following formula: Monthly net flowsc,t = TNAc,t -
TNAc,t-1 · (1 + Rc,t). Fire-sale exposure is defined in Section 2.2 and measures the extent
to which an open-end fund is exposed to fire-sales by ARS-levered funds. Retail is a dummy
variable that equals one if the share class caters to retail investors, and zero otherwise. The
3m abnormal return is the 3-month fund return in excess of the value weighted return of all
open-end sample funds. All other variables are defined in Appendix A.I. The regressions are
based on share classes of all open-end funds during the sample period from February 2008 to
February 2010. T-Values are reported in parentheses. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity
robust and clustered at the share class level. *,**,*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%
and 1% levels respectively.
3m fund net flowsq+1
(1) (2)
FS exposure * 3m abn fund retq * Retail 13.04∗∗
(2.03)
3m abn fund retq * Retail -0.10 -0.16
(-1.11) (-1.37)
Retail (Y/N) -0.03∗∗∗ -0.04∗∗∗
(-6.71) (-6.92)
FS exposure * Retail 1.52∗
(1.86)
N 6,648 6,648
Adjusted R2 0.223 0.223
Fund x quarter time fixed effects Yes Yes
Lagged flows No No
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A.3 Variable definitions
Table A.I: Variable Definitions
Variable Name Definition Source
Leverage characteristics:
ARS leverage Liquidation value of all auction rate securities on
the fund’s balance sheet, scaled by TNA.
N-SAR,
N-CSR, N-Q
Other leverage The sum of all liabilities on the fund’s balance
sheet less the liquidation value of all auction rate
securities, scaled by TNA.
N-SAR,
N-CSR, N-Q
Total leverage The sum of other and ARS leverage. N-SAR,
N-CSR, N-Q
Redemption A dummy variable which equals one if the fund re-
ports a decreases in its outstanding ARS by more
than 1% in comparison to the previous quarter.
N-SAR,
N-CSR, N-Q
Types of funds:
ARS-levered fund A closed-end fund that reports ARS leverage on
its last available balance sheet before February
2008.
N-SAR,
N-CSR, N-Q
Non-ARS-levered fund A closed-end fund that reports no ARS leverage
on its last available balance sheet before February
2008.
N-SAR,
N-CSR, N-Q
Pressure measures:
Selling pressure(TGj,t
∑i∈ARS
i
(
max(−∆Sharesi,j,t,0)
NOSHj,t
∣∣∣∣Redemptioni,t = 1)
Selling pressure(CGI)j,t
∑i∈ARS
i
(
max(−∆Sharesi,j,t,0)
NOSHj,t
∣∣∣∣Redemptioni,t = 0)
Selling pressure(CGII)j,t
∑i∈non-ARS
i
(
max(−∆Sharesi,j,t,0)
NOSHj,t
)
M. selling pressure(TG)j,t
2∑
m=0
1
3 · Selling pressurej,t+m
FS exposurei,t
2∑
m=0
∑
j
M. selling pressure(TG)j,t−m · weighti,j,t−3
Cascade pressurej,t
∑i∈Open-end funds
i
max(−∆Sharesi,j,t,0)·FS exposurei,t−3
NOSHj,t
Fund characteristics:
Turnover ratio Min(purchases, sales)/average value of portfolio N-SAR,
CRSP
Monthly fund flowsi,t TNAi,t − TNAi,t−1 · (1 + Fund returni,t) CRSP
Continued on next page
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Table A.I: continued from previous page
Variable Name Definition Source
3-month abn. return 3-month fund return over the weighted return by
all open-end funds in the sample.
CRSP
Stock characteristics:
4-factor abnormal returnj,t Stock returnj,t−
4∑
k=1
factor returnk,t∗βj,k,t, where
the factor returns are the (i) market, (ii) size,
(iii) value-to-book, and (iv) momentum factors.
The betas are estimated by regressing the stocks’
excess daily returns on the factor returns over 250
trading days.
CRSP,
Fama/French,
Pastor
Liquidity beta The regression coefficient of the Pastor liquidity
factor when regressing the fund’s monthly excess
returns over the previous six years on the (i) ex-
cess market return, (ii) the Pastor liquidity factor,
(iii) the size factor, (iv) the value-to-book factor,
and (v) the momentum factor.
CRSP,
Fama/French,
Pastor
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A.4 Event study methodology
The event study methodology used in this paper is adopted from a recent study by Kolari
and Pynnönen (2010). Their design accounts for potential return autocorrelations and cor-
relations across stock returns as well as event-induced increases in stock return volatility.
The test statistics reported in all event-study tables are obtained in the following way:
1. For each stock j, we estimate betas by running the following time-series regression:
Stock returnj,t = αj +
4∑
k=1
Factor returnk,t ∗ βj,k,t + jt (10)
The regressions are based on daily returns in the estimation window [t0, t1] that spans
from February 2007 to January 2008. Factor loadings are only estimated if more than
40 stock observations are available during the estimation period. The factor returns
are (i) the excess market return, (ii) the size factor, (iii) the value-to-book factor, and
(iv) the momentum factor.
2. We use the factor loadings to calculate abnormal returns:
Abnormal returnj,t = Stock returnj,t − αˆj −
4∑
k=1
Factor returnk,t ∗ βˆj,k,t, (11)
3. We obtain cumulative abnormal returns for event window [t2, t3] by taking the sum
of stock j’s abnormal return in this window:
CAR[t2, t3]j =
t3∑
z=t2
Abnormal returnj,z (12)
4. We calculate standardized cumulative abnormal returns using the following formulas:
SCARj =
CAR[t2, t3]j
sCARj
, (13)
sCARj =
√√√√√√√√s2j · T 2EventTEstimation +
4∑
k=1
t3∑
y=t2
(Factor returnk,y − Factor returnk)2
t1∑
z=t0
(Factor returnk,z − Factor returnk)2
, (14)
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sj =
1
TEstimation − 1
t1∑
z=t0
(Abnormal returnj,z −Abnormal returnj)2, (15)
where TEvent and TEstimation denotes the number of observations in the event [t2, t3]
and estimation window [t0, t1], respectively. Factor returnk and Abnormal returnj
is the average (abnormal) return of factor k and stock j in the estimation period.
5. Using the SCARj of all N event stocks, we construct the average standardized cu-
mulative abnormal return in the event window:
ASCAR = 1
N
N∑
SCARj (16)
6. We calculate the Boehmer, Musumeci,and Poulsen(1991) t-test by dividing the ASCAR
by its cross-sectional standard deviation:
TBMP =
√
N
ASCAR
sCAR
(17)
sCAR =
√
1
N − 1 ·
N∑
(SCARj −ASCAR)2 (18)
7. To account for cross-sectional correlation of abnormal returns, we finally adjust this
test-statistic using the average cross-correlation of abnormal returns (r¯) across all
event stocks in the estimation period:
TKP = TBMP
√
1− r¯
1 + (N − 1)r¯ , (19)
r¯ = 1
N(N − 1)
q∑
k=1
Nk(Nk − 1)r¯k, (20)
where Nk event stocks with the same event date are assigned to group k and r¯k
denotes the cross-correlation of abnormal returns of these stocks in the estimation
period.
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Securities Lending and Fund Risk: Evidence
from Mutual Bond Funds
Laurenz Klipper
Abstract:
We examine whether mutual bond funds increase their risk exposure through
securities lending transactions by reinvesting the cash collateral of these trans-
actions in risky assets. Consistent with such risky collateral reinvestments, we
find that the return volatility of government bond funds increases with the
percentage of securities on loan. This relation is only evident among funds
whose lending agent likely reinvests the lending collateral riskily. Fund risk
is unrelated to lending if the lending program is managed by an agent who
typically relies on non-cash collateral which cannot be reinvested. In con-
trast to government bond funds, corporate bond funds do not exhibit a similar
risk-lending link.
Keywords: Mutual funds, risk, securities lending
JEL-Classification: G11, G18, G23, G31
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1 Introduction
“Pressure to improve returns could spur undue risk taking whether via direct
credit exposure or through securities lending and cash reinvestment.”
— International Monetary Fund (2015)
Securities lending by mutual funds is commonly perceived as a risk-free way to
generate additional income for fund investors. However, the lending activity
of mutual funds can lead to an increase in risk exposure since most lending
transactions are collateralized by cash, which can be reinvested by the lender.1
Those reinvestments work like leverage because the lender is exposed to both
price changes of the reinvested collateral and of the securities lent. Current
fund regulation leaves sufficient room for a collateral reinvestment with sub-
stantial risk exposure. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) only
vaguely mandates that collateral needs to be invested in short-term and “suffi-
ciently liquid” instruments. While the leverage and risks embedded in securi-
ties lending programs are not necessarily detrimental for fund investors, several
regulators including the SEC, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the
Financial Stability Board (FSB) recently expressed their concerns about the
opacity of reinvestment practices by mutual funds, which makes it “impossible
to understand fully the extent and nature of financial risks to investors in the
funds and to markets”.2 The objective of this study is to shed light on these
risks by systematically analyzing the relationship between lending and fund
risk in a large sample of mutual bond funds.
Studying the impact of lending on fund risk is challenging because neither
the funds’ lending activity nor their collateral reinvestment is directly observ-
1 Securities lending transactions that are collateralized by cash account for about 70% to
85% of all lending transactions.
2 Quotation taken from a report of the International Monetary Fund (2015). See the reports
of the International Monetary Fund (2015) and the Financial Stability Board (2012) for
a summary of how securities lending is perceived by regulators worldwide.
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able. The main contribution of our study is to address these challenges. While
we are unable to obtain information on collateral reinvestments, we proxy for
the funds’ lending activity by collecting data on the collateral received for se-
curities on loan.3 Using this data we are able to measure the lending volume
for a sample of 887 government bond funds and 834 corporate bond funds over
a time period that spans from 1996 to 2011.
However, this information alone does not allow for a thorough risk-
lending examination as any observed correlation between risk and lending
might be driven by unobserved factors that affect both lending and fund risk.
Acknowledging this problem, we employ two identification strategies that both
rely on additional data on the funds’ lending agents.4 The lending agent is the
institution that runs the securities lending program on behalf of the fund.5 In
our first set of analyses, we identify funds whose lending agent is not a tra-
ditional bank but a central depository (about 12% of all cases). In programs
managed by central depositories, the lender typically does not receive cash
collateral for loaned securities, but relies on assets of the borrower pledged by
the depository as a guarantee. Hence, funds whose lending agents are central
depositories do not have the possibility of risk-taking through (cash) collateral
reinvestments.
While the data on central depositories is helpful for the identification
of funds whose lending transactions are collaterized by non-cash securities,
it does not allow for a differentiation between funds that reinvest their cash
collateral in risk-free assets and those that reinvest their collateral in risky
assets. For that reason, we consider a second identification strategy that is
3 As we do not observe individual liability positions, we take the liability volume of all
liabilities contained in the N-SAR category ’other liabilities’ to proxy for the funds’ lending
collateral. In a random sample of 100 bond funds, the lending collateral accounted for
80% of this category.
4 We identify lending agents using data about each fund’s custodian bank, which typically
coincides with the lending agent.
5 A few large funds manage their lending program on their own without relying on a lending
agent.
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more noisy but targets the set of funds that are more likely to reinvest their
cash collateral riskily. We target those funds by assuming that a lending
agent runs a riskier reinvestment program if the financial press reported about
lending losses generated by the agent during the sample period. This is a clear
indicator that at some point the agent’s collateral pool was invested in risky
assets.6 As a lending agent manages the lending programs of multiple clients,
the lending loss of an agent is not necessarily generated on behalf of our sample
funds. However, some risk commonality in the reinvestment strategy across
an agent’s collateral pools seems plausible; for example, because some agents
rely more strongly on cash collateral than others.7
In support of the idea that lending impacts fund risk, we find that there
exists a positive risk-lending relationship among government bond funds who
do not employ a central depository as their lending agent. Similarly, we find
that this relation is more pronounced if the fund’s lending agent has run risky
reinvestment programs at least once during the sample period. These results
are obtained after controlling for fund and time fixed effects that account for
potential time trends and time-invariant heterogeneity across funds.
The relationship is also economically sizable. A one standard deviation
increase in the lending collateral of government bond funds is associated with
an increase of the median return volatility (idiosyncratic risk level) by 2% to
3% (4% to 6%). This magnitude is a result of pooling all funds whose agents are
non-depositories (identification I) or classified to be ‘risky’ (identification II).
Since it is likely that among these groups not all funds follow risky reinvestment
strategies, the documented risk-lending sensitivity is plausibly a lower bound
and larger for some of the sample funds.
6 In 54% of the observations, the respective lending agent realized lending losses at least
once during the sample period.
7 Since our identification is based on reinvestment outcomes, agents that did not realize
losses could potentially have made reinvestments with similar or even more risk. However,
the probability of realizing losses should increase with the risk embedded in the lending
program, especially since most risky assets lost sharply in value during the financial crisis.
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While using a fund’s lending agent is an important part of our identi-
fication strategy, the choice of the lending agent is endogenous. We try to
mitigate this concern by fixing the fund-agent relationship at each fund’s first
observation in our sample, at which the fund has not yet established a lending
program.8 Although the agent selection in earlier time periods bears similar
endogeneity issues, it is clearly less likely that this selection is related to future
lending and risk-taking. Moreover, the test makes sure that our results are not
driven by a simultaneous change of risk and the lending agent. Using the fixed
fund-agent relationship, we rerun all tests and show that the results are robust
to this adjustment.9
Interestingly, we do not find a similar risk-lending relationship among the
sample of corporate bond funds. The difference in the risk-lending sensitivity
between corporate and government bond funds even persists if we only consider
the variation across corporate and government bond funds within the same
fund family or the same lending agent. These findings are consistent with
the observation of the Federal Reserve (2013) that loans of government bonds
involve greater embedded reinvestment risk than loans of corporate bonds.10
Overall, our results should be important for regulators, who currently
try to asses the risks embedded in securities lending programs. Moreover, our
findings should alert fund investors to carefully monitor the lending programs
of their funds, especially given the large lending losses that some lenders ex-
perienced during the 2007-2009 financial crisis.11
8 We eliminate all funds that had already a securities lending program in place at the fund’s
first year of appearance.
9 We also run several other robustness tests described in Section 7.3.
10The Federal Reserve (2013) does not offer an explanation for this finding.
11The most prominent lending loss is the $13 billion write-off by AIG that was caused by
collateral reinvestments in mortgage backed securities. This and other losses are covered
by a large number of financial articles including Weiss, Miles, ”AIG to Absorb $5 Billion
Loss on Securities Lending”, Bloomberg News (June 27, 2008); Karmin, Craig and Leslie
Scism, ”Securities-Lending Sector Feels Credit-Crisis Squeeze”, Wall Street Journal (Oc-
tober 30, 2008); Story, Louise, ”Banks Shared Clients’ Profits, but Not Losses”, The New
York Times (October 18, 2010).
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Apart from documenting a relationship between lending and fund risk,
we also examine how many and what kind of bond funds lend securities. We
find that the number of lending funds and the extent of lending has increased
dramatically over the sample period. While at the beginning of the sample
period in 1996, only about 7.5% of all government and corporate bond funds
were engaged in securities lending, it was practiced by about 40% at the end
of 2007 and by about 25% by 2011. Similarly, the average lending collateral of
those funds engaged in securities lending increased from less than 4% of TNA
to up to 12% from 1996 to 2011.
Lending is correlated with several fund characteristics. Older and retail
oriented funds are more likely to lend out securities. Similar to equity funds
(see Rizova, 2012; Evans, Ferreira, and Prado, 2016), the decision to lend out
securities is positively related to fund size suggesting that economies of scale
are an important factor. Confirming the results of Evans et al. (2016), we find
that netflows are negatively correlated with fund lending. In the government
bond fund sector, lending is more likely if fund turnover is high and past
performance was poor. In contrast to the prediction of Porras Prado, Saffi,
and Sturgess (2016), but consistent with collateral being invested in short-term
securities, we show that the fraction of short-term assets in the portfolio of a
fund is positively related to initiating a lending program.
Finally, we briefly analyze whether lending is associated with fund per-
formance. Similar to the analysis before, we differentiate by the funds’ lending
agent, but do not find a relation between lending and fund performance for
any agent type. This suggests that risk-taking in lending programs does not
significantly impact fund performance.12
12We find, however, that restricted government bond funds perform better. This contrasts
the results by Evans et al. (2016), who show that restricted equity funds have a lower
fund performance.
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Our results contribute to several strands of the literature. First, it is
closely related to the literature that investigates the impact of lending on fund
returns. Adams, Mansi, and Nishikawa (2014) show that lending returns of
index funds that use sponsor-affiliated lending agents are substantially lower
compared to the lending returns of funds with non-affiliated lending agents.
These results suggest that securities lending programs are prone to agency
problems. Evans et al. (2016) focus on active equity funds and document
that funds which are engaged in securities lending experience lower fund re-
turns, especially if funds face stronger investment restrictions. We contribute
by showing that lending is also related to fund risk, which has not been doc-
umented before. Moreover, we show that lending is not negatively related to
fund performance in the bond fund industry, even if bond funds are restricted.
Second, we contribute to the literature that examines the motives and
determinants of mutual fund lending. Aggarwal, Saffi, and Sturgess (2015)
show that one reason for securities lending is the transfer of voting rights prior
to voting dates. Evidence presented in our paper suggests that risk-taking
might be another motive for lending, beyond the desire to earn additional
income. Rizova (2012) and Evans et al. (2016) investigate the determinants of
lending of index and equity funds, respectively. We complement these studies
by exploring a new data set of a large sample of U.S. mutual bond funds.
Lastly, our study is linked to the large body of literature (e.g. Brown,
Harlow, and Starks 1996, Chevalier and Ellison 1997, Huang, Sialm, and Zhang
2011 and Goetzmann, Ingersoll, Spiegel, and Welch 2007) that documents that
mutual funds strategically vary their risk levels. Fund risk can be altered
using various instruments. For example, Chernenko and Sunderam (2014)
show that money market mutual funds increase their risk exposure by lending
to Eurozone banks. The findings of Koski and Pontiff (1999) and Adam and
Guettler (2015) suggest that funds use derivatives to manage their risk levels in
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response to inflows and outflows or in crisis periods. Studying closed-end funds,
Elton, Gruber, Blake, and Shachar (2013) find a correlation between leverage
and fund return volatility. The evidence provided in this paper suggests that
securities lending is used as an additional instrument for risk-taking.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides
institutional details. In Section 3, we discuss our empirical strategy. Section
4 covers the data. In Section 5, we describe the lending behavior of mutual
bond funds using descriptive statistics. Section 6 reports our main empirical
results. In Section 7, we present additional tests. Section 8 concludes.
2 Institutional background
In a typical transaction (illustrated in Figure 1), the beneficial owner of a
security, such as a mutual fund, pension fund, or an insurance company, agrees
to lend its securities to a borrower, usually a hedge fund or a brokerage firm,
who provides cash or securities as collateral. The SEC requires the collateral
value to be marked to market daily and to be at least 100% of the value of the
lent securities. However, 102% collateral for domestic and 105% for non-US
securities are industry standards. In the U.S., cash is by far the most common
type of collateral and was used in about 83% (72%) of all lending transactions
in 2009 (2011).13 The vast majority of securities lending agreements are rolled
over daily until the security is returned by the borrower or recalled by the
lender, which is possible at any time. For the duration of the loan, ownership
of the security is transferred to the borrower but the security remains effectively
in the lender’s portfolio as the lender retains the right to collecting all coupon
payments and distributions of the lent securities.14 Similar to the stock market,
the most common reason for borrowing bonds (especially corporate bonds) is
13 Federal Reserve (2013).
14 For accounting purposes, the lent securities remain on the asset side of the balance sheet
and the additional collateral leads to an expansion of the balance sheet.
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to facilitate short sales. Bonds are, however, also borrowed for interest rate or
capital spread arbitrage as well as for hedging, cost-effective collateralization,
or making the market.
*** Insert Figure 1 about here ***
Mutual bond funds are allowed to lend bonds as long as a fund’s secu-
rities on loan do not exceed 33.33% of its total assets. The securities lending
programs of most mutual funds are run by an external lending agent, usually
the funds’ custodian, who provides the technology and expertise to aggregate
market supply and manage the collateral process.15 The agent also manage
the counterparty risk by providing indemnification for all losses in case of a
borrower’s default. For their services, lending agents are compensated by tak-
ing a share of the lending income and in rare cases by charging a fixed service
fee.16 In transactions that are collalaterized by non-cash securities, a lending
program generates income by charging a fee to the borrower. In cash collat-
eral transactions, the income from securities lending is equal to the fee paid
by the borrower plus the return earned on reinvesting the cash collateral.17
The cash reinvestment rate depends on how the cash collateral is reinvested.
The regulatory guidelines for collateral reinvestment are vague since securities
lending programs by mutual funds are predominantly regulated through sev-
eral no-action letters released by the SEC. While the SEC mandates in one of
these letters that cash collateral reinvestment should be limited to short-term
and sufficiently liquid instruments, it does not further specify what short-term
and sufficiently liquid means and leaves the type of reinvestment largely to
15Due to the scale of investment required to set up a securities lending program, only some
large funds manage their lending program on their own.
16According to the International Securities Lending Association (2015), the agent receives
about 30% of the lending income on average.
17Technically, the lender does not receive a direct fee from the borrower, but generates
income that equals to the cash reinvestment rate less a rebate rate. The rebate rate is
typically below the overnight money market rate and is the rate that lenders have to
channel back to the borrower for earning interest on the received cash collateral.
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the fund directors’ discretion. This leaves funds a large set of reinvestment
choices.
3 Empirical methodology
The main objective of our study is to examine whether mutual funds use
securities lending programs for risk-taking. Risk-taking in lending programs
can be achieved by reinvesting the lending collateral in risky assets. Since
collateral reinvestment decisions of funds are not observable, we study this
question by analyzing the link between lending and total fund risk. This
indirect examination is problematic as lending and fund risk are potentially
affected by other variables. Therefore, observing a simultaneous increase in
risk and lending does not necessarily imply that lending collateral is reinvested
riskily.
Acknowledging this problem, we do not study the risk-lending corre-
lation unconditionally, but distinguish between funds with different lending
programs. A lending program can be organized in three different ways. First,
lending transactions might be collateralized by non-cash securities. In this case
collateral reinvestments are impossible. Second, lending funds might receive
cash in exchange for lending securities, but decide to reinvest this collateral in
risk-free assets. In both cases, the lending activity of a fund should not have
any effect on fund risk. Finally, funds might receive cash collateral and reinvest
it in risky securities. Given that the reinvestment and the lent securities both
contribute to fund returns, the reinvestment is essentially a form of leverage,
which will, ceteris paribus, increase fund risk.18
18Note that a risky reinvestment will only have a positive effect on fund risk if the collateral
is reinvested in securities that show a non-negative correlation with the other investments
of the fund (i.e. no hedging). Otherwise, lending would have a negative effect on fund
risk. This can easily be seen when considering the variance of a portfolio that consists
of reinvested collateral (marked by subscript ’1’) and other investments (subscript ’2’):
V ar(P ) = w21 ·var(r1)+w22 ·var(r2)+2w1w2 ·cov(r1, r2). Since a reinvestment in securities
with negative correlation would work against us, such a behavior is unproblematic for our
study.
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*** Insert Figure 2 about here ***
While mutual funds do not disclose how their lending program is orga-
nized, we categorize funds by using information on the fund’s lending agents.
Lending agents are engaged by funds to manage their lending programs. We
start by differentiating between funds whose lending agent is a traditional bank
and funds whose program is managed by a central depository (identification I).
Securities lending programs run by central securities depositories are special in
the sense that the lender of a security usually does not receive cash collateral
from the borrower. Instead, if needed, the lender can fall back on the securi-
ties of the borrower, for which the depository guarantees.19 As illustrated in
Figure 2, we use this information to identify funds whose lending transaction
are collateralized by non-cash securities and contrast this group with all other
funds. Given that the majority of U.S. lending transactions are collaterized
by cash, the non-depository group should mainly consist of funds that receive
cash collateral in exchange for lent securities. This gives rise to the following
hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1 (Central depositories)
When a fund increases its securities lending activity that is managed by a
central depository, the riskiness of fund returns increases to a smaller extent
compared to programs that are run by other lending agents.
Using central depositories is useful to identify lending programs in which
transactions are not collateralized by cash. However, it is less helpful in dis-
tinguishing between collateral reinvestments in risky and non-risky securities.
For that reason, we use an alternative method that is more noisy, but identifies
funds whose collateral is more likely reinvested in risky securities (identifica-
tion II). The identification relies again on information about the funds’ lending
19 See the International Securities Lending Association (2015)’s report on securities lending
for a short discussion about central securities depositories.
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agent. We define a lending agent to be ‘risky’ if the financial press reported
about lending losses that the agent generated on behalf of its clients dur-
ing the sample period. Given that clients are typically indemnified against
counterparty losses, these losses must have resulted from risky collateral rein-
vestments. As a lending agent makes individual arrangement with each client,
risk-taking in some accounts does not necessarily imply that the reinvestment
of all other accounts of the agent are equally risky. However, it is likely that
the reinvestment strategy of an agent is correlated across its accounts, for ex-
ample, because some agents rely more strongly on cash collateral than others.
Hence, we expect agents that suffered from lending losses to have a higher
probability of running a risky collateral reinvestment strategy. We compare
funds with risky agents with funds whose lending programs are managed by
non-risky agents (see Figure 2) and hypothesize:
Hypothesis 2 (Risky agents)
When a fund increases its securities lending activity that is managed by a risky
agent, the riskiness of fund returns increases to a greater extent compared to
programs that are run by other lending agents.
Note that our definition of risky agents is based on realized outcomes.
Thus, we are only able to capture funds for which the collateral reinvestment
resulted in losses. Other agents might have used similar or even riskier reinvest-
ment strategies, which were just more successful. Hence, our defined group of
non-risky agents could potentially include agents that take on similar or more
risk through collateral reinvestments than the group of risky agents. This
would impede the validity of our tests. However, most lending losses occurred
in the financial crisis, in which almost all, especially the more volatile assets
lost sharply in value. Thus, it seems plausible that the probability of a loss
realization is an increasing function of risk embedded in lending programs.
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4 Data
4.1 Data sources and sample
We use web-crawling techniques to obtain balance sheet data and other in-
formation on mutual funds’ trading activities from SEC N-SAR forms, which
U.S. investment companies are required to file twice a year. We clean the data
by dropping all observations for which the fund name, TNA, or total assets
are missing, negative, or zero. We eliminate entries for which the sum of all
active balance sheet items does not equal the sum of all items on the passive
side of the balance sheet. Using fund tickers or, if not available, fund names we
match our data to the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) Mutual
Fund database. To avoid spurious mismatches, we inspect all matches manu-
ally and require net assets by both data sources to deviate by less than 5%.20
To address the incubation bias identified by Elton, Gruber, and Blake (2001)
and Evans (2010), we exclude all observations of a fund whose total net assets
are smaller than $5 million in the previous month and whose reporting date is
prior to the fund’s inception date provided by CRSP. To eliminate closed-end
funds we only keep funds that indicate to be an open-end investment company
(N-SAR question 27). Records with a missing answer to question 27 are kept
as long as total netflows over the past six months are nonzero.
To identify bond funds, we use question 62 on the N-SAR form, the
proportion of assets invested in debt securities reported on the funds’ bal-
ance sheets (N-SAR question 74), and the Thomson investment objective code
(IOC), which we obtained by matching our data to Thomson Reuters using
MFLINKS. A fund is classified as a bond fund if its IOC is either 5 (Munic-
ipal Bonds) or 6 (Bond & Preferred) and the fund indicated to be primarily
20We tolerate small deviations to allow for differences in net assets due to rounding and
non-availability of small share classes in the CRSP database.
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invested in debt securities (N-SAR question 62). If the IOC is not available or
unclassified (IOC 9) the fund needs to have at least 80% of its assets invested
in debt securities to be categorized as a bond fund. We exclude money market
funds, which are identified by having turnover ratios of zero and non-missing
daily net asset values on their N-SAR forms. We remove all funds that CRSP
identifies as index funds or that report to be an index fund on their N-SAR
forms (question 69). We also drop all funds that have more than 50% of their
assets invested in state and municipal bonds as municipal bond fund typically
do not engage in securities lending. Finally, we use the proportion of assets
invested in corporate and government bonds to classify the remaining funds
as corporate or government bond funds. While a corporate bond funds needs
to have at least 50% of its assets invested in corporate bonds, a government
bond fund needs to allocate at least 50% of its assets in U.S. treasuries or
U.S. government agency bonds. We differentiate between securities lenders
and non-lenders using N-SAR question 70 N. Our final sample, which spans
from 1996 to 2011, consists of 8,569 observations by 887 distinct government
bond funds and 7,215 observations by 834 distinct corporate bond funds.
Most of our variables are constructed using the data obtained from CRSP
and SEC N-SAR forms as described in Appendix A.I. For calculating betas
and alphas we additionally rely on the Barclays U.S. Aggregate Bond Index,
Barclays U.S. Government Intermediate Index, Barclays U.S. Corporate High
Yield Index, Barclays GNMA Index, and the stock market index, which we
downloaded from Datastream and Kenneth R. French’s website.
4.2 Measuring securities lending collateral
A key challenge of our study is to measure the extent to which funds are
engaged in securities lending. As securities lending arrangements are bilateral
and take place OTC, lending transactions are not directly observable. However,
funds must disclose the cash or non-cash collateral they receive in exchange
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for lent securities as liabilities on their balance sheet. While we do not have
data on single liabilities, we make use of information in SEC N-SAR forms,
in which aggregated data for seven liability categories are contained. These
categories are shown in Panel A of Table 1 for all funds that have lent securities
over the past six months. The biggest liability category, which is responsible
for about 52% of total liabilities, are payables that emerge from instrument
purchases that are not yet settled. Liabilities that emerge from owing to
affiliates, senior long term debt, reverse repurchase agreements, short selling, or
written options are comparably small and represent in aggregate less than 4%
of total liabilities. The low level of liabilities in these categories is consistent
with Almazan, Brown, Carlson, and Chapman (2004), who show that the
majority of open-end funds do not borrow, short sell nor trade with options.
The lending collateral is contained in the category ’other liabilities’, which
accounts for about 45% of total liabilities ($77 million).
*** Insert Table 1 about here ***
To ensure that the category ’other liabilities’ incorporates mainly lending
collateral, we decompose this category for a random sample of 100 funds that
were engaged in securities lending over the last six month and for which other
liabilities exceeded 10% of their TNA. As shown in Panel B, the lending col-
lateral is responsible for about 80% of the total volume of other liabilities. In
comparison, payables and borrowings, which are the second and third strongest
contributors to other liabilities, represent only 9% and 6%, respectively.21 We
use total other liabilities and the information whether a fund currently lends
securities to proxy for each fund’s lending collateral in the following way:
21 In robustness tests we show that our results do not change if we exclude funds that
indicated to borrow money (N-SAR question 70 O).
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Securities lending collateral =

80% ·Other liabilities , if lending
0 , otherwise
(1)
4.3 Identifying central securities depositories
Since lending programs are usually managed by the funds’ custodian banks, we
collect for each fund the name of its primary custodian using N-SAR question
15.22 We use this data to construct the dummy ‘Depository (Y/N)’ that equals
one if a fund declares that its custodian falls under Rule 17f-2 and, hence,
classifies as a central securities depository (12% of all observations). Our
dummy is set equal to zero if the custodian type is a bank (83%), foreign
custodian (4%), or belongs to another category (1%).
4.4 Identifying risky agents
We classify lending agents as ’risky agents’ on the basis of recent articles in the
financial press. We carefully inspect news articles from the Financial Times,
the New York Times, and the World Street Journal to identify securities lend-
ing agents whose collateral pools suffered losses during the sample period.
Since counterparty risk is usually borne by the agent, the losses must have
resulted from the reinvestment of cash collateral. Using this information, we
create the dummy ‘risky agent’, which we set to one if the financial press men-
tioned the lending agent in connection with securities lending losses. For 54%
of our observations this dummy equals one (risky), while for 46% the dummy
equals zero.
22A few funds have more than one custodian bank. For these funds, we use the first custodian
mentioned on the funds’ N-SAR form.
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5 Securities lending by mutual bond funds
5.1 Summary statistics
Table 2 shows summary statistics for securities lenders and non-lenders. All
continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% levels. Panel A shows that gov-
ernment bond funds in our sample are considerably large. Government bond
funds that lend securities have on average more assets under management ($0.9
billion) and are more frequently part of a fund family (80%) when compared to
government bond funds that have no securities on loan ($0.7 billion and 76%).
This suggests that economies of scale play an important role for setting up a
lending program. Government bond funds that are engaged in lending report
on average lending collateral on their balance sheets that represents 9.8% of
the funds’ total net assets. The high standard deviation as well as the low me-
dian value, however, indicate that some funds lend a much higher percentage
of their assets. When compared to government bond funds that are not en-
gaged in securities lending, lenders tend to be older (15 years compared to 13
years), have higher turnover ratios (209% compared to 188%), and attract less
netflows from investors. Perhaps surprisingly, government bond funds that
lend securities have slighlty lower 6-month 4-factor alphas (-1.3% compared
to -1%) although lending programs offer an additional way to generate in-
come. Lenders and non-lenders also show small differences, when we compare
the restrictions on fund management (Almazan index) and the funds lend-
ing agents. Lending agents are differentiated either by distinguishing between
central depositories and other lending agents or by classifying agents in ‘risky’
and ‘non-risky agents’. In spite of these differences, lenders and non-lenders in
the government bond sector are similar with regard to other dimensions. Both
groups cater mainly to retail investors, have similar proportions invested in
short-term securities, and show comparable risk characteristics. Interestingly,
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securities lenders and non-lenders also have similar expense ratios, which sug-
gests that lending income is not used to lower management fees.
*** Insert Table 2 about here ***
Panel B reports the same descriptive statistics for corporate bond funds.
Similar to government bond funds, lending funds in the corporate bond sector
are larger ($1.1 billion in contrast to $0.8 billion), are more often part of a fund
family (84% vs. 81%), are older (14 years vs. 12 years), receive lower netflows,
and face lower management restrictions on average. The average lending col-
lateral of corporate bond funds engaged in securities lending represents 6.9% of
the funds’ TNA. Hence, corporate bond funds lend out a smaller proportions
of their portfolios on average, compared to government bond funds. While
securities lenders perform more poorly in the government bond sector, they
perform better within the corporate bond sector. There are no strong differ-
ences between lenders and non-lenders with regard to risk measures, the retail
dummy, the expense ratio, the family dummy, and the portion invested in short
term securities. As in the government bond sample, corporate funds that lend
out securities, however, tend to employ central depositories and ’risky agents’
slightly more frequently.
5.2 Securities lending over time
As illustrated in Figure 3, the aggregate volume of funds’ lending collateral
has increased strongly over the past years. At the beginning of the sample
period in 1996, the total collateral volume amounted to less than $2.5 billion
for government as well as corporate bond funds. By early 2008, the lending
collateral of the government bond funds in our sample has increased to $40
billion while the lending collateral of all corporate bond funds was worth $13
billion in aggregate. Beginning in 2008, both fund classes reduced their lending
activity slightly. At the end of our sample period in 2011, the lending collateral
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reached $30 billion in the government and $20 billion in the corporate bond
fund sector. These levels represent significant portions of the entire securities
lending market. For example, according to the Federal Reserve (2013) about
337 billion of government bonds were on loan in the U.S. by September 2011,
which implies that collateral of our government bond fund sample was respon-
sible for about 9% of the entire lending supply. The corporate bond funds in
our sample contributed with a share of 13% to 26% (across time) even stronger
to the market of corporate bond loans.23
*** Insert Figure 3 about here ***
The increase in securities lending volume could result from an increased
number of securities lenders or an elevated portfolio proportion lent out by
the same lending funds. To differentiate between these two possibilities and
to better understand how many of our sample funds participated in lending
transactions, Figure 4 shows the number of funds as well as the average lending
collateral for our sample funds over time. Similar to the aggregated collateral
volume, the number of securities lenders as well as the average collateral value
of the lending funds shows a strong increase from 1996 to 2008. While in
1996 less than 10% (5%) of government (corporate) bond funds were engaged
in securities lending, the lending proportion increased to about 35% (28%) in
2008. In the same period the average collateral value rose from 5% (2%) to
14% (10%) among our government (corporate) bond funds, which implies that
the observed aggregate volume increase was a result of an increase in both
the intensive and extensive margin. From 2008 to 2010, we observe a drop in
the fraction of funds with lending programs as well as in the average lending
collateral. However, at the end of the sample period in 2011, lending was still
highly popular and used by 23% of all government bond funds and 24% of all
corporate bond funds with an average lending collateral of about 8%.
23The Federal Reserve (2013) estimated an average volume of $75 billion in the period
between 2009 and 2012.
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*** Insert Figure 4 about here ***
5.3 Securities lending and fund characteristics
Table 3 shows results of multinomial logistic regressions for our government
and corporate bond funds. In these regressions we relate several fund charac-
teristics to two dummy variables. The dummy variable used in columns (1)
and (3) is called ‘Lender’ and equals one if the fund is currently engaged in
securities lending. Since some funds have only very small proportions of their
securities on loan, we use an alternative dummy as the dependent variable in
the remaining regressions. This dummy equals one if funds have a lending
collateral that exceeds 5% of their TNA (‘Collateral > 5%’).24 We cluster
standard errors at the fund level to account for non-independent observations
within funds (Petersen, 2009) and use time fixed effects to absorb common
time trends.
*** Insert Table 3 about here ***
Consistent with Rizova (2012) and Evans et al. (2016), who study the
lending decision of equity and index funds, we find that fund size is positively
and significantly correlated with our lending dummies in all four specifications.
Given the potentially high costs of setting up a securities lending program, this
relationship may be related to economies of scale considerations. Consistent
with this argument, we also observe a significant correlation between lending
and fund family membership. However, this correlation is only present among
government bond funds and is unrelated to the ‘Collateral > 5%’ dummy.
Older government and corporate bond funds are more likely to start lending,
but age is only correlated with a lending volume of more than 5% in the gov-
ernment bond fund sector. Similar to Evans et al. (2016), we find that netflows
24Our results are largely similar if we use a 10% cutoff instead.
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of the previous six months are negatively correlated to lending, except in col-
umn (2). The p-value of the netflow coefficient in this specification, however, is
close to the 10% significance level. If the observed correlation between netflows
and lending is a result of a causal relationship, it is unclear whether investors
shy away from securities lending programs or managers start to increase their
lending engagement in response to fund outflows. Government bond funds
with a high turnover ratio lend securities more often and on a larger scale.
Interestingly, we do not find a similar lending-turnover link for corporate bond
funds. The expense ratio is not related to lending decisions. This is surprising
as many funds claim that the lending income is used to reduce management
fees. Government and corporate funds that are targeted to retail investors are
more likely to initiate a securities lending program, but do not lend out more
than 5% of their assets more frequently. Porras Prado et al. (2016) argue that
funds that invest in long term securities are more likely to be a loan supplier of
securities because their portfolios change less frequently. In contrast to their
results, we find that funds who invest more in short term securities are more
likely to lend securities in all specifications. This inconsistency is explainable
by the fact that our sample funds are usually long-term investors with less
than 7% of their assets invested in short term securities on average. Hence,
the observed positive relationship might just result from funds investing part
of their collateral in short-term securities. Finally, we find that government
and corporate bond funds respond differently to past performance. Govern-
ment bond funds increase their lending activity if alphas are low consistent
with seeking additional sources of income after performing poorly (e.g. Brown
et al. 1996 and Chevalier and Ellison 1997). Among corporate bond funds, we
observe the opposite relationship if we consider the ‘Lender’ dummy, and no
correlation if we consider the ‘Collateral > 5%’ dummy variable.
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6 Securities lending and fund Risk
6.1 Central depositories vs. other lending agents
As described in Section 3, mutual funds employ different lending agents to
run their lending programs. If the lending program is managed by a cen-
tral depository, the typical lending transaction is not collateralized by cash,
but is secured by the borrowers’ assets pledged by the depository. For that
reason, there is no opportunity for risky collateral reinvestments. We, there-
fore, estimate different risk-lending sensitivities for lending programs managed
by depositories and other agents. For this estimation, we use the following
regression framework:
Riski,t = αi+αt+β1·Collaterali,t×CDi,t+β2·Collaterali,t+β3·CDi,t+γ·Xi,t+i,t
(2)
Riski,t represents one of the following risk measures, which we will use
as dependent variables in different regression specifications: (i) the standard
deviation of fund returns, (ii) the beta measuring the sensitivity of fund returns
to the U.S. aggregate bond index and (iii) the idiosyncratic risk, which is the
residual variance not captured by the beta. We compute all risk measures
over a six month window around the reporting date of the lending collateral.25
Collaterali,t is the securities lending collateral of fund i at half-year t scaled
by the fund’s total net assets. CDi,t is a dummy variable that equals one if
the fund’s lending agent (proxied by the fund’s custodian bank) is a central
depository. Interacting the collateral with the central depository dummy allows
us to obtain different coefficients for both agent types. We include time fixed
25While the collateral information we use is only a snapshot at the end of the reporting
period, unreported analyses reveal that lending collateral volumes are highly persistent.
91
effects to capture potential time trends, such as general increases in return
volatility or lending collateral. We use fund fixed effects to control for time-
invariant differences between our sample funds. We also include time-varying
fund characteristics (Xi,t) such as fund size, lagged fund performance, and
turnover, which could potentially be correlated with fund risk and the lending
collateral. Standard errors are clustered at the fund level and are, hence,
robust to non-independent observations within funds.
*** Insert Table 4 about here ***
Table 4 reports the regression results for government (columns (1) to
(3)) and corporate bond funds (columns (4) to (6)) separately to account for
potential structural differences in their securities lending programs. In the
government bond fund regressions, the interaction term is significantly and
negatively correlated with the standard deviation and idiosyncratic risk of
fund returns. In contrast, the coefficient of the non-interacted collateral is
positive. The absolute magnitude of the interacted and non-interacted coeffi-
cient is statistically not differentiable. Hence, the risk-lending relationship is
only observable for funds with non-depository agents, supporting Hypothesis
1. If a fund with a non-depository agent increases its lending collateral by one
standard deviation, the return volatility (idiosyncratic risk) shows a simulta-
neous increase of 0.5% (0.4%) which represents about 2% (4%) of the mean
value. As we use fund fixed effects in our regressions, this effect is not driven
by time-invariant differences in our sample funds. In the beta specification,
the interaction term as well as the non-interacted lending collateral is not sig-
nificant. The observed risk increase, hence, is predominantly driven by risk
exposure to a factor that is not systematically related to the aggregate bond
index.
92
Turning to the corporate bond funds, the coefficients of the interaction
term point in the right direction, but are not statistically differentiable from
zero. One exception is the coefficient of the interaction term in regression
(5), in which, however, the non-interacted coefficient is insignificant. Overall,
the results do not suggest that there is a sizable correlation between lending
and fund risk among corporate bond funds. We will discuss this result more
thoroughly in Section 7.1.
6.2 Risky vs non-risky lending agents
In the previous section, we compared funds whose lending transactions are
collateralized by non-cash securities with funds who are more likely to rely on
cash collateral. The disadvantage of this comparison is that we do not directly
identify funds that reinvest the collateral in risky assets. Moreover, funds
using central depositories might be structurally different to funds that engage
other agents. We, therefore, use an alternative method to classify lending
agents with the intention to target funds that reinvest the collateral in risky
securities. For that purpose we try to differentiate between ‘risky’ and other
agents. As described in Section 3, we define an agent to be a ‘risky agent’
if there is evidence of the agent suffering lending losses during the sample
period.26 These losses indicate that the agent reinvested some of its collateral
in risky securities. While the losses of the agent might not be generated on
behalf of our sample funds, we assume that there is some risk commonality
in the reinvestment strategy across the collateral pools of an agent. As in
the previous section, we interact the lending collateral with the ‘risky agent’
dummy and hypothesize that funds with ‘risky’ agents show stronger risk-
lending sensitivities (Hypothesis 2 ).
*** Insert Table 5 about here ***
26 In Section 3 we discuss potential concerns of using realized outcomes to define our agents.
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In the regressions reported in Table 5, we find support for our hypothesis
among the government bond funds. The regression coefficient of the lending
collateral is only significant if interacted with the ‘risky agent’ dummy. For
funds with risky agents, a change in lending collateral by one standard devia-
tion is associated with a 0.75% (0.5%) change in the funds’ standard deviation
(idiosyncratic risk measure) representing about 3% (6%) of the median value.
For funds with non-risk agents, there is no lending-risk link consistent with
the idea that on average these funds did not reinvest their lending collateral
in (sufficiently) risky securities.
For corporate bond funds, we do not find any significant relationship
between a fund’s lending activity and risk, except in the idiosyncratic risk
regression. In this regression the interaction term is significant at the 10%
level, but is not statistically distinguishable from zero if taken in conjecture
with the coefficient of the non-interacted lending collateral.
Overall, the results in the government bond fund sector imply that the
risk-lending correlation varies with the type of the agent regardless whether we
differentiate between central depositories and conventional banks or between
risky and non-risky agents. All findings are in support of our story that some
lenders reinvest their lending collateral in risky assets. Moreover, alternative
stories are only plausible if they can explain the variation of the risk-lending
sensitivities found across funds. For example, while it is likely that in times
of high volatility short-sale demand and return risk is high, it is difficult to
imagine why this should only affect funds with ‘risky’ agents.
6.3 Lending agents and endogeneity
While using lending agents helps to improve our identification, it raises a po-
tential concern given that the choice of the agent is endogenous. For example,
funds that run risky reinvestment strategies during periods, in which the de-
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mand for securities loans is high, might prefer a certain agent at this time.
We try to mitigate this concern by fixing the fund-agent relationship using
details on each fund’s first observation in our sample. If a fund was already
engaged in securities lending at the fund’s first or second observation, we ex-
clude the fund from the analysis.27 Hence, all funds left in our sample have
at least one year at the beginning of the sample period, at which they were
not yet engaged in securities lending. For our test to work, we have to rely on
two assumptions: First, the relationship between a bank and its clients needs
to be persistent over time, an assumption supported by several papers in the
relationship-banking literature. This literature argues that switching cost be-
come more expensive the longer the relationship lasts (e.g. see Sharpe 1990
and Rajan 1992). Moreover, in our sample 58% of the funds employ the same
agent over the whole sample period. Second, the choice of the lending agent
at the beginning of the period should not be correlated with future return risk
and future lending behavior. While we cannot rule out that such a correla-
tion exists, we believe that endogeneity concerns are significantly mitigated
by using fund information before the fund’s first lending engagement. Having
fixed the agent-lending relationship, we rerun our regressions of the previous
sections and report the regression results for the government bond funds in
Table 6.28
*** Insert Table 6 about here ***
Not surprisingly, fixing the agent-fund relationship reduces the power of
our tests. However, in the regressions in which the standard deviation is the
dependent variable, the coefficient of the interaction term remains statistically
significant for both the central depository and the ‘risky agent’ regressions,
27Our results are stronger if we keep the entire sample. To be conservative, we exclude both
the fund’s first and second observation because the agent selection might have already
occurred at the end of the previous period.
28To save space we omit results for the corporate bond fund sample.
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which is consistent with our previous findings. If we regress our variables on
idiosyncratic risk, the significance of the interaction term drops barely below
the 10% level (t-value of -1.59) in the depository specification, but remains
significant in in the risky agent regression (t-value of 1.89). Hence, the lending-
risk correlation is generally robust to fixing the fund-agent relation.
7 Additional tests
7.1 Government vs. corporate bond funds
In the previous sections, we document a correlation between lending and fund
risk for government bond funds, but do not find a similar relationship for cor-
porate bond funds. We employ two additional tests to analyze this difference
in greater detail. We start by documenting the differential effect between the
two groups using a pooled regression. For that purpose we interact the lending
collateral with a dummy variable that equals one if the fund is a government
bond fund. Columns (1) to (3) of Table 7 document the results, which are
in line with our previous findings. While we do not find any significance for
the non-interacted lending collateral, the lending collateral interacted with
the government bond fund dummy is positive and significantly related to the
standard deviation of returns and the idiosyncratic risk measure.29
*** Insert Table 7 about here ***
Given our previous results, the difference between corporate and gov-
ernment bond funds might result from different fund-agent relationships. For
example, the lending agents of corporate bond fund might have relied more
strongly on non-cash collateral in general compared to government bond funds.
29 In unreported tests, we also examine the difference between government and corporate
bond funds when we differentiate by lending agents. Regardless of the lending agent,
government bond funds have a higher risk-lending sensitivity compared to corporate bond
funds.
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We examine the role of the agent in columns (4) to (6) by including ‘agent x
time’ fixed effects.30 These fixed effects absorb all common variation that
comes from an specific agent in a given time period. Hence, if the observed
lending-risk heterogeneity between both fund groups is driven by some general
characteristic or actions of a specific agent (e.g. a certain way the agent rein-
vests all of its collateral pools), the differential effect should vanish once we
include agent-time fixed effects. However, as evident in Table 7, the difference
in the collateral-risk correlation between the two fund groups still prevails.
In the last three columns, we examine whether the difference between
corporate and government bond fund disappears if we compare funds of the
same fund management company. For that purpose, we exclude all funds
that do not belong to a fund family. We also drop a fund observation if in
the considered period the fund management company does not own at least
one government and corporate bond fund in our sample. We then include,
similar as in the agent regressions, ‘family x time’ fixed effects to examine the
variation within the same family in the same period. A drop in significance
of the interaction term would imply that the difference between corporate
and government bond funds is driven by funds belonging to different fund
families that might have heterogeneous lending policies. Inconsistent with this
explanation, the coefficient of the interaction term remains significant after
including ‘family x time’ fixed effects.
Overall, our results indicate that the difference between government and
corporate bond funds is not driven by a commonality on the agent or fund
family level. Instead our results suggest that lending programs in the gov-
ernment and corporate bond market are structurally different. These findings
are consistent with a recent report of the Federal Reserve (2013), which doc-
uments that the income of loaning government bonds depends more strongly
30 Similar results are obtained by only including agent fixed effects.
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on collateral reinvestments (and less strongly on lending fees) than the income
of loaning corporate bonds.
7.2 Securities lending and fund performance
In this section, we examine the relationship between lending and fund perfor-
mance as several studies suggest that lending affects performance. To mea-
sure fund performance, we calculate 4-factor alphas. Hence, lending can only
impact fund performance if it generates returns that are not systematically
related to the following risk factors: (i) the excess return of the US aggre-
gated bond index, (ii) the excess return of the stock market, (iii) a default
factor, and (iv) a mortgage market factor.31 Similar to the previous sections,
we differentiate between different lending agents using interaction terms. We
additionally include a variable called ’Almazan index’, which was introduced
by Almazan et al. (2004) and is used by Evans et al. (2016) to measure whether
fund managers are constrained.32 In their sample of equity funds, Evans et al.
(2016) find the lending activity of constrained funds to be negatively related to
performance. We follow Evans et al. (2016) and interact this variable with the
funds’ lending activity.33 We regress all interaction terms on fund performance
and report the results in Table 8.
*** Insert Table 8 about here ***
Columns (1) to (3) show the regression estimates for the government bond
fund sample, while regressions (4) to (6) are based on our corporate bond funds.
In all specifications, the coefficient of the non-interacted lending collateral
is insignificant. Similarly, we do not find any correlation between lending
31Our results are similar if we use 1-factor alphas which are only based on the US aggregated
bond index. See Appendix A.I for a detailed description of how alphas are calculated.
32As described in Appendix A.I, we make small adjustments to the index to fit our bond
fund sample.
33Note that Evans et al. (2016) do not use the lending collateral to measure the funds’
lending activity. Instead, they rely on a dummy variable that equals one if the fund is
engaged in lending and zero otherwise.
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and performance if we interact the collateral with our agent dummies. This
suggests that risk-taking through lending transactions is not per se detrimental
to fund performance.
Interestingly, in the government bond fund regressions, (1) and (2), the
interaction term that links the collateral and the Almazan Index is positive
and significant. Such a relation is not observable among corporate bond funds.
Both results are in contrast to the study of Evans et al. (2016), which implies
that their findings are not transferable to the bond fund industry.
7.3 Robustness tests
We examine the sensitivity of our results using additional robustness tests.34
First, since our measure of lending collateral might be contaminated by other
forms of leverage we rerun our tests using only funds that indicate not to
borrow money (N-SAR question 70 O). Second, we try to mitigate reverse
causality concerns. Instead of relying on the six months around the fund’s
reporting date, we compute our risk over the next three months. Third, we
examine whether our results are affected if we include all funds that never lend
their securities. We use the custodian bank of these funds as their fictious
agents. Our results are quantitatively and statistically robust to all of these
adjustments.
8 Conclusion
The percentage of mutual bond funds that run securities lending programs
has increased strongly over the past 20 years. While in 1996 less than 8%
of the funds were engaged in securities lending, this percentage increased to
almost 40% just before the outbreak of the financial crisis in 2007, falling
back to 25% by the end of our sample period in 2011. During this time
34Results are available upon request.
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period larger, older, and more retail oriented funds as well as funds with a
higher proportion of assets invested in short-term securities were more likely
to initiate a securities lending program. Lending transactions are also more
frequently undertaken by government bond funds with high turnover and poor
past performance. Despite the common perception that this activity is a risk-
less way of earning additional income, securities lending can be used to increase
a fund’s exposure to risk by reinvesting the collateral received in risky assets.
Consistent with funds using their lending programs in this way, we find that the
amount of securities on loan is positively associated with the return volatility of
government bond funds whose lending transactions are likely collateralized by
cash. In contrast, securities lending and fund risk is uncorrelated if the lending
program is run by a central depository, in which the typical form of collateral
are non-cash securities. We also document that the lending-risk relationship is
more pronounced for government bond funds if there is evidence in the financial
press that the lending agent generated lending losses during the sample period.
These findings suggest that investors should take into account the potential
risk embedded in securities lending programs and carefully monitor the lending
strategy and activity of their funds. However, fund risk does not vary with
lending for all of our sample funds. Interestingly, there is no risk-lending
link among corporate bond funds. This difference between government and
corporate bond funds even persists if we focus on corporate and government
bond funds of the same fund family or the same lending agent. Exploring this
difference further is an interesting task left for future research.
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Appendix
A.1 Figures
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Figure 1: Securities lending transaction
This figure illustrates the mechanism of a typical securities lending transaction,
in which loaned securities are collateralized by cash.
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Figure 2: Identification
This figure illustrates how the lending agent of a fund is used to distinguish be-
tween different lending programs. While lending programs managed by central
depositories are typically collateralized by non-cash securities, ‘risky’ agents
are expected to rely more strongly on cash collateral and risky reinvestment
strategies. Both agents are defined in Section 4.
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Figure 3: The volume of securities lending collateral
This figure displays the total aggregated volume of lending collateral on the
funds’ balance sheets over the sample period from 1996 to 2011. In Panel A,
the volume is computed by aggregating over all government bond funds while
the volume is the sum of the lending collateral of all corporate bond funds in
Panel B. Our sample consists of 8,569 observations by 887 government bond
funds and 7,215 observations by 834 corporate bond funds.
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Figure 4: Securities lending activity
The solid line of this figure shows the fraction of funds engaged in securities
lending over the sample period from 1996 to 2011. The dashed line represents
the value of the average lending collateral as a percentage of TNA for all funds
that have securities on loan at the respective period. The graphs displayed in
Panel A are based on 8,569 observations by 887 government bond funds, while
Panel B is based on 7,215 observations by 834 corporate bond funds.
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A.2 Tables
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Table 1: Securities lending collateral and other liabilities
Panel A of this table reports the average volume for seven distinct liability categories using
data from 6,433 observations by 760 distinct funds that were engaged in securities lending
over the past six months. In Panel B the category ’other liabilities’ is decomposed for a
random sample of 100 fund observations for which the lending collateral exceeded 10% of
TNA. The decomposition is based on individual liability positions that are assigned to seven
distinct liability categories. The percentages displayed in Panel A (Panel B) are computed
by dividing the average volume of each liability category by the average amount of total
liabilities (other liabilities).
Ø Volume (mio USD) % Total
Panel A: Breakup of liabilities using NSAR information
Payables 87.36 51.60
Owed to affiliated persons 0.69 0.41
Senior long-term debt 0.17 0.10
Reverse repos 1.09 0.64
Short sales 2.84 1.68
Written options 0.33 0.20
Other liabilities (including SL collateral) 76.80 45.37
Panel B: Breakup of other liabilities using a random sample of 100 lenders
Lending collateral 129.41 79.59
Payables 15.06 9.26
Dividends, fees and other expenses 0.63 0.39
Borrowings 9.64 5.93
Written options 6.33 3.89
Redeemed shares 1.39 0.86
Not-assignable liabilities 0.12 0.07
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A.3 Variable definitions
Table A.I: Variable Definitions
Variable Name Definition Source
Lending variables:
Lender Dummy variable that equals one if a fund was
engaged in securities lending over the past six
months.
N-SAR
Lending (SL) collateral 80% of other liabilities if a fund lends out se-
curities and zero otherwise.
N-SAR
Lending agent definitions:
Central depository Dummy variable that equals one if a fund de-
clares that its custodian falls under Rule 17f-2.
N-SAR
Risky agent Dummy variable that equals one if a fund’s
custodian was mentioned in the financial press
in connection with securities lending losses.
Press
Fund characteristics:
6m netflows The sum of monthly netflows over the past
six months divided by TNA of the previous
period, where monthly netflows are computed
by the following formula: TNAi,t−TNAi,t−1 ·
(1 + Fund returni,t)
CRSP
Turnover Minimum of total purchases and total sales
over the monthly average value of the portfo-
lio.
CRSP
Expenses A fund’s operating expenses including 122b-1
fees over TNA.
CRSP
Retail Dummy variable that equals one if the ma-
jority of share classes is catered to retail in-
vestors.
CRSP
Investment in ST securities Percentage of assets invested in securities with
a maturity of less than 1 year.
NSAR
Continued on next page
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Table A.I: continued from previous page
Variable Name Definition Source
Leverage index Average value of three dummy variables that
equal one if a fund is not permitted to (i) bor-
row money, (ii) purchase on margin and (iii)
sell securities short.
NSAR
Derivatives index Average value of two dummy variables that
equal one if a fund is not permitted to (i) write
or invest in debt options and (ii) write or in-
vest in interest rate futures.
NSAR
Illiquid assets index Dummy variable that equals one if a fund is
not permitted to invest in restricted securities.
NSAR
Almazan index Average value of the leverage, derivatives, and
illiquid assets index.
NSAR
Risk and performance measures:
SD Standard deviation of fund returns over the
six months around the reporting date.
CRSP
Beta Coefficient obtained by regressing the U.S. ag-
gregate bond index return on fund returns
over the six months around the reporting date.
CRSP
Idio Variance of residuals obtained by regressing
the return of the U.S. aggregate bond index
on fund returns over the six months around
the reporting date.
CRSP
4f alpha Fund returni,t −
4∑
k=1
factor returnk,t ∗ βi,k,t,
where βi,k,t is computed for fund i and factor
k over the past 250 trading days. The factors
are: (i) the return of the US aggregated bond
index, (ii) the return of the stock market, (iii)
a default, and (iv) a mortgage factor.
Datastream, CRSP,
FF
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End-of-Period Trading by Mutual Funds
Hermann Elendner Laurenz Klipper
Abstract:
We provide an easy way to measure the trading activity by mutual funds in the
last three days of their reporting periods. Heavy end-of-period (EoP) traders
report more winner and fewer loser stocks, yet perform no better. Consistent
with window dressing, their rank and return gaps loom higher. Stocks with
a high positive EoP trade imbalance experience significant price increases of
about 20 bps over those three days. Inconsistent with information trading,
prices revert within a week. In line with price pressure from institutional in-
vestors, liquid stocks appreciate less strongly and revert more quickly. Period-
ends differ, however, across calendar months: stocks with a high EoP imbalance
appreciate at the end of all months, but reversals only follow if funds report
in June or December. Finally, we show window dressing, portfolio pumping,
or fund flows alone are unlikely to explain our results.
Keywords: Mutual funds, end-of-period trading, price pressure, reversal, win-
dow dressing, portfolio pumping
JEL-Classification: G23, G14, G12
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1 Introduction
Since mutual fund holdings are only disclosed quarterly, the academic litera-
ture has struggled to overcome the challenge of examining the trading activity
of funds over shorter horizons. We show that there exists easily accessible in-
formation that allows for an accurate and reliable measurement of mutual fund
trading over the last three days of each fund’s reporting period. While this
data is limited to end of reporting periods, it is available for the entire mutual
fund industry and offers a new opportunity to analyze the trading behavior
within this industry. The objective of this study is to provide a detailed exam-
ination of the extent of, motivation for, and economic impact of end-of-period
trades by mutual funds.
End-of-period trades by mutual funds are observable since equity trans-
actions typically require three days to be settled.1 For accounting purposes,
unsettled trades show up as account payables and receivables on the funds’
balance sheets. Consequently, the balance sheet at a reporting date reveals
the total purchase and sale volume that each fund has effected during the
three-day settlement period preceding this date.
We collect these volumes for a broad sample of 2,508 US equity funds from
1998 to 2011 and proceed along three lines of inquiry.2 First, we compare the
trading volume at period-ends with the average volume in-between disclosures.
While this difference is small in aggregate, we find considerably cross-sectional
and time-series variation on the individual fund level. While some funds trade
particularly actively during the last three days of their reporting periods, others
persistently avoid any trading during this period.
1 Non-equity trades have shorter settlement periods, ranging from 1 to 3 days.
2 Balance sheet data can be obtained by collecting SEC N-SAR forms available from
EDGAR.
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The second part of our analysis relates the trading activity of funds at
the end of their reporting period to return and fund characteristics as well as
to stock characteristics in an effort to understand the motives behind these
trades. In order to organize and limit the scope of our empirical analysis, we
consider the following four reasons for end-of-period trading: (i) information-
based trading, (ii) window dressing, (iii) portfolio pumping, and (iv) flow-
induced trading. Information-based trading refers to trades that are enacted
because fund managers possess superior information about stock fundamentals
(see Chen, Jegadeesh, and Wermers 2000; Wermers 2000 for evidence about
stock-picking abilities by mutual fund managers). Window dressing denotes
the practice of adjusting the holdings prior to disclosure date in order to pro-
vide a misleading picture in mandatory reports (Lakonishok, Shleifer, Thaler,
and Vishny, 1991; Musto, 1999; Agarwal, Gay, and Ling, 2014). Portfolio
pumping is the alleged activity of manipulating closing prices of fund holding
upwards through large last-minute orders that exert price pressure (Carhart,
Kaniel, Musto, and Reed, 2002; Hu, McLean, Pontiff, and Wang, 2014). Lastly,
flow-induced trading may arise because of sudden investor inflows or outflows
forcing a fund to sell or buy assets (Coval and Stafford, 2007).
We do not find evidence that end-of-period trading is related to pos-
sessing proprietary information about stock fundamentals. Funds that exhibit
high end-of-period trades do not achieve superior performance subsequent to
those trades. If anything, they perform worse when compared to funds with
low end-of-period trading activity, consistent with uninformed trades incurring
transaction costs.
In support for window dressing, funds with large end-of-period trade dis-
close more winner and fewer loser stocks. Heavy end-of-period traders also
tend to exhibit higher rank gaps and backward holding return gaps, thus scor-
ing higher on the two standard measures for window dressing. In line with
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these findings, stocks that receive large purchase orders performed well over
the previous period.
Portfolio pumping does not appear related to end-of-period trading. Large
end-of-period trades are not associated with high last-day fund returns, a find-
ing that would be expected if funds inflate their holding positions.
We find a strong relation between fund flows and trading at the last
days of the reporting period. Funds’ netflows tend to be high for funds with a
large purchase volume, while they are low for heavy end-of-period sellers. This
suggests that some buys and sales at the end of a fund’s reporting period are
driven by the necessity to react on provision or withdrawal of capital.
In our third line of inquiry, we examine the impact of end-of-period trades
on stock prices. Since the balance-sheet information about end-of-period trad-
ing does not include a breakdown into individual securities, we need to impute
which stocks are traded at the end of a period from holding changes. We
then aggregate the imputed end-of-period stock buys and sales over all funds
for each individual stock to obtain a proxy for the aggregate trade imbalance
from the mutual fund industry.
When we sort stocks along this trade imbalance, we find that those with
strong demand overhang (i.e. strong positive net trade imbalances) experience
significant price increases of about 20 bps during the last three days of the
period. This price effect is obtained after controlling for stock and time fixed
effects and after adjusting stock returns for their sensitivity to the (i) mar-
ket, (ii) size, (iii) value-to-book, and (iv) momentum factors (Carhart, 1997).
Interestingly, we do not find a similar price effect on the sell side.3
3 One potential explanation for not observing price effects for stocks with a large supply
overhang is outside liquidity. If outside investors provide sufficient liquidity to satisfy
all sell orders, market prices will not change. We, however, have no clear theoretical
explanation why liquidity problems arise on the buy, but not on the sell side.
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While the price effects on the buy side persist in most months of the cal-
endar year, the price appreciation observed in December and June is followed
by strong reversals over the following month.4 This suggests that trades at the
end of the half-year and at the end of the year are not driven by fundamental
information. Rather, the findings are consistent with temporary price pressure
induced by mutual fund trading as described by Scholes (1972). In line with
this theory, price appreciations are more pronounced and take longer to revert
for less liquid stocks when compared to liquid stocks.
Finally, we explore whether the temporary price effect observed in De-
cember and June can be linked to window dressing, portfolio pumping, or fund
flows. For that purpose, we split our fund sample into two halves along the
median of either our window-dressing indicators, last day fund returns, or fund
flows. For each of those splits, we find the link of end-of-period net trades and
stock prices to be present both in the above and below-median sub-sample.
This suggest that price increases and reversals are not driven by one of these
trading motives alone.
To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first comprehensive ex-
amination of the trading activity of mutual funds at the end of their reporting
period. The work closest to our paper is the study by Hu et al. (2014), who use
a proprietary sample of daily trades by 150 unknown equity funds to exam-
ine whether institutional investors are engaged in window dressing or portfolio
pumping. By studying trades that are based on almost the entire mutual fund
industry and by studying the economic impact of these trades, we offer a more
complete perspective on end-of-period trading. Our analysis of the relation
between end-of-period trading and stock prices is related to previous studies
that document a link between mutual fund trading and stock price movements
(Coval and Stafford, 2007; Lou, 2012). While these studies focus on forced
4 Funds in December and June appear to be similar to funds in other months of the year.
Hence, the result differences are unlikely driven by selection-effect explanations.
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trading induced by fund flows, our results are not explainable by inflows or
outflows, but rather appear to be largely driven by voluntary trades at the end
of the period.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews
the literature and offers a theoretical framework for the empirical analysis.
Section 3 introduces our data set and our measures. Section 4 presents the
results from our empirical analyses. Section 5 describes several robustness
tests. Section 6 concludes.
2 Conceptual framework
In this section we offer a conceptual framework for the examination of the
potential motives for, and the economic impact of end-of-period trading. Based
on the prior literature, we review the theory on which our empirical tests and
their interpretation are based.
2.1 Motives for end-of-period trading
Fundamentally, trades fall into two categories: those driven by information
about the securities bought or sold, and those carried out for reasons un-
related to information. In the following, we develop testable hypotheses to
differentiate between information-based and different non-information based
trading motives. We test these hypotheses in Section 4.2.
2.1.1 Information-based trading activity
One explanation for high trading volumes at the end of reporting periods is
private information. Many period-ends of funds coincide with enterprises final-
izing quarterly reports, such that heightened information arrival is well con-
ceivable. If this information arrival varies across funds, heterogeneous trading
levels in the cross-section as well as in the time-series should naturally arise.
126
To identify those trades, we examine the performance of funds that show
large EoP trades. If EoP trades are motivated by an informational advantage,
funds should profit from EoP trades by generating higher returns over the
following months.5
2.1.2 Non-information based trading activity
In contrast to information-based trades, trades unrelated to information should
not translate into higher fund returns. In fact, uninformed trades could even
be detrimental to fund performance due to transaction costs. Hence, we can
differentiate between informed and uninformed trading by examining the fund
performance subsequent to the reporting date.
We also want to differentiate between different motives for uninformed
trading. The literature has modeled an array of incentives for fund managers
to execute EoP trades, even without possessing superior information:
Window Dressing. One motive for such trading is window dressing. The
purpose of window dressing is to mislead investors by disclosing dispropor-
tionally higher holdings in stocks that showed strong past performance, or dis-
proportionally lower holdings of poorly performing stocks (Lakonishok et al.,
1991).6 The literature has developed two measures to capture window-dressing
behavior: First, the backward holding return gap (BHRG), and, second, the
rank gap.7 Both measures are detailed in Appendix A.I and identify window
dressers by calculating the discrepancy between a fund’s true performance and
the performance of a hypothetical portfolio based on the reported holdings of
the fund. A fund is classified as a window dresser if the performance of its
5 We analyze fund returns up to six months after the reporting date.
6 Note that our measures are only capable of capturing window dressing if trades are exe-
cuted in the last three days of the funds’ reporting period. Earlier holding adjustments
will remain undetected.
7 The BHRG was introduced by Lakonishok et al. (1991), while the rank gap was first
presented by Agarwal et al. (2014).
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disclosed holdings exceeds its actual performance. If window dressing drives
EoP trading, heavy EoP traders should, therefore, show large backward hold-
ing return and rank gaps. Moreover, the portfolio of funds with large EoP
trades should consist of a larger (lower) proportion of winner (loser) stocks.8
Finally, EoP purchases should predominantly target stocks with high past
performance, while sales should target poorly performing stocks. Therefore,
window-dressing behavior should lead to a relation between the amount of EoP
trades and these window-dressing indicators.
Portfolio Pumping. A different strategy for funds to influence disclosures is
to deliberately inflate stock prices by creating price pressure through aggressive
trading immediately before the period-end. This practice, known as “painting
the tape,” “marking up,” or “portfolio pumping,” is driven by the managers’
attempt to improve the reported current performance of the fund. Empirical
evidence for such a behavior has been documented by Carhart et al. (2002)
and Hu et al. (2014).9 Because portfolio pumping is intended to improve fund
performance, we expect portfolio pumpers to show high returns at the last day
of the reporting period. Moreover, their trades should occur predominantly in
stocks with low market liquidity, which should react more strongly to induced
price pressure. While we test the first prediction by examining the funds’ last-
day returns, we test the second hypothesis by studying the liquidity of stocks
with large EoP purchase orders.
Fund flows Apart from disclosure management, end-of-period trading could
also be triggered by capital inflows and outflows. A sudden withdrawal of
liquidity will require the fund to sell assets, while incoming capital typically
results in purchase orders. We analyze whether there is evidence for flow-
8 Winner stocks are defined as those in the highest performance quintile over the last quar-
ter; loser stocks as those in the lowest.
9 Since portfolio pumping necessarily occurs at the very last moment, the corresponding
trading activity will be fully captured by our EoP measures.
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induced trading at the end of reporting periods by studying whether higher
EoP buy volumes are linked to higher net flows (and higher sell volumes to
lower flows) during the reporting period.
Other reasons Finally, end-of-period trading might also be related to other
motives, such as portfolio re-balancing, tax evasion, or the desire to reach
certain turnover targets. Due to the important role information-based trading
and disclosure-management practices play in the extant literature, we leave
such other potential reasons outside the scope of this paper.
2.2 The economic impact of end-of-period trading
Since mutual funds are the largest and most active traders in equity markets, it
is important to understand whether and how their trades impact these markets.
We address this question by examining stock price reactions to end-of-period
trades.
2.2.1 Stock price impact
A large body of literature shows that trading is linked to asset-price move-
ments. The market maker literature offers a theory that can explain these
price movements. In the models of this literature, market makers manage
their inventories by adjusting their price quotes. When market makers receive
large volumes of buy (sale) orders, their inventory level falls (increases). They
react on these inventory changes by increasing or decreasing the asset price
until their inventory is back to their target level (Kyle, 1985). Similarly, the
price hypothesis by Scholes (1972) predicts temporary stock price changes in
response to excess demand or supply. Consistent with these theories, numer-
ous studies including Gallant, Rossi, and Tauchen (1992), Hiemstra and Jones
(1994), and Lo and Wang (2000) find a significant relationship between order
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imbalances and stock prices. We hypothesize similar asset price reactions to
trade imbalances occurring at the end of reporting periods.10
2.2.2 Persistent vs. temporary stock price impact
Persistent stock price impact. If asset prices react to end-of-period trad-
ing, the price change can persist or be temporary in nature. The most obvious
reason for a persistent price change is an order imbalance that arises due to
new information about the fundamentals of an asset. If the new information
set suggests that the asset was undervalued (overvalued), excess buy orders
increase (decrease) the asset price until the price reflects the new fundamental
value (Kyle, 1985; Kelley and Tetlock, 2013).
Temporary stock price impact. In contrast, price movements can also
be caused by order imbalances that are not driven by fundamental informa-
tion. Market prices may react to these imbalances initially, but eventually re-
vert back to their fundamental values (Andrade, Chang, and Seasholes, 2008;
Grossman and Miller, 1988). In light of these arguments, we examine stock
price reversals in Section 4.3 to differentiate between information-based and
uninformed stock price movements.
2.2.3 Stock price impact and stock liquidity
If price fluctuations are caused by price pressure, the price impact should
vary with the liquidity of the respective stock. Less liquid stocks subject to a
demand or supply shock should experience stronger initial price changes and
slower reversals (Pastor and Stambaugh, 2003). We test this hypothesis by
separately analyzing price changes of low and high liquidity stocks.
10We implicitly assume that order imbalances found in the mutual fund industry are not
easily filled by other agents outside this industry.
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2.2.4 Stock price impact and the motives of end-of-period trading
Temporary trade imbalances can arise for different reasons. One area of re-
search implicitly examines the role of mutual fund flows in causing these im-
balances. Funds subject to inflows or outflows are forced to trade. When these
flows are correlated across funds, multiple funds need to place similar buy or
sell orders at the same time. This can create an aggregate demand or supply
overhang in certain stocks. Consistent with this idea, several studies, including
Coval and Stafford (2007) and Jotikasthira, Lundblad, and Ramadorai (2012),
provide evidence that stocks subject to flow-induced trading show temporary
price movements.
In contrast to trade imbalances that arise by flow-induced trading, mu-
tual funds may also engage in portfolio pumping to deliberately inflate asset
prices, as discussed in the previous section. Potential portfolio pumpers are
identified by showing large returns during the last day of their reporting pe-
riod. We test whether trades by these funds impact stock prices differently
than trades by funds with low last-day returns.
Finally, order imbalances can be caused by herding. Shiller, Fischer,
and Friedman (1984), De Long, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann (1990),
and Shleifer and Summers (1990), for example, posit that stocks experience
excess demand or supply because multiple investors at times follow certain
fads or place greater importance on the same news. Mark Grinblatt (1995),
Falkenstein (1996) and Guercio (1996) relate herding to certain trading strate-
gies. Scharfstein and Stein (1990), Lakonishok et al. (1991), and Lakonishok,
Shleifer, and Vishny (1994) argue that herding may arise due to agency prob-
lems, such as window dressing. We examine the latter argument by testing
whether trades by potential window dressers exhibit different price reactions
as compared to trades by funds unlikely to be window dressers.
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3 Data
This section outlines the data set and explains the construction of the end-
of-period trading measures. We construct trading measures on the fund and
stock level. Since the trading measures on the stock level rely on a number of
assumptions, we relate them to the actual stock trading volume for validation.
3.1 Data source and sample selection
Our mutual fund sample is based on N-SAR forms, which must be filed semi-
annually by all US investment companies registered with the SEC. We extract
balance-sheet information and fund characteristics from all N-SAR forms avail-
able in the SEC EDGAR database for the time between 1998 and 2011.11 We
drop entries for which the fund name, the filing date, the balance-sheet data,
or the turnover data are not identifiable or implausible.12 We exclude all funds
that indicate to be an index fund. Moreover, we drop all money-market funds,
which are identified by having turnover ratios of zero, a non-missing mark-to-
market net asset value per share, as well as a non-missing average daily net
asset value during the period. We also remove a fund observation from our
sample if the fund changes its reporting month, which is an indication for a
fund restructuring, a merger, or other special events within the fund family.
To obtain information about general fund characteristics, daily returns
and monthly net asset values, we link our data to the Center for Research in
Security Prices (CRSP) Mutual Fund database using fund tickers or – if not
available – fund names. To verify our matching procedure, we require that
total net assets of both data sources do not deviate by more than 5% and
11Prior to 1998, N-SAR forms are not consistently available and contain unreliable balance-
sheet data.
12Entries are deemed implausible if balance-sheet or turnover data are negative or accounts
payables (receivables) exceed total purchases (sales) of the period.
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manually check our data for mismatches.13 We use MFLINKS to link our
database to the Thomson Reuters S12 Ownership Database, which provides
quarterly fund holdings.
In order to restrict our sample to US open-end equity funds, we follow
Kacperczyk, Sialm, and Zheng (2008) by relying on (i) the investment ob-
jective code (IOC) provided by Thomson Reuters, (ii) the Strategic Insight
Objective and (iii) the Wiesenberger Fund Type Code provided by CRSP, as
well as (iv) the asset composition obtained from N-SAR forms. We start by
removing all international (IOC code 1), municipal-bond (IOC code 5) and
balanced funds (IOC code 7), as well as all bond and preferred funds (IOC
code 6) from the sample. We then eliminate all funds whose Strategic Insight
Objective Codes differ from the following equity investment objectives: AGG,
GMC, GRI, GRO, ING, and SCG. If the fund does not have a valid Strategic
Objective Code, we instead rely on the Wiesenberger Fund Type Codes and
require the fund to have one of the following codes: G, G-I, AGG, GCI, GRI,
GRO, LTG, MCG, and SCG. Since some funds have neither a valid Strategic
Objective nor a Wiesenberger Fund Type Code, we finally exclude all funds
that have less than 80% of their assets invested in common stocks.
To address the incubation bias in the CRSP database identified by El-
ton, Gruber, and Blake (2001) and Evans (2010), we remove all observations
of a fund that reports less than $5 million in assets under management in the
previous month. This leaves us with a final data set of 21,928 half-year obser-
vations generated by 2,508 US equity funds during the sample period ranging
from 1998 to 2011.
13We tolerate a difference of up to 5% in order to account for rounded values and missing
share classes in the CRSP database.
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3.2 End-of-period trading measures
We use our data set to construct two trading measures. The first mea-
sure captures the end-of-period trading volume at the fund level. The second
measure is at the stock level and proxies how end-of-period trades are allocated
to individual stocks.
3.2.1 Measuring end-of-period fund trading
One of the major contributions of this paper is to document that balance-
sheets contain information about each fund’s trading volume during the last
three days of the reporting period. Mutual funds are obliged to report balance-
sheet data twice a year to the SEC, including information about their accounts
payables for instruments purchased and accounts receivables from instruments
sold.14 For mutual funds accounts payables and receivables arise from security
transactions that are not yet settled.
The SEC requires transaction partners to settle equity trades within three
trading days. Following this requirement, a settlement period of three days
has been established as industry standard for equity transactions.15 In the
three-day settlement period a fund will report all unsettled trades in the form
of payables (for securities purchased) and receivables (from securities sold) on
its balance sheet; holdings, however, are updated immediately. Hence, the
disclosed amounts of accounts payables and receivables at a reporting date
disclose – with audited quality – a fund’s total trading volume over the last
three days of the respective reporting period. For convenience, we refer to the
dollar amounts of accounts payables and receivables as end-of-period (EoP)
fund buys and sales:
14Payables and receivables are reported in items 74.O and 74.J of the SEC N-SAR form.
15The required settlement period for non-equity trades is usually shorter. For example,
certificates of deposit and commercial paper must be settled on the same day, US treasuries
are settled within one day, and the settlement period of foreign-exchange transactions is
two days.
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EoP fund buysi,t = Payables for instruments purchasedi,t
EoP fund salesi,t = Receivables from instruments soldi,t
(1)
3.2.2 Measuring stock trades at funds’ period-ends
In order to identify potential effects of end-of-period trading on stock prices,
we need a trading measure at the level of individual stocks. However, while the
disclosed EoP trading activity of funds differentiates purchases from sales, each
of those two volumes is an aggregate with no breakdown into the transactions
at a security level. Therefore, we have to rely on quarterly changes in fund
holdings to proxy for the amount of purchases and sales per stock. This is
achieved by imputing for each stock j at month t the following buy measure:
EoP stock buysj,t =
∑
i∈Funds
EoP fund buysi,t · wbuysijt
Mcapjt
,
where wbuysijt =
Shares boughtijt · pjt∑
k∈Stocks
Shares boughtikt · pkt
(2)
Mcapjt and pjt are the market capitalization and the price of stock j at
the end of month t, respectively. Shares boughtijt is the increase in shares of
stock j by fund i from month t − 3 to month t. Intuitively, the variable EoP
stock buys captures to what extent a given stock j was purchased by our sample
funds over the last three days of month t.16 It is constructed by allotting each
fund’s end-of-period buys to stocks that the fund has bought over the last
quarter, putting more weight on large holding increases and less weight on
small holding increases of the fund. Stock end-of-period (EoP) buysjt are the
16Note that funds report in different months of the year. Hence, we capture only trades of
funds that report in a given month.
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sum of all EoP fund buys that were assigned to stock j, scaled by the stock’s
market capitalization.
Following an analogous procedure, we construct EoP stock salesj,t17:
EoP stock salesj,t =
∑
i∈Funds
EoP fund salesi,t · wsalesijt
Mcapjt
,
where wsalesijt =
Shares soldijt · pjt∑
k∈Stocks
Shares soldikt ∗ pkt
(3)
We define the total trading volume of a stock as the sum of stock buys
and stock sales. We take the difference of EoP stock buys and EoP stock sales
to compute each stock’s aggregate net trade imbalance:
EoP total tradesj,t = EoP stock buysj,t + EoP stock salesj,t (4)
EoP net tradesj,t = EoP stock buysj,t − EoP stock salesj,t (5)
We expect EoP total trades to be closely related to stock turnover. EoP
net trades, on the other hand, are computed to examine whether stocks re-
ceive relatively more buy than sell trades. Such trade imbalances have been
associated with stock price movements.
For ease of exposition, we decompose EoP net trades into two variables.
The variable EoP net trades+ captures positive net trades, while EoP net
trade– measures the absolute value of negative net trades.
17Note that our sale measure might be less accurate than our buy measure since we are
unable to capture sales of stocks that are neither disclosed on the portfolio of the previous
nor of the current month.
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3.3 Summary statistics
Table 1 shows summary statistics for common fund and stock variables. All
variables are winsorized at the 1% levels and defined in Appendix A.I. The
reported stock variables are computed by first taking the value-weighted mean
of all stocks in each fund’s portfolio and then by averaging across funds.
*** Insert Table 1 about here ***
Our sample is consistent with the literature: Funds are large, with a mean
of $1,083 million of assets under management. The average fund is relatively
old (12 years) and is part of a fund family (75%). Given a mean turnover ratio
of 90%, almost the entire portfolio, on average, is turned over once a year.
Fund buys and fund sales in the last three days of a reporting period average
at about 1% of TNA. However, the relatively high standard deviation implies
that some funds trade a substantially higher fraction of their TNA at the end
of the period. The majority of funds in our sample are capital-appreciation
funds (50%), followed by growth funds (38%). Smaller proportions of funds
follow an income (6%) or total-return investment strategy (6%).
Consistent with Wermers (1999), funds are on average invested in large-
cap stocks with a market capitalization of about $36 billion. The average
investment targets relatively liquid stocks with an average relative bid–ask
spread of 0.146%, an Amihud illiquidity measure of 0.012 and a 3-day trading
volume of $500 million. The mean stock in a fund’s portfolio has a market
beta close to one, implying that funds hold on average the market portfolio.
The average stock performance over the past three months is 5% if measured
by raw returns or 2.7% if measured by 4-factor alphas. The median stock
experiences EoP stock buys and sales of about 0.01% in terms of the stock’s
market capitalization. Consistent with a growing mutual fund industry, net
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trades are on average slightly positive at 0.004%. The relative small magnitude
of these net trades, however, suggests that the majority of fund buys and sales
net out within the fund industry.
3.4 Validation of the stock trade measures
Since the end-of-period trading measures on the stock level are imputed proxies
that rely on quarterly holding changes, it is critical to validate these measures
before turning to our empirical analysis. For that purpose, we relate the total
EoP trades to the stock’s actual trading volume. Given that mutual funds
own on average 30% of the U.S. equity market, we expect this relation to be
sizeable (ICI Investment Company Factbook, 2012).
*** Insert Table 2 about here ***
As shown in columns (1) to (4) of Table 2, our proxy for EoP trades is a
statistically significant predictor of (adjusted) stock turnover during the last
three days of the reporting period. This relationship even holds after including
several control variables that have been used in the turnover literature. The
adjusted turnover is the stock’s market trading volume over the last three days
of the reporting period less the average trading volume of the stock over the
20-day period around the reporting date. We make this adjustment to account
for recent turnover fluctuations unrelated to EoP trading.18 While columns (1)
and (2) are based on all observations, we exclude all December observations
in columns (3) and (4) as several studies show that the turnover at the end
of the calendar year is abnormally low. The relationship between our measure
and turnover is also sizeable. Stocks whose total trades are in the top quintile
experience a 0.03% to 0.05% increase in turnover. If we assume that mutual
funds account for 30% of total turnover, this represents 6% to 10% of the
average trading volume effected by mutual funds.
18Our results are robust if we do not make this adjustment.
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Figure 4 illustrates the relationship between the EoP total trade measure
and turnover graphically. For that purpose, we sort stocks into deciles accord-
ing to how much a stock was traded at the end of a month. Stock observations
with the highest EoP trades are assigned to the top and those with the lowest
trading volume to the bottom decile. While we observe almost no relationship
between turnover and trades in the the lower five quintiles, we observe a strong
increase in turnover as we move along the higher deciles. Our measure per-
forms poorly for the lower deciles because those stocks exhibit minimal, if any,
differences in EoP trades (see the grey bars in the graph). Across the higher
deciles, the difference in the trade measure is stronger, and a clear positive
relation between our measure and end-of-period turnover is observable.
*** Insert Figure 4 about here ***
In order to address the concern that the documented link between our
measure and turnover is spurious, we report results of a placebo test in columns
(5) to (8). In this placebo test we relate the EoP total trade measure to the
adjusted stock turnover one year later. Supporting the validity our measure,
the regression coefficients of our measure are insignificant in all specifications.
4 Empirical results
Our empirical analysis is structured into three parts. First, we explore the
extent of end-of-period (EoP) trading by comparing the magnitude of these
trades with the average trading volume over the whole reporting period. Sec-
ond, we analyze potential motives for EoP trades by studying fund and stock
characteristics. Finally, we examine whether EoP trading is associated with
stock price reactions.
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4.1 The extent of end-of-period trading
4.1.1 Distribution of fund observations and non-traders
To compute end-of-period (EoP) trades at the fund level, we rely on balance-
sheet data obtained from NSAR forms, which are available twice a year. How-
ever, funds report to their shareholders in different months. Hence, fund
reporting-ends are distributed over the whole calendar year. Panel A of Fig-
ure 1 shows the fraction of funds that report in each month of the year. Most
funds report in December and June (about 30% of all observations), followed
by roughly 25% of all observations reporting in April and October. 18% of our
balance sheet data is observed in June and September, while 6% to 8% of the
funds report in each of the other months of the year. Although the reporting
periods are somewhat clustered, the number of funds reporting in each month
is high given that our data set consists of more than 2,500 funds.
*** Insert Figure 1 about here ***
Panel B shows that in each month a significant number of funds do not
trade at their period-ends, ranging from 12% in January and July to 27% in
December. While the higher percentage of funds without any EoP trades in
December might be due to the clustering of holiday days at the end of the year,
it is striking that the low EoP engagement is also found at the other calendar
months.
*** Insert Figure 2 about here ***
We examine this further by analyzing whether a fund’s avoidance of EoP
trades is persistent over time. For that purpose, we select all non-traders at
a random time point and follow them through the entire sample period. We
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then examine how many of these funds continue to avoid trading in other time
periods. Figure 2 is based on all funds that have executed zero EoP buys
(solid) or EoP sales (dashed line) in the first half of 2004.19 On average about
50% of these funds also conduct no end-of-period trades in the other periods
of the time-series. This pattern is observable for EoP buys and EoP sales to
the same extent. It appears that some funds persistently avoid trading at the
end of their reporting period.
4.1.2 Realized and expected end-of-period trading
To quantify the extent of EoP trading, we compare EoP buys and sales with
an estimated expected value for these volumes. These estimates are obtained
by dividing a fund’s total six-month purchase or sale volume, which was re-
alized over the previous reporting period, by the number of trading days in
the period. We then multiply this number by three to get an estimate over a
three day window. As illustrated in Figure 3, the realized EoP trades are in
some months above and in other months below the expected trading volume,
but the two measures are in general closely related. The realized trades in
December are significantly below expectations, indicating that fund managers
trade less between Christmas and New Year. Some of the lack of trading in
December appears to be shifted to January, when realized EoP trades exceed
expected EoP trades strongly. The average trade size in the last three days
of a reporting period is sizeable and varies from $5 million in December to al-
most $20 million in January. Hence, reporting-ends are active trading periods.
Finally, we observe that EoP purchases and sales in each month are similar in
magnitude. This indicates that most trades can be settled within the mutual
fund sector.
*** Insert Figure 3 about here ***
19Results are very similar if we consider a different time period to identify non-traders.
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4.2 Motives for end-of-period trading
In this section we analyze the motives for end-of-period (EoP) trading. We
start by an examination of general characteristics of heavy EoP traders on the
fund level. We then inquire into the relationship between fund performance
and EoP trading. Finally, we study which stocks are subject to particularly
high demand or supply at the end of a period.
4.2.1 End-of-period trading and fund characteristics
Table 3 shows fund characteristics for different levels of end-of-period (EoP)
trading. We scale our EoP trade measures in two ways. For the first scaling
we use a fund’s TNA. Scaling by TNA is useful to identify funds that have a
high EoP trading volume in comparison to their portfolio size. For the second
scaling, we divide the EoP buys (sales) by the expected 3-day purchase (sale)
volume of the fund. The expected values are obtained by taking the average
of each fund’s total buys (sales) over the last six months. Scaling this way
relates the EoP trading volume to the ‘usual’ trading volume of the fund at
other trading days in the period.
In each month, we sort all funds into quintiles according to both mea-
sures. Funds with exactly zero EoP fund buys or sales are reported separately,
as a sixth group for each measure. This way, low-quintile values are not con-
taminated by the bulk of non-traders. EoP fund buys are reported on the left
half, while EoP fund sales are shown on the right half of the table.
*** Insert Table 3 about here ***
Panel A reports average fund characteristics for quintiles sorted by our
EoP trade measures scaled by TNA. The first column of both table halves
depicts the average characteristics of all funds with no EoP buys or sales in a
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given period. While these funds have zero EoP trades by definition, funds in
the other quintiles exhibit significant EoP trading. Funds in the highest buy
quintile accumulate an average EoP purchase volume of 4.9% of their TNA.
Similarly, funds in the highest EoP sale quintile sell on average 4.2% of their
portfolio at the end of their reporting period.
Funds that show either no or very large EoP trades manage portfolios
that are on average about 50% smaller compared to other funds in the sample.
Hence, small funds appear to be more extreme in their EoP trading behavior.
Heavy EoP traders display higher turnover ratios throughout the year, suggest-
ing that some EoP activity is simply driven by their higher trading intensity.
Interestingly, the average turnover ratio of funds with zero EoP buys and sales
is relatively high on the buy and about average on the sell side. Hence, the
non-trading activity of some funds at period-ends is unlikely a result from
low-turnover strategies.
EoP buys correlate with netflows. While funds with zero EoP buys have
negative netflows (i.e. outflows), assets under management grow by about
1.4% for funds with EoP buys in the top quintile. This suggests that some
purchases at period-ends result from the investment of fresh capital. On the
sell side, there is a similar, but negative relationship between EoP trades and
flows. High flows observed in the bottom sale quintile might have helped to
avoid some asset sales.
We also find evidence consistent with the hypothesis that EoP trading is
related to window dressing.20 While there is little variation in the disclosed pro-
portion of loser stocks across the different quintiles, the proportion of winner
stocks is significantly increasing with the amount of EoP trades.21 Moreover,
20Window dressing refers to the the practice of disclosing more winner and fewer loser stocks
in the disclosed portfolio holdings in an attempt to mislead investors. See Section 2 for a
more detailed explanation.
21Winner stocks are defined as the stocks whose performance over the last quarter ranked
in the highest quintile of all sample stocks; loser stocks rank in the lowest.
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funds with high EoP trades display higher backward holding return (BHRG)
and rank gaps, which are the two standard measures of window dressing in the
literature. In contrast, the window-dressing variables stay low for funds that
avoid EoP trading.
Finally, we see no evidence that the last-day return of a fund’s reporting
period is linked to EoP trading. This suggests that EoP trades are largely
unrelated to portfolio pumping, which aims at inflating fund returns shortly
before disclosure.
In Panel B, we report the same statistics, but quintiles are constructed by
scaling the EoP trade measures by the expected amount of EoP buys or sales.
By adjusting for the funds’ general turnover, we can identify funds executing
EoP trades in excess of their usual trading volume. Funds in the first three
quintiles have an adjusted EoP trading volume of less than 1, which indicates
that their EoP trading is lower than on other days of the period. In contrast,
funds in the highest EoP buy or sale quintile show a trading volume that is four
times higher than on an average 3-day trading window. These large deviations
from expectations are predominantly found among funds with low turnover
ratios.
When compared to Panel A, we find a similar relationship between EoP
trades and netflows as well as EoP trades and fund size. In line with the
findings of Panel A, the last-day fund return remains unrelated to a fund’s
EoP trading activity. Interestingly, however, the relationship between EoP
trading (scaled by expected EoP trades) and our window-dressing indicators
is less pronounced. While most window-dressing indicators tend to increase
first, they drop significantly for the highest EoP trade quintile. Hence, window
dressing does not seem to occur when EoP trades deviate strongly from the
typical trading volume. From a window dresser’s perspective, the avoidance
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of these extreme trades makes sense to not raise unnecessary attention by
regulators or investors.
In summary, our evidence suggests that EoP trading is related to several
motives. While some trades seem to be a byproduct of usual trading or driven
by fund flows, others seem to be related to window dressing.
4.2.2 End-of-period trading and fund performance
In this section, we want to examine whether large EoP trades are motivated
by information. If this is the case, funds with large EoP trades should achieve
positive abnormal returns subsequent to their trades. To test this hypothesis,
we construct value-weighted portfolios that are rebalanced each month by se-
lecting all funds whose EoP buys or sales (scaled by TNA or expected EoP buys
or sales) were in the top quintile at their latest reporting period.22 We regress
the returns of these portfolios on the (i) market, (ii) size, (iii) value-to-book,
and (iv) the momentum factor to asses whether funds with large EoP trades
show abnormal performance. The regression results are reported in Table 4.
*** Insert Table 4 about here ***
Columns (1) and (2) of Panel A show an insignificant alpha coefficient
(intercept) for both portfolios based on funds with large EoP buys. Hence,
heavy EoP buyers do not outperform the market on average. On the sell side,
we find that the intercept is negative and statistically significant in column (3),
but insignificant in column (4). The portfolios of both regressions are based
on all funds with large EoP sales, but sales are scaled by TNA in column (3)
and by expected EoP sales in column (4). Hence, underperformance is evident
when EoP sales are large in comparison to the size of the portfolios, but not
when EoP sales are large in comparison to turnover.
22Our results are similar if we construct equally weighted portfolios.
145
In Panel B, we compare the performance of funds with large EoP trades
with the performance of funds with low trading. To that end, we construct
portfolios that are long on all EoP buyers or sellers in the top quintile (see
Panel A), and short in a portfolio consisting of all EoP buyers or sellers in the
bottom quintile. Using these portfolios, we find insignificant alphas when EoP
trades are scaled by expected trades, and negative alphas when EoP trades are
scaled by TNA. Hence, EoP trades do not improve fund performance, but are,
if anything, detrimental. This implies that large EoP trades are on average
not driven by the possession of superior information.
4.2.3 End-of-period trading and stock characteristics
Finally, we inquire into the motives for EoP trading by examining the charac-
teristics of stocks that receive large EoP buy and sell orders.
*** Insert Table 5 about here ***
Table 5 relates our end-of-period (EoP) net trade measures to stock char-
acteristics. Recall that positive (negative) EoP net trades obtain when EoP
stock buys exceed (fall short of) EoP stock sales. Similar to the analysis on
the fund level, we sort stocks into quintiles based on their EoP net trade im-
balance. We report stocks with a large demand (positive trade imbalance) and
supply overhang (negatve trade imbalance) separately. We find stocks subject
to strong EoP activity to be smaller and to have lower trading volumes than
stocks with median net trade imbalances. Despite of having smaller market
caps and trading volumes, there is no identifiable relationship between the EoP
net trade imbalance and the relative bid–ask spread or the Amnihud illiquid-
ity measure. Hence, there is no clear evidence that low liquidity stocks receive
heightened demand at the end of a period, which would be expected if funds
engage in portfolio pumping.
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In line with the previous result that EoP buyers hold a larger proportion
of winner stocks in their portfolios, stocks that are heavily bought during the
last days of the period tend to have higher past 3-months returns and alphas.
In contrast, stocks with large negative trade imbalances tend to have lower
past performance. Both the tendency to buy winner and sell loser stocks are
consistent with the motive of window dressing.
4.3 The economic impact of end-of-period trading
Previous research suggest that trades by mutual funds can result in stock
price movements (see Section 2 for a review of the literature). Therefore, we
examine whether stocks that experience large trade imbalances at the period-
end experience abnormal price changes.
4.3.1 End-of-period trading and stock prices
We start by regressing each stock’s EoP net trade imbalance (EoP buys less
EoP sales) on its 4-factor alphas around the end of a reporting period. We use
4-factor alphas to adjust for potential price changes not related to EoP trading.
We also account for potential heterogeneity between stocks by including stock
fixed effects. To control for time trends or month-specific price changes we
include monthly time fixed effects.
*** Insert Table 6 about here ***
As shown in column (1) of Table 6, we find a strong relationship between
the EoP net trade imbalance and stock prices. Large net trade imbalances
are associated with positive and significant alphas over the last three days
of a reporting period. In column (2), we differentiate between positive and
negative trade imbalances to identify potential asymmetries on the buy and
sell side. Surprisingly, the relationship documented in column (1) is entirely
driven by excess trades on the buy side and is not evident among stocks with
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large negative trade imbalances. This suggests that sufficient outside liquidity
accommodates the sell orders.23
The correlation between alphas and the positive net trade imbalance is
economically sizeable. As documented in columns (3) and (4), stocks whose
net trade imbalance is in the top decile or whose positive net trade imbalance
is in the top tercile experience on average alphas that are 21 and 14 bps higher
compared to the remaining stocks in the sample.
*** Insert Figure 5 about here ***
Columns (6) to (8) as well as Figure 5 show that the observed price in-
crease on the buy side is followed by significant reversals. For example, alphas
revert by about 12 bps for stocks with the highest net trade imbalance (top
decile) over the following three days. That stock prices are only temporary
inflated is consistent with stock price movements arising due to price pressure.
It is inconsistent with a reverse causality explanation, according to which mu-
tual funds buy stocks only after the price inflation took place. It also supports
our previous findings that EoP trades are not motivated by fund managers’
ability to access new information faster than the market.
Next, we study whether the price effect is observable throughout the
calendar year and whether the reversal effect persists over a longer time pe-
riod. In Panel A of Table 7, we again report regressions results based on all
observations, but measure the stock price reaction over up to 30 days. We
then split our data into sub-samples. Panel B reports results based on De-
cember observations only, while we use a sub-sample of June observations in
Panel C. Regressions using only the other months of the calendar year result
in coefficients that are very similar to Panel D. Therefore, we do not report
these regressions separately. Finally, in Panel E all observations are included,
23The theoretical literature does not offer a clear explanation for this asymmetry.
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and interaction dummies capture the difference of the stock-price sensitivity
to EoP trades in June or December.
*** Insert Table 7 about here ***
Column (1) of Table 7 shows that the net trade imbalance is positively
correlated with stock returns over the last three days of a period in all specifi-
cations. Moreover, as evident in Panel E, the December and June interaction
terms are insignificant, suggesting that the price increase of stocks with high
net trade imbalances prior to the reporting date is of similar magnitude in all
months of the year. However, a significant long-term price reversal arises only
for trades initiated in December and June. This is noteworthy as it suggest
that the economic impact of EoP trading differs across the year. Appendix
A.II shows that this difference is unlikely driven by different sample compo-
sitions across the calendar months as fund characteristics between funds that
report in December and June are very similar to those that report in the other
months of the year. Finally, we observe that the reversal effect in December
and June is persistent. Even 30 days after the reporting date stock prices are
negatively correlated with a stock’s net trade imbalance.
4.3.2 End-of-period trading, stock prices and liquidity
To further investigate the hypothesis that the temporary price impact observed
in June and December is driven by price pressure rather than by fundamental
information, we analyze the price impact and reversal among stocks with dif-
ferent liquidity. Our hypothesis implies that more liquid stocks will suffer less
price impact, and recover faster from any price increase. We employ five liq-
uidity proxies: market cap, stock turnover, Amihud’s illiquidity measure, the
relative bid–ask spread, and a bid–ask proxy suggested by Corwin and Schultz
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(2012).24 For each of these measures we split the sample at the median and
report the regression coefficients around period-ends for the two sub-samples
separately. Panel A reports the regression results using all observations, while
the regressions in Panel B are based on December and June observations alone.
*** Insert Table 8 about here ***
In both Panels we observe a stronger relation between the positive net
trade imbalance and 3-day alphas in the last three days of a period for stocks
with lower market caps, lower trading volumes, a higher Amihud illiquidity
measure, and higher bid-ask spreads. Hence, across all liquidity measures
more liquid stocks with high net trade imbalances experience a lower price
impact, when compared to less liquid stocks. Panel B shows that liquidity is
also related to the speed of the price reversal. While the reversal effect of less
liquid stocks becomes significant only after 30-days, more liquid stocks already
exhibit statistically significant price reversals one day after the reporting-end.
This evidence strongly supports the notion that prices are inflated due to
temporary price pressure.
4.3.3 End-of-period trading, stock prices and fund characteristics
Finally, we examine whether the observed temporary price effects in December
and June can be linked to certain fund characteristics. For that purpose, we
split our sample funds into above and below-median sub-samples for five fund
variables. For each fund variable, we construct two trade imbalance measures:
One that captures all trades by above-median funds and one that is based on
all trades by funds for which the fund variable in interest is below the median.
We label the net trade imbalance that arises from trades by above-median
funds with the subscript high and the net trade imbalance caused by below-
24The bid–ask estimator uses the high and low stock price during a trading day and is
supposed to be a better estimate than bid–ask spreads observed at the end of a trading
day.
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median funds with the subscript low. We regress each stock’s 4-factor alpha on
both measures and test for statistical significance between the two regression
coefficients.
*** Insert Table 9 about here ***
In Panel A and B, we examine whether the sensitivity between net trades
and stock alphas differs across trades that originate from funds with high and
low backward holding return (BHRG) and rank gaps. If window dressing is
related to the EoP price effect,the effect of net trade imbalance on stock prices
should be stronger for trades from funds whose rank and return gap lies above
the median. However, the coefficients of both net trade measures are very
similar. Neither the initial price increase, nor the long-term reversal effect
seems to be related to having high or low window-dressing indicators. The
only observable difference is that trades by funds with high rank gaps seem to
be related to a quicker price reversal. This effect, however, is not observable
when window dressing is measured by backward holding return gaps.
In Panel C, we report similar regression estimates, but split funds ac-
cording to last-day fund returns. If the price inflation is driven by portfolio
pumping, funds with high last-day returns should be the predominant source
of price pressure. While the regression coefficient that measures the price in-
crease is larger for trades by funds with high last-day returns, there is no
difference among the regression coefficients that measure the reversal. More-
over, the relation between 3-days alphas prior to disclosure and the net trade
imbalance measure remains statistically significant even if the net trade im-
balance is computed by using trades by low-return funds. Hence, while we
cannot exclude that some of the price effect is related to portfolio-pumping,
portfolio-pumping does not appear to be exclusively responsible for the price
appreciations.
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Since funds flows have been associated with price pressure (e.g. Coval
and Stafford 2007), we follow the same methodology as before to differenti-
ate between trades by funds that receive netflows above and below the me-
dian. In all regressions the regression coefficients for EoP net trades+high and
EoP net trades+low are not statistically different from each other. Hence, the
increase and reversal of stock prices is unlikely driven by flow-induced trading.
5 Robustness
Our results on the stock level are robust to the following three alternative
specifications.25 First, we obtain similar results if our stock level measures are
scaled by a stock’s average turnover over the past year, instead of dividing by
the stock’s market capitalization. Second, our findings are comparable if we
relate stock returns to EoP stock buys instead of using a net trade balance
(buys less sales). Finally, the relationship between our trade measures and
stock prices is similar when we adjust the stock returns only by a one or three
factor model.
6 Conclusion
We show a novel way to measure the trading activity of mutual funds at the
end of their reporting periods. Using this measure, we find substantial cross-
sectional variation in the end-of-period (EoP) trading activity across funds.
While some funds persistently avoid any trading before their disclosure date,
the trading volume at period-ends is more than four times higher than on an
average trading day for about 20% of the reports.
These large end-of-period trades do not seem to be driven by possess-
ing proprietary information about the stocks’ fundamentals as the subsequent
25All results are available upon request.
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performance of heavy end-of-period traders tends to be worse than the perfor-
mance of funds with a low trading activity.
Inquiring further into the motives for EoP trading, we find that large
purchase or sell orders at period-ends are positively correlated with a fund’s
backward holding return and rank gap, as well as with the proportion of dis-
closed winner stocks in the fund’s portfolio. All of these measures have been
used in the literature to identify window dressing.
We also find evidence for flow-induced trading immediately before dis-
closure. Funds with large EoP buys receive disproportionally larger inflows,
while funds with large EoP sales exhibit lower net flows. This suggest that
some end-of-period trades are initiated in order to manage liquidity.
While our findings suggest that EoP trading activity by funds is related
to their flows and to window dressing, we do not find evidence that large
EoP buys are associated with portfolio pumping, the attempt to inflate fund
returns shortly before disclosure. EoP purchases are neither associated with
larger funds returns at the last day prior to reporting, nor are they targeted
towards particularly illiquid stocks as portfolio pumping would predict.
We also asses whether aggregate EoP trades are linked to stock price
reactions. Based on a 4-factor return model, we find stocks that experience
a large demand overhang to appreciate in price by about 20 bps over the last
three days of the reporting period. This price increase reverts over the following
month for December and June reports. Less liquid stocks show stronger price
appreciations and slower reversals. These findings are consistent with stock
price movements being caused by price pressure.
Finally, we investigate whether the relationship between end-of-period
trades and stock prices can be linked to window dressing, flows, or portfolio
pumping. Price reactions remain similar even if we focus on the trades of funds
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that experience large fund netflows, that have low window-dressing indicators,
and that are least likely to be engaged in portfolio pumping. Hence, the
documented price effect goes above and beyond the effect of familiar stories.
We leave the further exploration of the stock price reaction to future research.
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Appendix
A.1 Figures
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Figure 1: Funds reporting end-of-period fund buys and sales by months
Panel A shows the number of end-of-period (EoP) observations of our sample
funds by calendar month as a fraction of the total number of sample observa-
tions. Panel B shows which fraction of those funds report exactly zero trades
during the last three days of a reporting period, again broken down by calendar
month. Both panels are based on 34,734 observations by 2,966 distinct funds.
160
Figure 2: Funds with no end-of-period buys and sales
This figure contains only funds that report zero end-of-period (EoP) fund buys
(solid line) or sales (dashed line) in the first half of 2004. The solid (dashed)
line shows which fraction of these funds do not show EoP buys (sales) during
other time periods. The EoP fund buy (sale) measure is defined in Section 3.2.1
and captures the total purchase (sale) volume for a given fund during the last
three days of the fund’s reporting period as a percentage of total net assets.
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Figure 3: Expected and realized end-of-period fund buys and sales
Panel A (B) reports both expected and realized average volumes of end-of-
period fund buys (sales) by calendar month. The EoP fund buy (sale) measure
is defined in Section 3.2.1 and captures the total purchase (sale) volume for
a given fund during the last three days of the fund’s reporting period as a
percentage of total net assets. Expected fund buys (sales) are each fund’s
average 3-day buy (sale) volume over the last six months. Both panels are
based on 34,734 observations by 2,966 distinct funds.
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Figure 4: End-of-period trades and the trading volume of stocks
This figure shows the average adjusted trading volume for stocks sorted into 10
deciles according to each stock’s end-of-period (EoP) total trade measure. The
EoP total trade measure is defined in Section 3.2.2 and captures the imputed
total trade volume for a given stock by our sample funds in the last three
days of their reporting periods. The adjusted EoP stock trading volume is
the difference between the volume of shares traded at the last three days of a
period and the average three day share volume over the 20 days around the
period-end, scaled by total shares outstanding. All deciles are based on 8,447
distinct stocks and are redefined each month over the sample period from 1998
to 2011. December observations are excluded.
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Figure 5: End-of-period net trades and stock returns
These figures show averages of cumulative 4-factor alphas around the end of
reporting periods (t = 0) for stocks belonging to the first and tenth decile of
positive (Panel A) and negative EoP net trades (Panel B). The EoP net trade
measure is defined in Section 3.2.2 and captures the imputed volume of total
purchases less total sales for a given stock induced by our sample funds in the
last three days of their reporting. The betas obtained to calculate 4-factor
alphas are estimates from 4-factor regression using daily returns over the last
250 trading days. All deciles are redefined each month over the sample period
from 1998 to 2011, covering a total of 8,447 distinct stocks.
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A.2 Tables
165
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
This table reports descriptive statistics for fund and stock characteristics of 2,508 distinct
open-end equity funds from 1998 to 2011. Panel A contains summary statistics on the fund
level. Panel B shows stock characteristics of the funds’ holdings, which are computed as
averages across funds, taking the value weighted average of all stocks in each fund portfolio.
All variables are defined in Appendix A.I.
Open-end fund observations from 1998 to 2011
Mean p50 Sd #
Panel A: Fund characteristics
TNA ($ millions) 1,083 186 2,828 21,928
Age (years) 12.061 8.005 13.249 21,928
Fund family (%) 75.583 100.000 42.960 21,387
Turnover ratio (%) 90.401 68.000 80.943 20,095
EoP fund buys (%) 1.181 0.441 1.982 21,842
EoP fund sales (%) 0.998 0.350 1.676 21,831
Capital appreciation (%) 50.275 100.000 50.000 21,301
Growth (%) 37.841 0.000 45.662 21,301
Income (%) 5.866 0.000 16.881 21,301
Total return (%) 6.018 0.000 23.783 21,301
Panel B: Stock characteristics (weighted averages across portfolio holdings)
Market cap ($ billions) 36.208 31.860 32.107 21,928
3-day turnover ($ millions) 511.766 209.336 609.919 21,928
3-month returns (%) 5.312 5.052 12.472 21,928
3-month 4-factor alphas (%) 2.686 1.729 6.714 21,928
Market beta 1.028 1.022 0.178 21,928
Rel. bid-ask (%) 0.146 0.068 0.263 21,928
Amihud illiquidity 0.012 0.000 0.198 21,928
EoP stock buys (%) 0.017 0.013 0.018 21,928
EoP stock sales (%) 0.013 0.010 0.013 21,928
EoP net trades (%) 0.004 0.002 0.015 21,928
EoP net trades+ (%) 0.020 0.015 0.022 21,928
EoP net trades− (%) -0.016 -0.012 0.017 21,928
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Table 4: End-of-period trades and fund performance
This table reports OLS regressions relating end-of-period (EoP) trades to fund performance.
The EoP fund buy (sale) measure is defined in Section 3.2.1 and captures the total purchase
(sale) volume for a given fund during the last three days of the fund’s reporting period. The
dependent variables are portfolio returns in excess of the risk-free rate. The portfolio return
in Panel A is the value-weighted return of all sample funds whose EoP buys (columns 1
and 2) or sales (columns 1 and 3) belong to the highest quintile according to the fund’s last
reporting date, and is rebalanced each month. The portfolios in Panel B are based on a long
position in the top quintile buy portfolio (columns 1 and 2) or sale portfolio (columns 3 and
4) and a short position in the bottom quintile buy or sale portfolio. Returns are measured
in a monthly frequency starting and ending always three trading days prior to month-end.
Portfolio returns are regressed on the (i) the market, (ii) size, (iii) value-to-book and (iv)
momentum factor. T-Values are reported in parentheses. *,**,*** indicate significance at
the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.
Portfolio returns (%)
based on EoP buys, scaled by based on EoP sales, scaled by
TNA E[EoP buys] TNA E[EoP sales]
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Top EoP buy/sale quintile
Intercept (%) -0.03 0.14 -0.27∗∗ 0.10
(-0.23) (1.38) (-2.18) (0.84)
Rm - Rf (%) 1.00∗∗∗ 0.97∗∗∗ 1.01∗∗∗ 0.93∗∗∗
(37.73) (42.92) (37.79) (34.98)
SMB (%) 0.20∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗ 0.17∗∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗
(5.32) (2.32) (4.62) (5.24)
HML (%) -0.07∗∗ 0.05∗ -0.09∗∗ 0.04
(-1.99) (1.66) (-2.46) (1.11)
UMD (%) 0.08∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗ 0.03
(3.80) (2.28) (3.30) (1.56)
N 153 153 153 153
Adjusted R2 0.928 0.939 0.928 0.917
Panel B: Long in the top EoP buy/sale quintle, short in the bottom quintile
Intercept (%) -0.34∗∗ -0.14 -0.65∗∗∗ -0.16
(-2.52) (-1.03) (-4.18) (-1.22)
Rm - Rf (%) 0.08∗∗∗ 0.01 0.08∗∗ -0.03
(2.84) (0.36) (2.35) (-1.09)
SMB (%) 0.20∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗ 0.12∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗
(4.93) (2.09) (2.47) (2.69)
HML (%) -0.07∗ 0.12∗∗∗ -0.19∗∗∗ 0.01
(-1.82) (3.08) (-4.27) (0.27)
UMD (%) 0.13∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗
(5.52) (3.06) (3.58) (3.19)
N 153 153 153 153
Adjusted R2 0.384 0.0898 0.308 0.116
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Table 7: End-of-period stock trades and reversal
This table reports OLS regressions relating each stock’s imputed end-of-period (EoP) net
trades to 4-factor alphas around the end of funds’ reporting periods. The EoP net trade
measure is defined in Section 3.2.2 and captures the imputed volume of total purchases less
total sales for a given stock induced by our sample funds in the last three days of their re-
porting period. EoP net trades+ contain all positive EoP net trades, while EoP net trades−
denote all negative EoP net trades. 4-factor alphas are computed using each stock’s betas
to the (i) the market, (ii) size, (iii) value-to-book and (iv) momentum factor which are
estimated using the previous 250 trading days. Panels A to E show separate regressions
based on different sub-samples. T-Values are reported in parentheses. Standard errors are
heteroskedasticity robust and clustered at the stock level. *,**,*** indicate significance at
the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.
4-factor alphas (%)
[t− 3, t] [t, t+ 1] [t, t+ 3] [t, t+ 10] [t, t+ 30]
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: All observations (N = 289,720)
EoP net trades+ (%) 2.34∗∗∗ -0.87∗∗∗ -0.98∗∗ -1.15 -2.97∗∗
(5.71) (-3.52) (-2.22) (-1.49) (-2.19)
EoP net trades− (%) 0.70 -0.13 -0.48 0.34 1.51
(1.52) (-0.50) (-0.98) (0.38) (1.04)
Panel B: December observations only (N = 35,360)
EoP net trades+ (%) 3.36∗∗∗ -0.82 -2.70∗ -5.73∗∗ -12.2∗∗∗
(2.95) (-0.97) (-1.78) (-2.26) (-3.13)
EoP net trades− (%) 1.98 -0.27 -2.19 -1.76 -3.77
(1.20) (-0.28) (-1.18) (-0.62) (-0.77)
Panel C: June observations only (N = 39,045)
EoP net trades+ (%) 2.13∗∗∗ -0.16 -1.29 -1.68 -7.14∗∗∗
(2.70) (-0.34) (-1.50) (-1.11) (-2.66)
EoP net trades− (%) 0.80 -0.55 -1.13 0.09 1.67
(0.78) (-1.02) (-1.21) (0.04) (0.55)
Panel D: All observations except June and December (N = 211,662)
EoP net trades+ (%) 2.06∗∗∗ -1.14∗∗∗ -0.21 0.15 1.83
(3.79) (-3.51) (-0.36) (0.15) (1.46)
EoP net trades− (%) 0.53 -0.00 -0.29 -0.29 0.53
(0.94) (-0.01) (-0.47) (-0.27) (0.40)
Panel E: All observations (N = 289,720)
EoP net trades+ (%) 2.12∗∗∗ -0.92∗∗∗ 0.31 0.66 2.28∗
(3.91) (-2.84) (0.55) (0.66) (1.84)
EoP net trades− (%) 0.46 0.20 0.20 0.03 0.71
(0.83) (0.60) (0.33) (0.03) (0.54)
June*EoP net trades+ (%) -0.10 0.87 -2.36∗∗ -2.38 -6.35∗∗∗
(-0.11) (1.60) (-2.46) (-1.39) (-3.06)
June*EoP net trades− (%) -0.10 -0.91 -1.54 2.00 2.34
(-0.09) (-1.51) (-1.49) (0.97) (1.03)
December*EoP net trades+ (%) 1.79 -1.39∗ -5.07∗∗∗ -8.87∗∗∗ -12.4∗∗∗
(1.48) (-1.72) (-3.45) (-3.58) (-4.25)
December*EoP net trades− (%) 2.01 -0.77 -2.23 -1.42 1.29
(1.27) (-0.82) (-1.22) (-0.50) (0.37)
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Stock fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
172
Ta
bl
e
8:
E
nd
-o
f-
pe
ri
od
tr
ad
es
,s
to
ck
re
tu
rn
s
an
d
liq
ui
di
ty
T
hi
s
ta
bl
e
re
po
rt
s
O
LS
re
gr
es
sio
n
co
effi
ci
en
ts
re
la
tin
g
ea
ch
st
oc
k’
s
po
sit
iv
e
en
d-
of
-p
er
io
d
(E
oP
)
ne
t
tr
ad
es
to
4-
fa
ct
or
al
ph
as
ar
ou
nd
th
e
en
d
of
fu
nd
s’
re
po
rt
in
g
pe
rio
ds
.
T
he
Eo
P
ne
t
tr
ad
e
m
ea
su
re
is
de
fin
ed
in
Se
ct
io
n
3.
2.
2
an
d
ca
pt
ur
es
th
e
im
pu
te
d
vo
lu
m
e
of
to
ta
lp
ur
ch
as
es
le
ss
to
ta
ls
al
es
fo
r
a
gi
ve
n
st
oc
k
in
du
ce
d
by
ou
r
sa
m
pl
e
fu
nd
s
in
th
e
la
st
th
re
e
da
ys
of
th
ei
r
re
po
rt
in
g
pe
rio
d.
Eo
P
ne
t
tr
ad
es
+
co
nt
ai
n
al
lp
os
iti
ve
Eo
P
ne
t
tr
ad
es
.
T
he
re
gr
es
sio
n
re
su
lts
re
po
rt
ed
in
Pa
ne
l
A
(B
)
ar
e
ba
se
d
on
al
l(
on
ly
Ju
ne
an
d
D
ec
em
be
r)
ob
se
rv
at
io
ns
.
T
he
re
sp
ec
tiv
e
va
ria
bl
e
in
ea
ch
ro
w
is
us
ed
to
sp
lit
th
e
sa
m
pl
e
in
to
tw
o
su
b-
sa
m
pl
es
co
nt
ai
ni
ng
on
ly
ob
se
rv
at
io
ns
ab
ov
e
(le
ft)
an
d
be
lo
w
(r
ig
ht
)
th
e
m
ed
ia
n
va
lu
e
in
a
gi
ve
n
m
on
th
.
4-
fa
ct
or
al
ph
as
ar
e
co
m
pu
te
d
us
in
g
ea
ch
st
oc
k’
s
be
ta
s
to
th
e
(i)
th
e
m
ar
ke
t,
(ii
)
siz
e,
(ii
i)
va
lu
e-
to
-b
oo
k
an
d
(iv
)
m
om
en
tu
m
fa
ct
or
w
hi
ch
ar
e
es
tim
at
ed
us
in
g
th
e
pr
ev
io
us
25
0
tr
ad
in
g
da
ys
.
T
-V
al
ue
s
ar
e
re
po
rt
ed
in
pa
re
nt
he
se
s.
St
an
da
rd
er
ro
rs
ar
e
he
te
ro
sk
ed
as
tic
ity
ro
bu
st
an
d
cl
us
te
re
d
at
th
e
st
oc
k
le
ve
l.
*,
**
,*
**
in
di
ca
te
sig
ni
fic
an
ce
at
th
e
10
%
,5
%
an
d
1%
le
ve
ls
re
sp
ec
tiv
el
y.
4-
fa
ct
or
al
ph
as
(%
)
St
oc
k
ob
se
rv
at
io
ns
ab
ov
e
m
ed
ia
n
St
oc
k
ob
se
rv
at
io
ns
be
lo
w
m
ed
ia
n
[t
−
3,
t]
[t,
t
+
1]
[t,
t
+
3]
[t,
t
+
10
]
[t,
t
+
30
]
[t
−
3,
t]
[t,
t
+
1]
[t,
t
+
3]
[t,
t
+
10
]
[t,
t
+
30
]
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
(9
)
(1
0)
P
an
el
A
:E
oP
ne
t
tr
ad
es
+
co
effi
ci
en
t
ba
se
d
on
al
lm
on
th
s.
St
oc
ks
ar
e
sp
lit
al
on
g
th
e
m
ed
ia
n
of
th
e
st
oc
ks
’..
.
M
ar
ke
t
ca
p
1.
3∗
∗
-0
.9
∗∗
∗
-0
.2
-1
.0
0.
1
3.
1∗
∗∗
-0
.5
-0
.7
0.
6
-2
.9
(2
.5
5)
(-
2.
87
)
(-
0.
32
)
(-
1.
07
)
(0
.0
7)
(4
.7
0)
(-
1.
15
)
(-
1.
01
)
(0
.4
8)
(-
1.
32
)
Tr
ad
in
g
vo
lu
m
e
2.
1∗
∗∗
-1
.0
∗∗
∗
-0
.4
-0
.2
-0
.2
3.
2∗
∗∗
-0
.1
-0
.2
0.
4
-1
.7
(4
.2
8)
(-
3.
25
)
(-
0.
66
)
(-
0.
22
)
(-
0.
10
)
(4
.6
5)
(-
0.
15
)
(-
0.
20
)
(0
.3
4)
(-
0.
77
)
A
m
ih
ud
ill
iq
ui
di
ty
3.
8∗
∗∗
-0
.2
-0
.3
0.
9
-1
.9
1.
6∗
∗∗
-1
.0
∗∗
∗
-0
.3
-0
.7
0.
4
(5
.3
4)
(-
0.
58
)
(-
0.
44
)
(0
.6
8)
(-
0.
83
)
(3
.2
6)
(-
3.
42
)
(-
0.
56
)
(-
0.
76
)
(0
.2
6)
R
el
at
iv
e
bi
d-
as
k
2.
7∗
∗∗
-0
.3
-0
.3
1.
3
-3
.5
1.
1∗
∗
-0
.6
∗
-0
.8
-2
.1
∗∗
-3
.0
∗
(3
.6
6)
(-
0.
82
)
(-
0.
45
)
(0
.9
2)
(-
1.
44
)
(2
.3
8)
(-
1.
89
)
(-
1.
49
)
(-
2.
32
)
(-
1.
87
)
Bi
d-
as
k
pr
ox
y
2.
9∗
∗∗
-0
.8
∗∗
-0
.9
-0
.3
-2
.1
1.
5∗
∗∗
-0
.8
∗∗
-0
.9
∗
-2
.2
∗∗
-3
.6
∗∗
(4
.5
9)
(-
2.
22
)
(-
1.
32
)
(-
0.
28
)
(-
0.
99
)
(3
.3
3)
(-
2.
54
)
(-
1.
81
)
(-
2.
50
)
(-
2.
36
)
P
an
el
B
:E
oP
ne
t
tr
ad
es
+
co
effi
ci
en
t
ba
se
d
on
Ju
ne
an
d
D
ec
em
be
r
on
ly
.
St
oc
ks
ar
e
sp
lit
al
on
g
th
e
m
ed
ia
n
of
th
e
st
oc
ks
’..
.
M
ar
ke
t
ca
p
0.
7
-1
.4
∗∗
∗
-2
.6
∗∗
∗
-3
.9
∗∗
-6
.2
∗∗
5.
1∗
∗∗
0.
6
0.
3
-0
.1
-1
2.
3∗
∗∗
(0
.9
5)
(-
3.
02
)
(-
2.
93
)
(-
2.
54
)
(-
2.
50
)
(4
.7
3)
(0
.7
9)
(0
.2
1)
(-
0.
06
)
(-
3.
41
)
Tr
ad
in
g
Vo
lu
m
e
2.
1∗
∗∗
-1
.3
∗∗
∗
-2
.1
∗∗
-3
.0
∗
-7
.6
∗∗
∗
4.
5∗
∗∗
0.
9
1.
0
0.
4
-7
.4
∗∗
(2
.9
6)
(-
2.
77
)
(-
2.
32
)
(-
1.
87
)
(-
2.
84
)
(4
.0
0)
(1
.2
8)
(0
.7
5)
(0
.2
0)
(-
2.
06
)
A
m
ih
ud
ill
iq
ui
di
ty
5.
2∗
∗∗
0.
6
0.
1
1.
4
-6
.8
∗
1.
4∗
∗
-1
.5
∗∗
∗
-1
.7
∗∗
-3
.5
∗∗
-8
.3
∗∗
∗
(4
.4
1)
(0
.8
3)
(0
.0
8)
(0
.6
2)
(-
1.
72
)
(2
.0
8)
(-
3.
23
)
(-
1.
97
)
(-
2.
27
)
(-
3.
29
)
R
el
at
iv
e
bi
d-
as
k
4.
1∗
∗∗
1.
3
0.
0
-0
.1
-1
2.
3∗
∗∗
1.
3∗
∗
-0
.8
∗
-1
.5
∗
-2
.4
-5
.8
∗∗
(3
.2
5)
(1
.5
6)
(0
.0
3)
(-
0.
03
)
(-
2.
80
)
(2
.0
2)
(-
1.
88
)
(-
1.
71
)
(-
1.
58
)
(-
2.
29
)
Bi
d-
as
k
pr
ox
y
3.
3∗
∗∗
0.
8
-0
.2
-1
.3
-1
0.
4∗
∗∗
2.
0∗
∗∗
-0
.9
∗∗
-2
.0
∗∗
-2
.9
∗∗
-5
.5
∗∗
(3
.0
9)
(1
.2
0)
(-
0.
17
)
(-
0.
62
)
(-
2.
83
)
(2
.9
8)
(-
2.
00
)
(-
2.
44
)
(-
2.
07
)
(-
2.
30
)
Eo
P
ne
t
tr
ad
es
−
in
cl
ud
ed
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
T
im
e
fix
ed
eff
ec
ts
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
St
oc
k
fix
ed
eff
ec
ts
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
173
Table 9: EoP trades & price reversal across fund characteristics
This table reports OLS regression coefficients relating end-of-period (EoP) net trades to
4-factor alphas around the end of funds’ reporting periods. For each variable of Panel A to
E, we compute EoP net trades+high(low) by aggregating all EoP fund buys net of all EoP
fund sales over those funds with the variable above (below) its median value. Thus, we split
EoP net trades+into two consistent parts coming from the same number of funds: those
that score high vs. low along the five fund characteristics in Panels A to E. The EoP fund
buy (sale) measure is defined in Section 3.2.1 and captures the total purchase (sale) volume
for a given fund during the last three days of the fund’s reporting period. 4-factor alphas are
computed using each stock’s betas to the (i) the market, (ii) size, (iii) value-to-book and (iv)
momentum factor which are estimated using the previous 250 trading days. The regression
results reported are based on June and December observations in the sample period 1998-
2011. T-Values are reported in parentheses. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust
and clustered at the stock level. *,**,*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels
respectively.
4-factor alphas (%)
[t− 3, t] [t, t+ 1] [t, t+ 3] [t, t+ 10] [t, t+ 15] [t, t+ 30]
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: BHRG
EoP net trades+high 3.81∗∗∗ -0.15 -1.36 -3.04∗ -5.23∗∗ -9.80∗∗∗
(4.37) (-0.28) (-1.33) (-1.74) (-2.44) (-3.17)
EoP net trades+low 1.81∗ -1.31∗∗ -2.38∗∗ -2.34 -5.57∗∗ -9.14∗∗∗
(1.84) (-1.99) (-1.98) (-1.11) (-2.36) (-2.90)
p-value(high = low) 0.13 0.18 0.52 0.80 0.92 0.88
Panel B: Rankgap
EoP net trades+high 2.20∗∗ -1.75∗∗∗ -5.08∗∗∗ -8.16∗∗∗ -9.90∗∗∗ -14.2∗∗∗
(2.11) (-2.67) (-3.93) (-3.91) (-3.94) (-3.75)
EoP net trades+low 3.43∗∗∗ 0.03 -0.33 -0.71 -3.63∗ -8.43∗∗∗
(4.20) (0.06) (-0.34) (-0.42) (-1.84) (-3.07)
p-value(high = low) 0.36 0.04 0.00 0.01 0.05 0.22
Panel C: Last day fund return
EoP net trades+high 4.22∗∗∗ -0.70 -2.32∗∗ -2.74 -6.48∗∗∗ -10.2∗∗∗
(4.74) (-1.18) (-2.10) (-1.50) (-2.93) (-3.25)
EoP net trades+low 1.60∗ -0.21 -1.36 -2.09 -3.44 -9.24∗∗∗
(1.67) (-0.36) (-1.27) (-1.08) (-1.51) (-2.88)
p-value(high = low) 0.05 0.55 0.53 0.81 0.34 0.83
Panel D: 3-month fund flows
EoP net trades+high 2.75∗∗∗ -0.89∗ -2.14∗∗ -1.81 -4.85∗∗ -8.76∗∗∗
(3.53) (-1.73) (-2.22) (-1.10) (-2.50) (-3.13)
EoP net trades+low 3.26∗∗∗ 0.16 -0.71 -4.67∗∗ -6.34∗∗ -11.9∗∗∗
(2.68) (0.21) (-0.52) (-2.00) (-2.24) (-3.09)
p-value(high = low) 0.73 0.27 0.40 0.33 0.67 0.52
EoP net trades−included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Stock fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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A.3 Variable definitions
Table A.I: Variable Definitions
Variable Name Definition Source
End-of-period (EoP) trading measures:
EoP fund buysit Payables for instruments purchased of fund i
at day t.
NSAR
EoP fund salesit Receivables from instruments sold of fund i
at day t.
NSAR
Shares boughtijt Quarterly increase in stock j’s shares by fund i
reported at t.
Thom
Shares soldijt Quarterly decrease in stock j’s shares by fund i
reported at t.
Thom
EoP stock buysjt Obtained for stock j at day t by the following formula:∑i
EoP fund buysi,t
Mcapjt
· Shares boughtijt·pricejt∑k Shares boughtikt·pricekt
NSAR,
Thom
EoP stock salesjt Obtained for stock j at day t by the following formula:∑i
EoP fund salesi,t
Mcapjt
· Shares soldijt·pricejt∑k Shares soldikt·pricekt
NSAR,
Thom
EoP total tradesjt Sum of EoP stock buys and sales of stock j at day t. NSAR,
Thom
EoP net tradesjt Difference between stock j’s EoP stock buys and sales
at day t.
NSAR,
Thom
EoP net trades+jt Maximum of 0 and stock j’s EoP net trades
at day t.
NSAR,
Thom
EoP net trades-jt Minimum of 0 and stock j’s EoP net trades at day t,
multiplied by -1.
NSAR,
Thom
Fund characteristics:
3-month fund flowsit Sum of monthly netflows over the past three months
divided by TNA of the previous quarter, where
monthly netflows are computed for fund i at time
t by the following formula:
TNAi,t − TNAi,t−1 · (1 + Fund returni,t)
CRSPF
Continued on next page
175
Table A.I: continued from previous page
Variable Name Definition Source
Fund 4-factor alphait Fund returni,t −
4∑
k=1
factor returnk,t ∗ βj,k,t, where
βj,k,t is computed for fund i at time t over the past
250 trading days. The subscript k is used as a label
for the following four factors: (i) market, (ii) size, (iii)
value-to-book and (iv) momentum factor.
CRSPF,
FF
Winner proportionit Percentage of assets invested by fund i at time t in
stocks whose returns over the last quarter were in the
top quintile of all sample stocks.
CRSPF,S,
Thom
Loser proportionit Percentage of assets invested by fund i at time t in
stocks whose returns over the last quarter were in the
bottom quintile of all sample stocks.
CRSPF,S,
Thom
Rankgapit Return rankit − Winner rankit+loser rankit2 /200,
where winner (loser) rank is computed by assigning
a rank to fund i at time t after sorting all sample
funds according to each fund’s winner (loser) propor-
tion. The rank ranges from 1 to 100 and is highest for
funds with the lowest winner (highest loser) propor-
tion. Similarly, the return rank ranges from 1 (high-
est) to 100 (lowest) and is based on quarterly fund
returns.
CRSPF,S,
Thom
BHRGit Quarterly return of a hypothetical portfolio compris-
ing fund i’s end-of-quarter holdings at time t less the
actual fund return over the quarter.
CRSPF,S,
Thom
Stock characteristics:
Trading volumejt Average of three day trading volume of stock j over
the quarter ending at time t.
CRSPS
Adj. EoP trading voljt Difference between the dollar value of shares traded at
the last three days of a period and the average three
day dollar volume of stock j over 20 days surrounding
the reporting date t, scaled by the stock’s total shares
outstanding.
CRSPS
Continued on next page
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Table A.I: continued from previous page
Variable Name Definition Source
Alphajt Stock returnj,t − factor returnk,t ∗ βj,k,t, where βj,k,t
is computed for stock j at time t over the past 250
trading days. The subscript k is used as a label for
the market factor.
CRSPS,
FF
4-factor alphajt Stock returnj,t −
4∑
k=1
factor returnk,t ∗ βj,k,t, where
βj,k,t is computed for stock j at time t over the past
250 trading days. The subscript k is used as a label
for the following four factors: (i) market, (ii) size, (iii)
value-to-book and (iv) momentum factor.
CRSPS,
FF
Systematic riskjt The coefficient of the market factor of stock j at time
t, when regressing the returns of the stock over the
past 250 trading days on the market factor.
CRSPS,
FF
Idiosyncratic riskjt The variance of the residuals of stock j at time t,
obtained when regressing the returns of the stock over
the past 250 trading days on the market factor.
CRSPS,
FF
Ret. autocorrelationjt The autocorrelation of stock j’ returns over the last
quarter ending at time t.
CRSPS
Rel. bid-askjt Average of daily relative bid-ask spreads of stock j
over the quarter ending at time t, where the daily
relative bid-ask spreads are calculated by the follow-
ing formula: Ask−Bid(Ask+Bid)/2 .
CRSPS
Amihud illiquidityjt Average of daily illiquidity of stock j over the last
quarter ending at time t, where the daily stock illi-
iqudity is calculated by the following formula:
|Stockreturn|
(Dollar amount of shares trades)/2 .
CRSPS
Bid-ask proxyjt Average of daily bid-ask spread proxies of stock j over
the quarter ending at time t, where the daily bid-ask
spread proxies are calculated by the formula docu-
mented in Corwin and Schultz (2012).
CRSPS
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A.4 Supplementary results
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